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We are what we believe we are.
– C.S. Lewis
Set your life on fire. Seek those who fan your flames.
– Rumi

Abstract
Technology downscaling has increased the hardware’s overall susceptibility
to random hardware faults to the point where they became non-negligible.
Hence, current and future computing systems must be appropriately de-
signed to cope with errors in order to provide a dependable service and
correct functionality. Dependability has many facets to be addressed when
designing a system and that is specially challenging in mixed-critical real-
time systems, where safety standards play an important role and where
responding in time can be as important as responding correctly or even
responding at all. Moreover, future mixed-critical multi- and many-core
platforms requires sufficient independence among the applications with dif-
ferent requirements and criticalities that co-exist in the system, further
intensifying the challenge.
Cross-layer fault-tolerance solutions are the key to effectively and ef-
ficiently achieve dependability in future mixed-critical real-time systems.
The thesis addresses the dependability of mixed-critical real-time systems,
considering three important requirements: integrity, resilience and real-
time. More specifically, it looks into the architectural and performance
aspects of achieving dependability, concentrating its scope on error detec-
tion and handling in hardware – more specifically in the Network-on-Chip
(NoC), the backbone of modern MPSoC – and on the performance of error
handling and recovery in software.
The thesis starts by looking at the impacts of random hardware faults
on the NoC and on the system, with special focus on soft errors. Then,
it addresses the uncovered weaknesses in the NoC by proposing a resilient
NoC for mixed-critical real-time systems that is able to provide a highly
reliable service with transparent protection for the applications. With a
strong fault containment and a resilient router design, the proposed ap-
proach limits the impacts of errors in time and in space, resulting in a
NoC that is highly available but lossy under errors. The reliable trans-
port of data is then achieved in the upper layers of the network stack by
ARQ-based protocols with real-time guarantees. The formal communica-
6tion time analysis of common ARQ protocols is modeled for NoCs and
includes a novel ARQ-based protocol optimized for DMAs.
After addressing the efficient use of ARQ-based protocols in NoCs, the
thesis proposes the Advanced Integrity Q-service (AIQ) approach. AIQ is
a low-overhead mechanism to achieve integrity and real-time guarantees of
NoC transactions on an End-to-End (E2E) basis. Inspired by transactions
in distributed systems, the mechanism differs from the previous approach
in that it does not provide error recovery in hardware but delegates the
task to software, making use of existing functionality in cross-layer fault-
tolerance solutions.
Finally, the thesis addresses error handling in software as seen in cross-
layer approaches. It addresses the performance of replicated software ex-
ecution in many-core platforms. Replicated software execution provides
protection to the system against random hardware faults. It relies on
hardware-supported error detection and error handling in software. The
replica-aware co-scheduling is proposed to achieve high performance with
replicated execution, which is not possible with standard real-time sched-
ulers.
Kurzfassung
Die fortschreitende Miniaturisierung der Halbleitertechnik hat die Anfa¨l-
ligkeit von Hardware gegenu¨ber zufa¨lligen Fehlern so weit erho¨ht, dass sie
nicht mehr vernachla¨ssigbar sind. Um einen zuverla¨ssigen Betrieb und
korrekte Funktionalita¨t zu gewa¨hrleisten, mu¨ssen aktuelle und zuku¨nftige
Computersysteme so ausgelegt werden, dass sie mit diesen Fehlern umge-
hen ko¨nnen. Zuverla¨ssigkeit hat viele Aspekte, die bei der Entwicklung
eines Systems beru¨cksichtigt werden mu¨ssen. Das gilt insbesondere fu¨r
Echtzeitsysteme mit gemischter Kritikalita¨t, bei denen Sicherheitsstan-
dards, die ein korrektes und rechtzeitiges Verhalten fordern, eine wichtige
Rolle spielen. Daru¨ber hinaus erfordern zuku¨nftige Multi- und Many-Core-
Plattformen eine ausreichende Unabha¨ngigkeit zwischen Anwendungen mit
unterschiedlichen Anforderungen und Kritikalita¨ten, die im System neben-
einander existieren, wodurch die Herausforderung weiter erho¨ht wird.
Cross-Layer-Fehlertoleranzlo¨sungen sind der Schlu¨ssel, um effektiv und
effizient die Zuverla¨ssigkeit von zuku¨nftigen gemischt-kritischen Echtzeit-
systemen zu erreichen. Diese Dissertation befasst sich mit der Zuverla¨ssig-
keit von gemischt-kritischen Echtzeitsystemen unter Beru¨cksichtigung von
drei wichtigen Anforderungen: Integrita¨t, Resilienz und Echtzeit. Genauer
gesagt, behandelt sie Architektur- und Leistungsaspekte die notwendig sind
um Zuverla¨ssigkeit zu erreichen, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf der Fehler-
erkennung und -behandlung in der Hardware – genauer gesagt im Network-
on-Chip (NoC), dem Ru¨ckgrat des modernen MPSoC – und auf der Leis-
tung der Fehlerbehandlung und -behebung in der Software liegt.
Die Arbeit beginnt mit der Untersuchung der Auswirkung von zufa¨lligen
Hardwarefehlern auf das NoC und das System, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf
weichen Fehler (soft errors) liegt. Anschließend werden die aufgedeckten
Schwachstellen im NoC behoben, indem ein widerstandsfa¨higes NoC fu¨r
gemischt-kritische Echtzeitsysteme vorgeschlagen wird, das in der Lage ist,
einen ho¨chst zuverla¨ssigen Betrieb mit transparentem Schutz fu¨r die An-
wendungen zu bieten. Mit einer starken Fehlerbegrenzung und einem ro-
busten Router-Design begrenzt die vorgeschlagene Methode die Auswirkun-
8gen von Fehlern in Zeit und Raum, was zu einem hochverfu¨gbaren NoC
fu¨hrt, dass aber verlustbehaftet bei auftretenden Fehlern ist. Der zu-
verla¨ssige Transport der Daten erfolgt in den oberen Schichten des Netzw-
erkstacks durch ARQ-basierte Protokolle mit Echtzeitgarantie. Die formale
Kommunikationszeitanalyse ga¨ngiger ARQ-Protokolle ist fu¨r NoCs model-
liert und beinhaltet ein neuartiges, fu¨r DMAs optimiertes ARQ-basiertes
Protokoll.
Nach der Auseinandersetzung mit der effizienten Nutzung von ARQ-
basierten Protokolle in NoCs, wird die Advanced Integrity Q-Service (AIQ)
Methode vorgestellt. AIQ ist ein Mechanismus mit geringem Overhead,
um Integrita¨t und Echtzeit-Garantien von NoC-Transaktionen auf Ende-
zu-Ende (E2E)-Basis zu erreichen. Inspiriert von Transaktionen in verteil-
ten Systemen unterscheidet sich der Mechanismus vom bisherigen Konzept
dadurch, dass er keine Fehlerbehebung in der Hardware vorsieht, sondern
diese Aufgabe an die Software delegiert und dabei die vorhandene Funk-
tionalita¨t in schichtu¨bergreifenden Fehlertoleranzlo¨sungen nutzt.
Schließlich befasst sich die Dissertation mit der Fehlerbehandlung in
Software, wie sie in schichtu¨bergreifenden Methoden zu sehen ist. Sie be-
handelt die Leistung der replizierten Software-Ausfu¨hrung in Many-Core-
Plattformen. Replizierte Software-Ausfu¨hrung schu¨tzt das System vor
zufa¨lligen Hardwarefehlern. Es setzt auf hardwaregestu¨tzte Fehlererken-
nung und Fehlerbehandlung in der Software. Das Replika-bewusste Co-
Scheduling wird vorgeschlagen, um eine hohe Performance bei replizierter
Ausfu¨hrung zu erreichen, was mit Standard-Echtzeit-Schedulern nicht mo¨g-
lich ist.
Contents
1. Introduction 13
1.1. Multi- and many-core real-time systems . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.2. Network-on-Chip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3. Dependability challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.4. Threats to dependability: random hardware faults . . . . . 20
1.5. Attaining dependability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.5.1. Fault-tolerant system architecture . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.5.2. Error detection vs. error recovery . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.6. Research objective and contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.7. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2. The Impact of Soft Errors 31
2.1. Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.2. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) . . . . . . . . . 34
2.2.1. FMEA-based analysis methodology for NoCs . . . . 35
2.2.2. Qualitative and quantitative extension . . . . . . . . 36
2.3. Impact of soft errors on NoCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.3.1. Local and global effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.3.2. Effects characterization and probabilities . . . . . . 40
2.3.3. Assessment of uncovered effects . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.3.4. Early exploration of analysis-enabled resilience im-
provement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.4. Impact of soft errors on the system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.5. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3. Designing a Resilient NoC 51
3.1. Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.2. Overview of the proposed architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3. Fault containment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3.1. Containing corrupt flits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3.2. Containing derouted flits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
10 Contents
3.4. Resilient router design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.4.1. Pre-processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4.2. Input buffer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4.3. Crossbar switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4.4. Switch arbiter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4.5. Virtual channel access controller . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4.6. Link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5. Between lower and upper layers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.6. Reliable transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.7. Experimental evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.7.1. Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.7.2. Performance under errors: random traffic . . . . . . 69
3.7.3. Performance under errors: FMS use case . . . . . . . 74
3.7.4. Implementation overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.8. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4. ARQ Protocols for NoCs 81
4.1. Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.2. Modeling end-to-end transport protocols . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2.1. Compositional Performance Analysis (CPA) . . . . . 84
4.2.2. Transport and network layer modeling . . . . . . . . 85
4.2.3. Interface with the underlying NoC analysis . . . . . 89
4.3. Formal analysis of ARQ protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.3.1. Stop-and-Wait ARQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.3.2. Go-Back-N ARQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.3.3. DMA ARQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.4. Experimental evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.4.1. General traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.4.2. DMA traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.4.3. Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.5. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5. A Low-overhead Fault-tolerant NoC 111
5.1. Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.2. The AIQ approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.2.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.2.2. Transactions in the NoC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.2.3. Error model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.2.4. Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Contents 11
5.2.5. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.3. Formal analysis of AIQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.3.1. Modeling in CPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.3.2. Formal analysis: the error-free case . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.3.3. Formal analysis: the error case . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.4. Experimental evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.4.1. Performance evaluation: benchmark applications . . 134
5.4.2. Performance evaluation: avionics use case . . . . . . 135
5.4.3. Implementation overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.4.4. Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.5. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6. Replica-aware Co-scheduling for Mixed-criticality 149
6.1. Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.2. The proposed approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.2.1. System model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.2.2. Task model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
6.2.3. Error model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
6.2.4. Offsets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6.3. Formal response-time analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
6.3.1. Fork-join tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
6.3.2. Independent tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
6.3.3. Error recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
6.4. Experimental evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
6.4.1. Evaluation with benchmark applications . . . . . . . 169
6.4.2. Evaluation with synthetic workload . . . . . . . . . . 172
6.5. Cross-layer integration discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
6.6. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
7. Conclusion 179
A. Protocol Definitions 183
A.1. Stop-and-Wait ARQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
A.2. Go-Back-N ARQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
A.2.1. Formal analysis: the error-free case . . . . . . . . . . 187
A.2.2. Formal analysis: the error case . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
A.3. DMA ARQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
12 Contents
B. List of Publications 193
B.1. Publications related to this thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
B.1.1. Reviewed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
B.1.2. Under review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
B.1.3. Unreviewed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
B.2. Publications not related to this thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
1. Introduction
Embedded systems are ubiquitous nowadays. Seen or unseen, they are
everywhere, from kitchen appliances and healthcare gadgets to medical and
military devices. It is extremely difficult to picture a life in modern days
without daily contact with an embedded system, except due to extreme
lifestyles or due to the lack of choice. Embedded systems are information
processing systems embedded into enclosing products [97]. A real-time
embedded system is one that additionally must react within precise time
constraints to events in the environment [24], in other words, where actions
are constrained in time.
Real-time embedded systems can be divided into soft and hard real-time
systems depending on how serious it is to miss a task deadline, i.e., to
violate its timing constraints [47, 93]. A timing constraint is hard when
the consequence of missing a deadline is fatal, a late response is useless and
unacceptable. A timing constraint is soft when the consequence of missing
a deadline is undesirable but tolerable. A soft real-time system is then
a system with only soft timing constraints. A hard real-time system is a
system with at least one hard timing constraint and may also contain soft
timing constraints.
Systems are safety relevant when they control or at least potentially im-
pact the functional safety of any application [46]. Thus, hard real-time
embedded systems are almost always also safety-critical systems. The in-
verse is always true – i.e., a safety-critical system is a hard real-time sys-
tem. Examples of applications are the Flight Management System (FMS),
Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS) and autonomous driving, in
the aerospace and automotive industries, respectively. Due to the impacts
of a failure, such systems are required to be certified, proving that the
processing architecture is capable of meeting the specified safety goals.
The certification processes and goals are defined in standards such as the
IEC 61508 [69] and the domain-specific counter-parts ISO 26262, for au-
tomotive electric/electronic systems [72], and DO-254, for airborne elec-
tronic hardware [35]. The standards also define up to five criticality levels
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called Safety Integrity Levels (SILs), Automotive Safety and Integrity Lev-
els (ASILs) and Design Assurance Levels (DALs), respectively. The proof
usually requires a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [68], which
systematically captures all potential faults and their effects, which must be
appropriately addressed.
Demanded by the market, increasingly complex new functionalities are
being implemented by such safety-critical systems nowadays. Automotive
vehicles and aircrafts contain a number of safety-relevant functions and
many others that are not, the so-called comfort functions [46]. In order to
meet stringent non-functional requirements w.r.t. cost, space, weight and
power consumption, such systems are evolving into complex mixed-critical
systems where components with different criticality levels are integrated
into a common hardware platform [22]. That raises yet another crucial
safety requirement, the sufficient independence [72], which requires a func-
tion not to be affected by the misbehavior or failure of another function
in the system. Moreover, complex functionalities of future systems require
the appropriate computational power and high speed communication to
process the large amounts of information and images of demanding appli-
cations such as FMS and autonomous driving. Those factors have con-
tributed to a migration from single-core platforms to multi-cores and to
future many-core architectures [103, 22].
1.1. Multi- and many-core real-time systems
Multi- and many-core processors have been widely adopted by the server
and consumer electronics markets. They present better performance and
are more efficient with respect to power, area and cost than single-cores.
Such processors are currently being evaluated for embedded markets as
real-time safety-critical systems [103]. Not only do they allow the inte-
gration of multiple applications in a single chip but they also provide the
performance required to implement the increasingly complex functionali-
ties demanded by the market. Nonetheless, the migration from single to
multi and many-cores in the the real-time domain is complex and has been
the subject of research for years. As pointed out by Burns and Davis,
the fundamental research question has been “reconciling the conflicting re-
quirements of partitioning for (safety) assurance and sharing for efficient
resource usage”. That has given rise to research platforms that investigate
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a range of techniques and mechanisms specifically for the mixed-critical
real-time domain [46, 14], such as CompSOC [54] and the Integrated De-
pendable Architecture for Many-Cores (IDAMC) [103, 150].
The IDAMC is a research platform developed at the Institute of Com-
puter and Network Engineering at TU Braunschweig, Braunschweig, Ger-
many. IDAMC has been used to prototype and evaluate several techniques
and mechanisms addressing such as predictable memory access scheduling
[42], shared resource management [84], and Quality-of-Service (QoS) of on-
Chip traffic [32]. This platform has been widely used as a starting point
for the experiments reported in this thesis. Figure 1.1 gives an overview
of IDAMC. The many-core platform features up to 64 nodes. Each node
is composed of a router and up to 4 tiles, which can be, e.g., a process-
ing element, hardware accelerator or a memory controller. The routers are
connected to each other forming a network, a Network-on-Chip (NoC), and
are connected to the tiles with network interfaces.
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Figure 1.1.: Overview of the IDAMC many-core platform.
Many-core platforms have also been commercially available for some
time. They target high-throughput applications such as networking, mul-
timedia and storage. Although not widely used in production of safety-
critical real-time systems, companies are actively involved in research to-
wards meeting the stringent requirements of those systems. Examples are
Kalray’s Massively Parallel Processor Array (MPPA) R© many-core proces-
sor family [77] and Mellanox’s TILE-Gx36TM and TILE-Gx72TM [100]. As
an illustrative example, the processor block diagram of TILE-Gx8072TM
is shown in Figure 1.2. The processor features 72 64-bit cores, each with
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split 32+32KB L1 caches, one 256KB L2 cache, and a maximum frequency
of 1.2GHz. A shared, coherent 18MB L3 cache is also included along
with 4 DDR3 controllers. For networking and system integration, the chip
includes USB, I2C, SPI, UART and JTAG interfaces as well as 10Gbps
XAUI and SGMII ports. The cores, interfaces and ports are connected by
an iMesh interconnect consisting of five independent low-latency NoCs.
Figure 1.2.: TILE-Gx8072TM processor block diagram [100].
1.2. Network-on-Chip
To handle the high-bandwidth requirements of such complex platforms, the
NoC was developed as the scalable interconnect solution [15]. NoCs over-
came the limitations of buses, which quickly became the bottleneck as de-
signs grew in size and complexity, and they are the interconnect to be found
in modern multi- and many-core processors and Systems-on-Chip (SoCs)
[15]. NoCs provides for easier wire routing and easier integration of hetero-
geneous components in modern, large and complex Multiprocessor System-
on-Chip (MPSoC) designs [4]. As an important shared component, the
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NoC concentrates all communication entering, leaving or occurring within
the chip. That includes, e.g., all I/O operations and memory transactions
accessing a memory external to the tiles. Many different types of NoCs
can be found in academia as well as available commercially. Examples of
commercial NoCs are Arteris’ FlexNoC R© [4] and NcoreTM [5], Netspeed’s
Orion [108] and Gemini [107], and Sonics’ family of NoC Intellectual Prop-
erties (IPs) [143]. The work reported in this thesis has been largely based
on the IDA NoC, featured in the research platform IDAMC.
The IDA NoC is a NoC for real-time mixed-critical systems [103]. The
network implements XY deterministic source routing, where the route and
Virtual Channel (VC) are defined at the source; wormhole switching, where
variable-sized packets are composed of fixed-sized Flow Control Units (flits);
and VC flow control, where flits transit through a number of VCs. The
routers implements the SLIP arbitration [99], a two-stage round-robin
scheduler.
The block diagram of the IDA NoC router is depicted in Figure 1.3.
The routers are input-buffered and the input buffer contains a FIFO queue
for each VC. The switch arbiter implements the SLIP arbitration. The
Virtual Channel Access Controller (VCAC) manages the access to VCs in
downstream routers. The crossbar switch connects the input buffers to the
respective output ports according to the arbitration grants. The flits are
then forwarded from the input buffer directly to the downstream router.
The router implements stop-and-wait flow control, raising a stop signal to
inform the near-full state of the VC queues to the upstream router.
Route management is performed before the flit is stored in buffers to keep
the routing data for the next router always in the first position. The route
is encoded as a list of runs, which is a pair: output port (direction) and
number of hops (distance). During a run, the hop counter is decremented.
Once the packet finishes a run, the route is rotated: the finished run is
moved to the end of the list and the next run becomes the head. The
router execution spans a 4-stage pipeline.
The packets have variable size and are composed of a Head Flit (HF),
zero or more Body Flits (BFs), and one Tail Flit (TF). A Single Flit
(SF) packet is also supported. The flit formats are depicted in Figure 1.4.
HFs and SFs (resp. BFs and TFs) are identical except for the flit type,
which distinguishes their semantics. For transmission, a flit may be further
divided in Physical Units (phits) to match the pipeline depth – i.e., 4 phits
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VC Flit Type Route Tile Port PayloadHF/SF
Size 3 bits 2 30 3 102
VC Flit Type PayloadBF/TF
Size 3 bits 2 135
Figure 1.4.: Single (SF), Head (HF), Body (BF) and Tail (TF) flit formats.
of 35 bits, not shown in Figure 1.4.
1.3. Dependability challenge
Besides predictability and efficient resource usage, mixed-critical real-time
systems face yet another challenge: the dependability challenge. Not only
must the system be operating correctly under ideal conditions but must
also continue operating under less-than-ideal conditions. At the same time
that technology downscaling has enabled many-core chips with billions of
transistors, it has also increased the overall system susceptibility to hard-
ware errors to a point where they cannot be neglected in the higher levels
of abstraction anymore [20, 41, 52, 61, 64]. Thus, real-time systems must
ensure not only that the timing constraints are met but also that the de-
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pendability requirements are met, such as defined by standards IEC 61508
[69], ISO 26262 [72] and DO-254 [35].
The possible attributes of a dependable system are: availability, relia-
bility, safety, integrity and maintainability [7]. According with Avizienis
et al., availability is the readiness for correct service; reliability is the conti-
nuity of correct service; safety is the absence of catastrophic consequences
on users and environment; integrity is the absence of improper system al-
terations; and maintainability is the ability to undergo modifications and
repairs. Alternatively, safety is defined by the ISO 26262 standard as the
absence of unreasonable risk [72].
The reliability of components and systems1 is usually quantified by two
important metrics: Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) and Failures in Time
(FIT) [112]. The MTTF is the arithmetic mean of the time it takes for a
non-repairable system to fail, usually expressed in hours [67]. The MTTF
can be obtained as follows [67]:
MTTF =
∫ ∞
0
R(t) dt (1.1)
where R(t) is the reliability in time, also called the survivor function. It
can be expressed as follows2 [67]:
R(t) = e−λ·t (1.2)
where λ is the constant failure rate. The FIT metric measures the number
of failures in a billion hours of device-hour operation [67]. FIT can obtained
from the MTTF, and vice versa, when the latter is given in hours:
FIT =
109
MTTF
(1.3)
Other metrics are also employed, specially in very specific domains, but
are not as relevant as MTTF and FIT, which can also be employed across
domains.
In the sequel, the threats to dependability and its attributes (faults,
errors and failures) are discussed. Afterwards, the means to attain de-
pendability in spite of the threats are discussed.
1A system is a set of components [72].
2Considering an exponential distribution of failures with a constant failure rate λ,
which models well the failures in the useful lifetime of a system [67].
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1.4. Threats to dependability: random hardware
faults
The threats to dependability and its attributes are faults, errors and failures
[7]. According to Avizienis et al., a fault is the cause of an error; the error
is a deviation of the external state of the system from the correct service;
when not handled, an error causes a failure; a failure is then an event
that occurs when the delivered service deviates from the correct service.
Similarly, ISO 26262 [72] defines a fault as an abnormal condition that can
cause the failure of the system; error is a discrepancy between computed
(or observed, measured) value (or condition) and the true (or specified,
theoretically correct) value (or condition); and failure is the termination of
the ability of the system to perform a function as required.
Errors can be caused essentially by faults of three groups regarding their
sources [7]:
• Development faults: occurring during the development (design flaws);
• Physical faults: affecting the hardware; and
• Interaction faults: external faults.
This thesis focuses on physical faults, which are also called random hard-
ware faults by ISO 26262 [72]. It is therefore assumed the absence of de-
velopment and interaction faults, also called systematic faults [72], which
can be achieved by good practices and processes, and design for safety.
Random hardware faults cause errors that can be classified in two types
[52]:
• Soft errors: caused by transient and intermittent faults, they are
events where the data is corrupted (bit-flip) and the device is not
permanently damaged.
– A transient fault occurs once and subsequently disappears; it
is caused, e.g., by electromagnetic interference and Single-event
effects (SEEs).
– An intermittent fault occurs time and time again, then disap-
pears usually in a component that is on the verge of breaking
down due to wear out.
Detailed classification of soft errors is introduced in Chapter 2.
• Hard errors: caused by permanent faults, they are events where the
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Communication
Computation
frequent
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Communication
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rare
Figure 1.5.: Occurrence probability of random hardware faults: computa-
tion vs. communication.
device fails permanently – e.g., a broken network cable due to me-
chanical destruction or a stuck-at fault due to aging.
Different types of faults have different occurrence probability and im-
pacts on different parts of the system. Efficacy and efficiency, therefore,
require them to be tackled with different strategies. Figure 1.5 decomposes
and illustrates the impacts of random hardware faults. Soft errors are by
far the most frequent, occurring orders of magnitude more frequently than
hard ones. By separating soft errors in computation and communication,
one sees that the latter are frequent but not as frequent as the former. In
fact, they are orders of magnitude more frequent. For instance, in automo-
tive Ethernet [21] transmissions are guaranteed to have at most one error
(bit flip) in 1010 transmitted bits – i.e., a Bit Error Rate (BER) lower than
or equal to 10−10. In computation, on the other hand, expected3 BERs are
in the order of 10−12 bit-flips per hour [6]. The design must however con-
sider higher rates (up to 10−9/hour) as a safety margin [91]. Hard errors
are relatively infrequent in both computation and communication. They
usually become perceptible and of importance in systems for high depend-
ability after soft errors are appropriately handled. Once the system is able
to tolerate soft errors, the next limitation in achieving high dependability
are the hard errors.
Random hardware faults are an ever increasing concern in electronic as
well as in system design. Ebrahimi et al. showed that error rates per bit
are decreasing with technology scaling. That contradicts early predictions
[20] that have not been confirmed thanks to improvements in Electronic
design automation (EDA) tools and in the device [41, 88]. Nonetheless,
3BERs derived for sequential and combinational logic [61] with data from [6] for 65nm
CMOS SRAM. Masking effects [41] are not taken into account.
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Figure 1.6.: Reliability of unprotected system.
the size and complexity of designs have been increasing much faster than
the error rates decrease, which has resulted in an overall increased vulner-
ability. Interestingly, it was also shown that the Soft Error Rate (SER)
of combinatorial logic increases with the frequency whereas the SER of
sequential logic decreases with the frequency [41].
To illustrate the importance of such faults in the system, assume a safety-
critical system under development, which must meet a certain reliability
requirement. The first step is to assess its reliability, e.g., by means of its
MTTF. Assume an initially unprotected system consisting of 4 processors,
a memory and a NoC. The exponential distribution is chosen to model
the reliability of the chip during its useful life period [67]. Constant failure
rates due to soft errors λp = 3 ·10−6, λm = 8.35 ·10−3 and λn = 3 ·10−6 are
assumed for each processor, memory and NoC, respectively. Additionally,
a failure rate due to hard errors λh = 10
−7 is assumed for the entire system.
The overall system failure rate can be obtained:
λ = 1− [(1− λp)4 · (1− λm) · (1− λn) · (1− λh)]
= 8.37 · 10−3 (1.4)
The reliability R(t) is then obtained with Equation 1.2 and the failure rate
λ. The resulting reliability function is better visualized in time in the plot
of Figure 1.6. After resolving the integral of Equation 1.1, a MTTF of the
system of 119 hours is obtained. In terms of FITs, obtained with Equa-
tion 1.3, that corresponds to 8.36 ·106 FITs. That is far from the reliability
requirements of safety-critical systems, which usually lie below 100 FITs
for less critical systems and below 1 FIT for highly-critical ones [72, 69].
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1.5. Attaining dependability
Dependability in a system can be attained by different means. According
with Avizienis et al., the means can be grouped in four major categories:
fault prevention, fault tolerance, fault removal and fault forecasting. Fault
prevention refers to prevention by using appropriate hardware processes
and hardware and software development methodologies. Fault tolerance
is carried out via error detection and recovery, which involves many tech-
niques such as fault masking, rollback, rollforward, compensation, diag-
nosis, isolation, reconfiguration, and reinitialization. Error detection can
be carried out preemptively or concurrently – i.e., while activity system is
inactive or during operation. Fault removal refers to the removal of faults
during development through validation and test, and during use through
corrective and proactive maintenance. Fault forecasting refers to quali-
tative and quantitative evaluations of the system behavior. This thesis
focuses on the synergetic application of fault prevention, tolerance and
forecasting techniques
In order to assess the vulnerabilities of the system, qualitative and quan-
titative evaluations of fault forecasting techniques are crucial. Only after
sufficient knowledge on the relevant threats and its impacts on the system
and its users, a meaningful and efficient strategy can be formulated. In
practice, such assessments usually involve an FMEA or an Failure Mode,
Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) [67, 68], as seen in ISO 26262
[72]. The FMEA systematically captures, in a bottom-up approach, all po-
tential faults and their effects by scrutinizing each system component for
its impact, when faulty, on the system behavior. The FMECA extends the
FMEA by assigning criticalities or priorities to effects [67, 68]. Naturally,
such evaluations are also imperative at the end of the project as means to
prove that the required dependability was attained [72]. That is usually
required in certification processes of safety standards [69, 72, 35]. More
details in Chapter 2.
Fault tolerance can then be implemented in a variety of ways that incur
different cost and performance penalty in the system under design. Fault-
tolerant approaches can be classified with respect to the abstraction level
where it handles faults and errors:
• Component-level fault-tolerance approaches;
• System-level fault-tolerance approaches; or
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Figure 1.7.: Example of two instances of reliable systems: the case for cross-
layer solutions.
• A combination of both in a cross-layer approach.
Cross-layer approaches are particularly interesting because they enable
a larger design space where the cost-reliability trade-off can be exploited
with different combinations of techniques. For instance, hardening a sin-
gle component to achieve high reliability might be extremely costly and
inefficient compared to a system-level approach or a combination of both.
Figure 1.7 illustrates the concept with two systems, one with a hardened
instance of a component and another with two instances of the unhardened
component, which can also be a sub-system.
An example of a cross-layer approach is seen in the ASTEROID project
[10, 38], in the frame of which part of the work reported in this thesis
was developed. The project was a member of Deutsche Forschungsgemein-
schaft – German Research Foundation (DFG)’s Priority Program SPP 1500
that focused on cross-layer approaches for dependable embedded systems
[63, 64]. ASTEROID developed a cross-layer fault-tolerance solution for
mixed-criticality that increases the system’s reliability at a higher level of
abstraction without resorting to hardware redundancy [10, 38]. Aiming at
efficiency and off-the-shelf hardware, ASTEROID combined error detec-
tion features in hardware and software with error handling and recovery in
software. More details of the overall approach of ASTEROID is given in
Chapter 6.
Another concept that is highly relevant in this thesis and in the context
of cross-layer approaches is resilience. Resilience can be seen as a form of
fault tolerance [7] and is defined here as the capability to recover from errors
and to resume correct service, tolerating possible data loss. Resilience is
relevant in cross-layer approaches as it allows the use of redundancy in time
in higher layers of abstraction – e.g., packet retransmission or software re-
execution. As seen later in Chapter 2, the lack of resilience prevents the
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use of redundancy in time due to the unavailability of the lower layers due
to errors. Notice, that resilience per se does not ensure the integrity of the
system, which should be achieved by other means.
When designing safety-critical components, sub-systems and systems,
high dependability is recurringly the requirement. Nonetheless, sooner or
later, depending on the failure rate, the component or system inevitably
fails. That raises yet another important feature, which dictates the behav-
ior upon failure:
• Fail-safe behavior; or
• Fail-operational behavior.
In the former, the component or system enters a safe state upon service
interruption. An example thereof is an Electronic Control Unit (ECU) con-
nected to a Controller Area Network (CAN) bus with a CAN transceiver.
When the ECU fails, it fails silently, not flooding the bus and affecting the
performance of the remaining ECUs [98]. In the latter, the component or
system is fault tolerant and continues operating albeit with reduced func-
tionality until transitioning to a safe state. Alternatively, ISO 26262 defines
the fail-operational as an emergency operation mode, which can be trig-
gered by a safety mechanism, with possible service degradation (reduced
functionality, performance or both) for providing safety until a transition
to a safe state is possible [72]. An example of the latter is an ADAS system,
which must continue (at least minimally) operating in spite of a failure un-
til the car has been safely stopped or taken over by a human driver [98].
Thus, the requirement depends on the intended functionality of the com-
ponent in the context of the system – i.e., how it integrates into the system
and interfaces other components.
1.5.1. Fault-tolerant system architecture
Hierarchical system architectures can be used to achieve fault tolerance
and fail-operational behavior. In fact, hierarchical designs are defined by
ISO 26262 as a highly recommendable principle for highly critical systems
(ASIL C and D) and recommendable for the lower critical ones (ASIL A and
B) [72]. Such an architecture comprises two or more subsystems, which may
be identical or not. When identical, it becomes the well-known n-modular
redundant architecture, requiring k-out-of-n subsystems to survive in order
for the system to survive (n ≥ k) – i.e., the system fails when n − k + 1
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Figure 1.8.: Reliability of classical redundant systems.
subsystems fail [67]. It inherits therefore its properties: MTTFs of 1/λ ·∑n
x=k 1/x at the cost of at least n times the original system [67].
To illustrate what can be achieved with classical n-modular redundancy,
Figure 1.8 plots the reliability in time of classical redundant systems. It
considers the system from Figure 1.6 as the original one (1-out-of-1) and
it considers ideal voters. Although, a 2-out-of-3 system, a classical Triple
Modular Redundancy (TMR) configuration, can extend the high reliability
up to a certain point in the short term, in the long term it actually results
in a system that is less reliable than the original one: the MTTF is 5/6
that of the original one. A 1-out-of-2 system can extend the reliability in
time but only in a Dual Modular Redundancy (DMR) configuration that
is capable of detecting which redundant system failed – i.e. pin-point the
failure. Usually, DMR can be used to detect a failure but cannot pin-point
it, whereas TMR can detect up to two failures and can pin-point the first
failure. An efficient and attractive alternative is to employ non-identical
subsystems, whose common functionality must be only the critical one in
order to provide the fail-operational behavior. Not only are unnecessary
costs reduced therewith, but also common cause failures are avoided.
An example of a hierarchical fault-tolerant architecture that is capable of
fail-operational behavior is illustrated in Figure 1.9 where a system is com-
posed of a high-performance layer, a fall-back layer and a voter. ISO 26262
also to such architecture as dynamic redundant architecture with standby
[72]. The high-performance subsystem implements the critical function-
ality and additional desirable functionalities. The second subsystem, the
fall-back, implements only the critical functionality. The critical function-
ality is thus ensured in case either subsystem fails. The system provisions
for a single failure scenario, where only one of the components fails. That
is, either one of the subsystems fail or the voter fails. Upon failure of
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High-performance layer
Fall-back layer Voter
Diagnosis
Diag.
Figure 1.9.: Example of a fail-operational system with two subsystems:
high-performance and fall-back.
the high-performance layer, the transition to the fall-back layer is called
fail-over, which is performed before any faulty output leaves the system in
order to maintain integrity. Notice that the voter may also fail. Therefore,
the voter must fail safe – i.e., it must chose either layer as output, ensuring
the operation under the single failure scenario.
In the occurrence of a failure, the system must then remain operational
until reaching a safe state [72]. For instance, in case of a motorized vehicle,
a plausible requirement is that the system must remain operational until
the vehicle has safely stopped. Given the first failure, the probability of a
second failure until the system reaches a safe state is usually acceptable.
The probability of a second failure, and thus the probability that the entire
system fails, is thus usually accounted as acceptable risk in ISO 26262 [72].
How much risk is acceptable, in turn, depends on the final application
– e.g., a car would require much less time to reach a safe state than an
airplane in cruising altitude that would require one hour to land.
1.5.2. Error detection vs. error recovery
In order to satisfy the strict integrity requirements of high criticalities
[72, 35], all errors and deviations from the correct behavior must be detected
and contained before a wrong output propagates outside the system. To
meet the dependability requirements, the system’s fail-operational behavior
continues providing the critical functionality. Finally, the system must
operate in a timely manner in order to meet the timing requirements.
The next goal after ensuring the critical functionality is to provide im-
proved quality and experience to the user with extra robustness. Fig-
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Figure 1.10.: The quality vs. cost vs. fail-overs trade-off.
ure 1.10 illustrates the cost of achieving integrity and the cost of further
increasing the dependability of the system. By recovering from more errors
(dotted curve), the frequency of fail-overs can be reduced (dashed curve),
therewith increasing the quality of the service. The perceived quality of
the product increases therewith.
An example is the aforementioned cross-layer ASTEROID approach. It
relies on error detection mechanisms in hardware for efficiency and lower
execution time overhead and delegates the task of handling errors to soft-
ware [10, 38, 127]. The approach then supports different strategies to
handle detected errors, which can be applied based on the requirements of
functions implemented by the system. For example, best effort tasks can
simply be restarted, whereas highly critical tasks can be recovered, e.g., by
means of checkpointing mechanisms [127].
Notice that, in a hierarchical fault-tolerant system, errors that are de-
tected and handled in a certain layer (or level of abstraction) are seen as
masked in the layers above. When errors are only detected and not handled
in a certain layer, the unhandled error is then reported to the layer above,
which will then either handle it or report it further. For instance, DMR
can detect that the service of the two sub-systems differ and it can thus
report to the system so that it can take appropriate action. Also, in cross-
layer approaches, some errors can be handled locally and the remaining,
unhandled errors can be reported and handled in the layers above. Thus,
a failure is then an error that cannot be handled in the highest layers of
the system. Notice that, by definition, an undetected error affecting the
service of the system is a safety violation and considered an unsafe failure
[72]. The choice of which errors should be detected, which should be han-
dled and where that should be done has, naturally, a direct impact on cost
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and QoS.
Thus, a clear distinction can be made between detecting errors and recov-
ering from them. Error detection is crucial. Integrity cannot be achieved
without it. On the other hand, the strategy with which the error is han-
dled can be chosen according with the system requirements, the available
budget or the available technology. Thus, higher product quality requires
tolerating more errors in the high-performance layer, whereas the budget
product can be safe and ensure the minimal functionality while potentially
suffering more disruptions of the additional services and high-quality func-
tionality.
1.6. Research objective and contributions
As introduced throughout this chapter, dependability has many facets that
must be addressed when designing a system. That is specially challenging
in real-time mixed-critical systems, where safety standards play an impor-
tant role and where responding in time can be as important as responding
correctly or even responding at all. This thesis addresses the issue of cross-
layer dependability in many-cores for real-time mixed-critical systems. It
addresses the question of what is the impact of random hardware errors
on a real-time many-core system, with special focus on the NoC, and what
must be done to overcome such errors and achieve a reliable service with
timing and integrity guarantees.
The grand objectives of this work are 1 to ensure that any errors in
are detected before propagating throughout the system, thereby ensuring
its timing and integrity, and possibly recover from errors, with focus on
the NoC; and 2 to efficiently handle errors in a cross-layer solution with
replicated software execution.
The minor objectives of this work are: to formally analyze the timing of
the proposed techniques; to evaluate the proposed techniques with respect
to their hardware cost and performance, where applicable; to compare
them with the state of the art; to keep the overhead required to achieve
high dependability minimal.
The core contributions of this thesis are:
• Uncovering and description of the impact of random hardware errors
on real-time NoCs and on the system (Chapter 2);
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• A resilient, real-time mixed-critical NoC architecture (Chapter 3);
• Proposal of Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ)-based transport pro-
tocols for real-time NoCs and their efficient use (Chapter 4);
• Proposal of AIQ, a lightweight mechanism to guarantee integrity and
predictability in mixed-critical, real-time NoCs (Chapter 5);
• Proposal of the replica-aware co-scheduling for mixed-criticality (Chap-
ter 6); and
• The formal timing analysis of the proposed approaches.
The core contributions of this thesis have been previously published in
conference proceedings and scientific journals. The contents of those pub-
lications have been used in this thesis in the form of text, figures and data.
A complete list of publications that are related to this thesis, including
brief descriptions, is given in Appendix B.
1.7. Overview
This thesis is organized as follows. The goals and challenges motivating
the work on dependable mixed-critical real-time systems are introduced
in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 reports the impacts of random hardware errors
starting at the NoCs-level and ending at the system-level. Based on those
findings, a set of mechanisms to attain dependability is introduced in the
sequel. Chapter 3 introduces the resilient NoC architecture for mixed-
criticality, which is able to provide a highly reliable soft error protection
that is transparent to software. Data can be reliable transported over
the proposed resilient NoC by means of ARQ-based protocols. Chapter 4
proposed the efficient use of transport protocol in NoCs under real-time
guarantees. Aiming at a low-overhead NoC with guaranteed integrity and
timing under errors, the AIQ approach is proposed in Chapter 5. AIQ
ensures integrity and real-time guarantees without recovering from errors,
which can be handled in software in a cross-layer approach. The han-
dling of errors in higher layers of cross-layer approaches is addressed with
replicated software execution. Chapter 6 proposes the replica-aware co-
scheduling for efficient resource utilization in mixed-critical many-cores.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes with remarks and an outlook.
2. The Impact of Soft Errors
Random hardware errors can be classified in two types: hard errors and
soft errors [61]. Soft errors in hardware are events where data is corrupted
and the device is not permanently damaged, whereas in hard errors the
device fails permanently. This work focuses on the former, which is orders
of magnitude more frequent. Soft error is a term commonly used to refer
to a subset of Single-event effects (SEEs) [61]. SEEs are induced by the
interaction of primary or secondary ionizing particles with electronic com-
ponents [52]. Primary particles are heavy ions in space or alpha particles.
Secondary particles, or recoils, are the result of the nuclear interaction of
particles, such as neutrons or protons, with atoms of the die [52]. According
to Heijmen, SEEs can be classified into the following categories:
• Single-bit upset (SBU): a bit-flip (upset) caused by a particle strike;
• Multiple-cell upset (MCU): the upset of two or more memory cells
or latches;
• Multiple-bit upset (MBU): the upset of two or more bits in the same
word;
• Single-event transient (SET): a voltage glitch in a circuit, which only
becomes an error when captured by register;
• Single-event functional interrupt (SEFI): loss of functionality due to
the perturbation of, e.g., control registers and clock and reset signals;
• Single-event latchup (SEL): the event creates a high-current state by
triggering a parasitic dual bipolar circuit, requiring a power reset.
This chapter focuses on the effects of SBUs, MCUs, MBUs and SETs.
SEFIs and SELs are not considered and are thereby assumed to be either
handled at the device or circuit-levels, or their occurrence is considered as
a failure if,unhandled, their effects differ from the other types.
Ebrahimi et al. showed that errors rates are decreasing with the tech-
nology scaling, which contradicts early predictions [20] that have not been
confirmed thanks to improvements in EDA tools and in the device. In-
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terestingly, Ebrahimi et al. also showed that the occurrence probability of
SETs increases with the frequency whereas the occurrence probability of
SBUs decreases with the frequency [41]. Although SEEs have the same
cause, their impact on the system depends on when and where they occur.
This chapter is organized as follows. The current state-of-the-art in the
analysis of errors in NoCs is reported in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 summarizes
the analysis methodology employed in this work, including an extension to
classify error effects. The analysis methodology is then applied to the IDA
NoC and the results are described in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 discusses the
impacts of errors in the system level. Finally, Section 2.5 summarizes the
chapter.
2.1. Related work
Fault-tolerance for NoCs has been extensively researched in the last 10
years [121]. However, research has addressed only specific errors and, con-
sequently, failure modes. In the context of mixed-critical systems, where
strict requirements must be met in certification processes [72, 35, 69], ad-
dressing errors individually is not sufficient. In a mixed-critical system, all
errors and their impacts must be taken into account, requiring a holistic
analysis of the NoC. A proof in certification processes usually involves an
FMEA [68].
The FMEA is a comprehensive bottom-up approach that systematically
captures all failure modes and their effects on the system [67, 68]. For
each component, failure of components in the lower levels of a system and
then evaluates its effects and their propagation throughout the system.
Since they propagate, the effects can be observed in different interfaces,
e.g., locally as well as globally. The FMEA can be extended, for instance,
by assigning criticalities or priorities to effects. That extended version is
known as the FMECA [67, 68].
Radetzki et al. present in [121] an overview of the state-of-the-art in
fault-tolerance of NoCs. They summarized and reviewed failure mech-
anisms, faults models, diagnose techniques and fault-tolerance methods.
Additionally, they present the application of the methods in the three lay-
ers of the network stack: data link, network and transport layers. Despite
the large number of mechanisms developed in previous years, they point
out the need for holistic, goal oriented approaches that are better linked to
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the physical causes. Marculescu et al. give an overview about outstanding
research problems in NoC design and also list fault-tolerance and reliability
as key problems. The motivations given in [95, 121] and many related works
are however the increased transient faults caused by transistor scaling and
not the certification for safety-critical systems.
The impact of circuit-level timing violations caused by process and tem-
perature variations was researched by Aisopos et al. in [2]. They proposed
a system-level error model where the functional effect of faults are mod-
eled, such as flit derouting, loss and duplication. However, the model is
intended to detect only circuit-level timing violations and does not cover
SEEs.
SoC-level approaches have also been researched. An FMEA methodology
for SoC-level design compliant with IEC 61508 [69] was proposed in [96].
The methodology extracts sensible zones from the Register-Transfer Level
(RTL) hardware description and use them as the basis for an FMEA. A
sensible zone is an elementary failure point of the SoC in which one or
more faults converge to lead to a failure [96]. They can be memory elements
(e.g., registers), primary inputs and outputs, and critical nets (e.g., clocks).
The proposed methodology was applied to design memory subsystems for
microcontrollers. Another work presents a SoC-level risk assessment using
a SystemC Transaction-level Modeling (TLM) model [27]. Although it
seems sufficient for risk assessment, it does not yield sufficient insight into
error propagation.
Numerous studies have addressed transient hardware faults [140, 39,
118, 81, 19], whereas others have put effort into comparing different fault-
tolerant schemes. Murali et al. studied in [104] the reliability-energy and
the performance-energy trade-offs for different error correction schemes:
ARQ and Hybrid ARQ, where ARQ is combined with Forward Error Cor-
rection (FEC). The authors of [43] and [116] concentrated on the triple
performance-reliability-energy consumption trade-off, the latter focusing
on router architectures.
Permanent hardware faults were investigated in [50], which proposes a
highly resilient NoC architecture. The redundancy in the network and in
the routers (e.g., buffers and decoders) is used as means to provide robust-
ness though reconfiguration without resorting to N-modular redundancy-
based solutions. Later on, Tsai et al. present a fault-tolerant scheme explor-
ing bidirectional channels between routers in [151]. Instead of deflecting
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packets away from faulty channels, as in traditional schemes, a bidirectional
channel is used in half-duplex mode when faulty channels are present.
For off-Chip networks, there is an even longer history of studies on relia-
bility including FMEA, as seen in [141]. While some ideas are applicable to
on-Chip networks, that is not always the case since in NoCs there are lim-
iting factors, such as area, power and timing constraints. Besides, the links
are the dominating factor in the reliability of off-Chip networks, whereas
the routers dominate in on-Chip ones. In off-Chip networks, the objective
of FMEA studies is usually to increase the availability of the network. This
work, on the other hand, aims at creating the base for a resilient NoC with
minimal overhead and which is compliant with safety standards.
Although extensive research has been carried out on fault tolerance for
NoCs, only certain mechanisms are presented and evaluated. Therefore,
one can not prove that all SEEs are covered, as required by safety stan-
dards, since a systematic assessment of all potential failure modes is re-
quired. To fill this gap, Ahrendts derived in [1] a methodology based on
the FMEA to evaluate the impact of SEEs on NoCs.
2.2. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
In the FMEA, each instance of each component type is analyzed [68].
Each possible failure mode of the component instance is then examined
for every possible system state, evaluating local and global effects of the
failure mode. A failure mode is the specific way in which a failure occurs
in terms of failure of the component function under investigation. Local
effects concern how the functionalities of individual sub-components or the
local switch are affected. Global effects concern how the functionality of
the NoC as a system is affected, i.e. error propagation.
If applied directly, the FMEA leads to an explosion of cases to be evalu-
ated. Since all combinations of components types, their instances and the
states of each instance must be evaluated, the number of cases increase
prohibitively for a real system, exceeding reasonable limits. To avoid that,
techniques can be applied to reduce the analysis complexity.
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2.2.1. FMEA-based analysis methodology for NoCs
When analyzing the impact of soft errors on NoCs, Ahrendts derived an
FMEA-based methodology for NoCs that keeps the analysis complexity
within reasonable limits [1]. The analysis is performed on the block-level
and assumes errors occur on all connections between blocks and between
adjacent switches. The errors are evaluated individually for each logical
signal, such as the actual flit data or the synchronization and control be-
tween modules. In the methodology, three techniques exploit properties of
the NoC to reduce the analysis complexity: error abstraction, symmetry
exploitation and worst-case effect on a test packet. Those are summarized
next.
Error abstraction: Instead of evaluating single-bit errors individually,
signals are grouped logically by their function, dramatically decreasing
the number of cases to be evaluated. By assuming that every single-bit
error has an immediate effect on each output signal of the component, the
results are still conservative after the simplification. Errors are considered
equivalent if their effect on a flit transmission is identical (e.g., all errors in
the packet’s payload are considered equivalent). Furthermore, only errors
at the block-level are considered, assuming that errors occurring within a
block will either eventually show up at its interface or are masked and hence
irrelevant – i.e., latent errors are irrelevant if they never show up at the
interface. The internal state of the blocks are considered when determining
the effects of each error.
Symmetry exploitation: Each switch has multiple inputs and outputs
that behave identically. Hence, it is not necessary to analyze all combina-
tions of input and output paths of every switch separately, the analysis of
one such path is sufficient. Likewise, a mesh network shows similar sym-
metry between switches for different paths through the network. Thus, one
does not need to consider a large network, but can construct a minimal net-
work configuration which still shows all effects of possible path segments
of larger networks.
Worst-case effect on a test packet: A single error in a switch may
have very different consequences depending on the current state of that
switch. The state is defined by the packets being transferred and the
respective state of those transfers. To avoid considering all possible com-
binations of transfers and their states, which would result in a tremendous
state space, only the transmission of one test packet – using different flit
36 2. The Impact of Soft Errors
compositions – along a selected path is considered (which is sufficient due
to symmetries). For that packet, all possible error effects on the packet
itself and on any potential background load are evaluated. For background
transfers, only the worst-case transfers and states are considered – i.e.,
those that actually interact with the test packet. Since the background
traffic and the test traffic are symmetric, uncovered errors affecting the
test traffic do not need to be evaluated again for the background load.
The methodology draws the system boundary between the NoC switches
and the network interfaces that are used to connect the IP blocks (e.g.,
processors and memory). That decision aims at modularity, since different
network interfaces may exist in the system depending on the type of IP
they are connected to. Regarding the network interfaces, the packets are
assumed to be injected fault-free in the NoC. In case they are injected
faulty, the errors are a subset of the ones found in a packet transmission
between switches. Moreover, the analysis includes the state machine that
handles flits received from the link, in order to reveal the effects of an error
in a switch (up to the network layer). This does not affect modularity since
this state machine does not change between different NIs in the same NoC.
They only depend on the packet formats supported by the network and
are essentially the same as the state machine in the switch.
2.2.2. Qualitative and quantitative extension
The methodology for NoC analysis was then extended to qualitatively and
quantitatively summarize the output of the FMEA [128, 129]. The output
of an FMEA is an extensive spreadsheet output of the data report, e.g., as
seen in [124]. Thus, a qualitative and quantitative summary of the results
of the FMEA enables a faster understanding of the vulnerabilities in a NoC
design and a faster response by the designer. The extension starts with
the characterization of the effects followed by a probability assessment.
2.2.2.1. Effects characterization
The error effects are classified by their duration on the NoC, based on the
error classification introduced in [28]. At first, two classes of effects were
identified, the conventional ones: transient and static effects [129]. Later
on, with modifications in the NoC trying to prevent, other classes of effects
were observed, such as degrading and intermittent [129].
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• Transient: the error vanishes with the affected packet – e.g., packet
payload corruption;
• Degrading: the error degrades performance. It accumulates due to
new occurrences and eventually manifests itself – e.g., credit counter
fails does not update and credits are erroneously lower;
• Intermittent: the error remains in the switch but can eventually
vanish – e.g., a VC was not released by a corrupt packet and will only
be released by a subsequent healthy packet traversing the switch in
the same direction.
• Static: the error remains in the switch affecting subsequent trans-
missions – e.g., the VC reservation is never released.
Since we are analyzing a NoC for mixed-critical systems, we also want to
understand how task isolation can be violated. Task isolation means that
the misbehavior of a task will not impair other tasks in the system, also
called sufficient independence [72]. Thus studying the effects that a faulty
transmission of one task has on other tasks in the NoC is crucial in order
to prevent them properly. That resulted in another class of errors called
isolation violation.
• Isolation violation: the error, regardless of its duration in the NoC,
affects the transmission of other streams – e.g., by corrupting or
causing a packet to be lost.
This is not an exhaustive list of classes, as there may be specific cases
in a particular architecture. Nonetheless, it serves as a starting point and
guideline for the more general cases.
2.2.2.2. Effects probabilities
After classifying the error effects, the designer already has a good insight
into the weaknesses of the NoC’s architecture when exposed to faults. The
next step is to assess their probability of occurrence of the failure modes.
This allows the designer to differentiate errors that are very unlikely and
the others very likely to occur.
The above-described analysis methodology conservatively considers that
any fault in a block leads to an error. As a result, the occurrence probability
of an error on an output signal of a component, i.e. a failure mode, can be
calculated as the probability that a fault happens in that component. This
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extension aims at assessing relative occurrence probabilities without being
bounded to a specific technology node and without going into details of the
underlying technology. Thus, the relative probability assessment is based
on the area consumed a component on the chip. That can be extracted
or estimated from metrics provided by, e.g., synthesis reports of Xilinx
Vivado [157]. Deriving accurate, absolute error occurrence probabilities
falls outside the scope of this work.
For Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), one can assess proba-
bilities relative to the number of registers used by each component in the
switch. Alternatively, one can assess probabilities relative to the number of
Look-up Tables (LUTs) used by each component. According to [129], the
difference between using LUTs and registers is smaller than 0.21%, thus
throughout this chapter, we report results with registers. For Application-
Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs), one can assess probabilities relative to
the area occupied by the cells of the design, as reported by, e.g., Synopsys
Design Compiler [145].
The assessed probability accounts for the direct effects of an error. The
indirect effects are not considered – i.e., the probability that one switch is
affected by effects propagated from errors in a different switch.
2.3. Impact of soft errors on NoCs
This section describes the impact of soft errors on an unprotected version
of the IDA NoC, introduced in Section 1.2. The FMEA analysis of the IDA
NoC uncovered 107 failure modes within the switch and 54 failure modes
in the link between switches. The interested reader can find the complete
output of the FMEA in [124]. Next, the failure modes are summarized
with respect to their local effects on the switch and their global effects on
the NoC.
2.3.1. Local and global effects
Each failure mode can present one or more local effects. An example is
that a flit can be forwarded to the wrong output port. In that case, the
original flit that was supposed to be forwarded to an expected port is lost
and an unexpected flit is forwarded to a different port.
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The local effects of a soft error were found to be of 6 different types:
• Error masked: The subsequent block ignores it. It occurs when
the faulty signal is only evaluated when other signals have a specific
value;
• Flit corruption: The flit content changes. Depending on where this
error occurs inside the flit, there may be different global consequences;
• Flit loss: It may happen when an error affects the communication
between blocks – e.g., the input module sends a flit to the switch
fabric but it doesn’t get through, or the corruption of a flit’s VC field
causing the flit to be stored in an incorrect VC buffer;
• Flit sent to wrong output port: It may be caused by an error
affecting the control information – e.g., input port select, or an error
in the communication between blocks – e.g., between arbiter and
switch fabric;
• Flit transmission delayed: It may be caused by an error affecting
the control information – e.g., the VC priority, or an error affecting
the communication between blocks – e.g., register bank and switch
arbiter. Arbitration errors usually do not lead to a complete loss of
functionality since the switch re-arbitrates every cycle;
• VC buffer blockage: It may occur when an error induces an incor-
rect decision regarding VC reservation in a switch. Such allocation
error is usually permanent since a reserved VC is only released when
the tail of a packet is processed, which will never happen as the
reservation error prevents progress.
Globally, a soft error can cause 5 different effects, observable at the NoC-
level. The global effects depend on the type and location of the errors. One
error can present one or more global effect. For instance, an error can cause
the corruption of a packet and at the same time cause the loss of a packet
of another traffic stream.
The global effects of a soft error in the NoC were found to be:
1. QoS violation: The VC QoS guarantee is violated. This may hap-
pen temporarily – e.g., due to an incorrect switch decision or a signal
glitch, or permanently – e.g., due to corruption of the VC priority or
due to VC buffer blockage;
2. Packet loss: The packet is lost in the network. The packet might
also be delivered to a wrong recipient. This may be caused by the
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loss of the head or tail of a packet (HF or TF), corruption of the
route or VC fields, an incorrect routing decision in a switch, or VC
buffer blockage;
3. Packet corruption: The packet arrives at the correct destination
but its content is corrupt. This may happen, e.g., due to a bit flip in
the payload of a flit or the loss of a BF;
4. Return route corruption: The route field gets corrupted without
immediate effect – e.g., because the error affected only the part of
the route that was already traversed, causing the Network Interface
(NI) to be unable to reconstruct the return route for a response or
acknowledgement;
5. VC buffer blockage: This may be caused by the loss of the head or
tail of a packet (HF or TF) or by the incorrect switch decision caused
by corrupt control data – e.g., credit counter and VC access control.
This effect appears often together with packet loss, although they
may happen independently. Due to wormhole switching, the error
may propagate to the downstream switches – e.g., when a packet’s
tail (TF) is lost causing all switches downstream to never release the
corresponding VC reservation due to the missing TF.
The effects of the corruption of the flit type and VC fields can also be
considered as a flit loss. The corruption alters the flit semantics and, in
the perspective of its aggregating packet, the flit is lost. Nonetheless, the
flit still exists in the NoC and will affect the transmission of other packets.
2.3.2. Effects characterization and probabilities
The effects were characterized with respect to their duration and isolation
violation, as described in Section 2.2.2.1. The metric used here to show
the results is the percentage of cases where a global effect (1–5) presents a
given characteristic. As a reminder, an effect is transient when the effect
goes with the affected packet and it is static when the effect remains in the
NoC affecting subsequent transmissions.
The percentage of cases where a global effect presents a given charac-
teristic is reported in Figure 2.1. The figure shows the effect duration on
the left-hand side. Global effect 1 usually presents transient effect dura-
tion, whereas effects 3 and 4 are always transient. Global effects 2 and 5
are critical. Effect 2 remains in the NoC in more than 57% of the cases,
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Figure 2.1.: Global effects characteristics: relative number.
whereas effect 5 remains in all cases. Global effects 2 and 5 are caused by
the corruption the state of the switch by the error. The state of the switch
is defined by the packets being transferred and the state of those transfers.
In the occurrence of the local effects flit corruption (VC field), flit loss, flit
sent to wrong output port and VC buffer blockage, the state of one or more
transfers don’t reflect the reality anymore.
The right-hand side of Figure 2.1 shows the relative number of cases
where a failure mode violates the isolation property. Notice that this char-
acteristic is independent from duration – i.e., transient or static. The
isolation is violated when a flit deviates from its route and affects other
transmissions in the NoC either by migrating to another VC or by chang-
ing its route. The local effects flit corruption (VC and route fields) and flit
sent to wrong output port are responsible for the violation.
Nonetheless, different errors have different occurrence probabilities and
so do their effects. To make evident which effects are more critical, the
relative probability of a global effect was assessed, as described in Sec-
tion 2.2.2.2. The numbers were obtained using synthesis results for a Xilinx
Virtex-6 FPGA [128, 129].
Figure 2.2 shows the relative occurrence probabilities of the global effects.
Among all effects, effects 2, 3 and 5 are the most likely to happen. That
is due to the impact of the input buffer on the occurrence probability
of an error that causes flit corruption or loss. The input buffer stores
approximately 85% of all data in the switch. Effect 1 presents almost
exclusively transient duration (very small probability of a static effect),
whereas effect 4 presents only transient duration. Both less likely to occur
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than the others.
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Figure 2.2.: Relative occurrence probabilities of global effects.
2.3.3. Assessment of uncovered effects
The analysis results revealed the nasty effects that a soft error can cause in
the NoC. As is, soft errors cause not only transient effects but also static
effects. The occurrence of a static effect causes partial unavailability of
the NoC and renders end-to-end mechanisms, such as ARQ, useless. The
static effect is similar to one of a hard error caused by a permanent fault,
but different in that the effect goes away when resetting the circuit. The
biggest problem with such static effects caused by soft errors is that they
have a much higher occurrence probability than the ones caused by hard
errors (cf. Section 1.4). Thus, handling them as hard errors would either
require very expensive overprovisioning or result in a low quality service,
as discussed in Section 1.5.1.
The major source of static effects was identified as the inability of the
switch to handle unexpected flits – i.e., inability to handle unexpected
input. For instance, when handling head-less and tail-less packets. The
VC flow-control does not allow a packet to be transmitted in a reserved
VC in a given output port when that VC is reserved for another packet. In
case of a tail-less packet, the respective VC reservation will not be released
and other packets will be blocked indefinitely in the input buffer. The other
case is the head-less packet, where the BF or TF is the first flit of the packet
to arrive at the IB. Since the received flit does not contain routing data
and a VC reservation does not exist, the flit will remain in the input buffer.
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Figure 2.3.: The VC flow-control state machine.
The state machine implementing the VC flow-control is shown in Fig-
ure 2.3. The state machine controls the second stage of the switch arbitra-
tion, where an input buffer requests access to a VC in a given output port.
The first arbitration stage controls the access to an output port. In the
figure, all the requests in the conditional transitions belong to the same
input buffer, except for the rightmost transition from reserved to deny ac-
cess. The first case happens when the VC is released and an input buffer
requests access to transmit a BF or TF (bold cycle on the left-hand side).
The second case happens when the VC is reserved and the input buffer
requests permission to transmit a HF or SF (bold cycle on the right-hand
side). In both cases the access will always be denied, effectively blocking
the VC.
2.3.4. Early exploration of analysis-enabled resilience
improvement
In an initial effort to transform the static effects into non-static ones and,
thus achieve resilience, the state machine of the VC flow-control was altered
in two ways:
• Drop flits that cannot be forwarded – i.e., a head-less packet;
• Transfer the VC reservation to the next packet entering the switch
through the same input port as the packet that has the VC reserva-
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tion when the switch detects it was not properly released – i.e., when
an input port receives a packet after a tail-less packet.
The changes are depicted in Figure 2.4, where the transitions represented
by the dashed edges were removed and the dotted ones were added. Now,
in the first case, when a VC is released and a head-less packet arrives, the
access is denied and the flits will be eventually dropped, allowing the next
packet to be served. In the second case, when a VC is reserved – e.g.,
not correctly released due to a tail-less packet – and a new packet arrives
at the same input port, the new packet takes over the reservation. The
case where the VC is reserved and a different input buffer sends a request
remains unchanged: the access is always denied, since no safe assumption
can be made. The changes are located in the link layer of the NoC and are
thus also applied to the NI.
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Figure 2.4.: The improved VC flow-control state machine.
The improved VC flow-control helped prevent cases of errors with static
effects. First, let us consider the percentage of cases where a global ef-
fect presents a given characteristic. Figure 2.5 plots the numbers for the
improved version of the NoC (I). To facilitate the comparison, the fig-
ure also plots the numbers for the baseline (B) version from Figure 2.1.
The changes resulted in a visible improvement by ruling out static effects.
However, two new classes of effect emerged: degrading and intermittent –
both less compromising than static. A degrading effect degrades the per-
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formance, accumulates due to new occurrences and then manifests itself
– e.g., error reduces the utilizable input buffer space until it violates the
QoS guarantees. The intermittent effect means that the effect can go away,
as opposed to static, but it takes longer or is less likely to happen than
a transient one – e.g., requiring a second packet to traverse the switch in
a specific direction. With respect to isolation, the number of occurrences
decreased in all cases, 14.77 percentage points in total.
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Figure 2.5.: Global effects characteristics: relative number.
The occurrence probabilities of the global effects are reported in Fig-
ure 2.6. For improved (I), the reduction of the probabilities of 2, 4 and 5
increased the ones for 1 and 3. This can be explained by the fact that, since
static VC blocking (5) does not occur anymore, fewer packets are lost due
to corruption (2) and, as a result, those packets are delivered despite be-
ing corrupted (3). They also may corrupt other packets and consequently
isolation violation increases. Return route corruption (4) decreased due to
the improved VC flow-control at the NI. Finally, QoS (1) increased for two
reasons: the effect is not being masked by VC blocking anymore; and be-
cause the values are relative – 1 and 3 increase to compensate the decrease
in 2, 4 and 5.
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Figure 2.6.: Relative occurrence probabilities of global effects.
Enabled by the FMEA, a small change to the design resulting in the
improved VC flow-control allowed the static effects to be ruled out. How-
ever, non-transient effects still remain in the NoC, impairing its resilience
and applicability in safety-critical real-time systems. Although the VC
flow-control was a main source of static effects, achieving resilience and de-
pendability in the NoC requires several additional measures. In Chapter 3,
those issues are addressed and a resilient NoC for safety-critical real-time
systems is introduced, including a resilient VC flow-control, which extends
the VC flow-control presented in this chapter.
2.4. Impact of soft errors on the system
The impacts visible at the software level have been summarized by Rebau-
dengo et al. in [134]. According to Rebaudengo et al., soft errors can affect
the software in two ways: it can affect the data or the execution flow. The
classification can also consider whether the error affected an application or
the operating system [37, 136]. Figure 2.7 summarizes the error classifica-
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tion. This section addresses the impact of errors affecting the application
and the operating system separately and summarizes the impacts at the
system-level.
Soft error
Application
Operating 
System
Data
Execution flow - Incorrect output
- No response
- No effectData
Execution flow
Figure 2.7.: Overview of impact of soft errors in software.
The impact of soft errors on a real-time operating system has been re-
cently evaluated with irradiation experiments [136]. The software consists
of dOSEK, a dependability-oriented static embedded kernel [66], and a gen-
erated application with 125 pairs of threads that communicate, where each
pair of thread communicate with each other. A Xilinx ZynqTM-7000 AP
SoC in 28nm Complementary Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor (CMOS) with
two ARM R© CortexTM-A9 cores with the maximum frequency of 667MHz
was employed. In the setup, only a single core was used and all hardware-
based soft error protection mechanism was disabled and only the SoC was
radiated, thus the rest of the platform, including the external Dynamic
Random-Access Memory (DRAM) chips, was error free. The SoC was sub-
mitted to a neutron flux of approximately 106n/cm2s with energies above
10MeV . The results showed that it is more likely for the system to hang –
i.e., to freeze without producing output – than to fail producing incorrect
output. However, as pointed out by the authors, the outcome of an error
is highly dependent on the application and the focus of the evaluation was
the kernel.
The impact of soft errors in the application has been investigated by
[37, 36, 144]. Do¨bel et al. performed, in the context of the project AS-
TEROID, fault injection campaigns targeting applications of the MiBench
benchmark suite [56] executing as user-level applications. Faults were in-
jected in the functional units of the processor, affecting the instruction
decoder, arithmetic logic unit, register bank and register allocation table.
The outcomes of the simulations were classified in four categories:
• success, where the execution finished and produced the correct result
– e.g., an error affects a variable that is overwritten before being read,
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masking the error;
• crash, where the execution was terminated prematurely with an ab-
normal result, also known as a fail-crash – e.g., an error causes the
program to access an illegal memory region and to be terminated by
the Operating System (OS);
• infinite, where the execution did not terminate within a specified
amount of time – e.g., an error caused the execution to enter an
infinite loop;
• Silent Data Corruption (SDC), where the execution finished but pro-
duced an incorrect result – e.g., an error affects the produced data
without causing a crash or an abnormally long execution.
The results showed that, in most cases, the error did not affect the outcome
of the execution at all (success). From the cases where the error actually
has an impact on the execution and its outcome the most common out-
come is a crash followed by SDC. Only in some cases an abnormally long
execution without crashing was observed (infinite).
Schuster et al. have also evaluated the impact of soft errors albeit fo-
cusing on errors affecting the control-flow [139]. The experiments showed
that, for errors affecting the control-flow of quicksort [56], in most cases
(90.96%) the errors resulted in a crash. In 5.95% of the cases, an SDC
occurs. In 2.51% of the cases, the error had no impact on the execution at
all (success). Similarly to [37], only in very few cases was an abnormally
long execution (infinite).
In summary, using the terminology defined by ISO 26262 [72] – the safety
standard for the automotive industry, the impact of soft errors in software
and system levels result in the following possibilities:
• Intended operating mode: the intended functionality is provided by
the system either because:
– Fault masked / no effect : the fault was masked before becoming
an error;
– Error handled : the fault became an error which was handled by
a safety mechanism without affecting the intended functionality;
• Degraded operating mode: the error is handled by a safety mechanism
but the system goes into a fallback mode with degraded performance
while guaranteeing the safety critical functionality;
• Failure: the error causes the system failure by deviating from the
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intended functionality either by:
– Incorrect functionality : the system eventually responds but be-
havior differs from the intended functionality;
– Irresponsive: the system does not respond.
2.5. Summary
This chapter investigated the impact of soft errors, the most common type
of random hardware faults, on the NoC interconnect and on the software
execution in real-time mixed-critical systems. The evaluation considered
the stringent requirements of safety standards, such as ISO 26262, which
require all possible faults and errors to be taken into account. The in-
vestigation included an FMEA, a bottom-up approach that systematically
uncovers all impacts of errors and that is usually required as proof by cer-
tification processes of safety standards, as well as relevant sources in the
literature.
Soft error impacts on the system can range from masked, to wrong out-
put, up to a complete system crash. Timing wise, errors can delay the
output of an application, independently of output corruption, to the point
where it becomes irresponsive. Based on the insight gained with the in-
vestigations a strategy can be employed to efficiently attain dependability
against the uncovered threats. The NoC, the central interconnect of many-
cores and modern MPSoCs, plays an important role. Unhandled random
hardware faults can cause not only data corruption and packet loss and der-
outing but can present static effects that lead to continuous corruption and
blocking scenarios during runtime. Moreover, errors can propagate and in-
directly affect the background traffic, propagating through criticalities and
throughout the system. Such error effects not only cause the violation of
integrity and resilience requirements and thus the failure of the system,
but also prevent the use of techniques with redundancy in time, such as re-
transmission and re-execution. In the next chapters, a set of techniques are
presented and evaluated that tackle random hardware faults in cross-layer
approaches.

3. Designing a Resilient NoC
Regulated by safety standards [72, 35, 69], mixed-critical real-time embed-
ded systems must meet strict real-time, resilience and integrity require-
ments. In such a context, threats to the intended functionality of the
system must be detected and handled appropriately to meet the specified
requirements. In case of errors, threats must be detected and contained to
ensure integrity; a recovery might be performed if possible and if resilience
is required to reach high reliability levels; and must do so in a timely and
predictable manner under real-time constraints. Due to the central role of
NoCs and their importance to the performance and dependability of the
system, their architecture and design is essential to enable their operation
under guarantees in the real-time mixed-critical domain.
This chapter proposes a NoC that satisfies strict integrity, resilience and
real-time requirements. In contrast to the state-of-the-art, all possible im-
pacts and durations of error effects are taken into account, as uncovered in
Chapter 2. The challenges are separated and handled in different network
layers [147], as illustrated in Figure 3.1. Errors affecting the NoC’s control
logic and data are handled in the lower layers. That results in a highly
available but lossy service to the upper layers, as error effects are restricted
to packet corruption, loss or short delay. Guaranteed integrity and packet
delivery of the transmitted data are selectively provided in the upper layers
by means of ARQ-based protocols.
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1. Physical
Handle errors 
in control
Handle errors 
in data
Provide:
- Integrity: control data
- Resilience
- Real-time
Provide:
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Figure 3.1.: OSI stack overview: errors affecting the control of the network
are handled in the lower layers; errors affecting data/payload
are addressed in the upper layers.
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ARQ-based protocols operating in the transport layer have been recently
formally analyzed for real-time NoCs. As shown in Chapter 4, ARQ can
be used without jeopardizing the predictability of the system. However,
it does require the underlying network to limit the effects of errors and
rule out static effects. To achieve that, the proposed approach exploits
well-known fault containment and retransmission techniques together with
the proposed resilient router design and resilient VC flow-control. The
VC flow-control manages the access to VCs in wormhole-switched NoCs.
It is a major contributor to cases of static effects due to a dependency
on the state of neighboring routers that only becomes evident in case of
errors [129]. To overcome those issues, a resilient VC flow-control is also
proposed. As a result, the proposed NoC operates under soft errors with
formal guarantees.
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows. After a review of
relevant related work in Section 3.1, an overview of the proposed transpar-
ent protection is given in Section 3.2. Then each mechanism is addressed
individually in Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.6 with a brief discussion inbetween in
Section 3.5. The evaluation is presented in Section 3.7. Finally, Section 3.8
summarizes the chapter.
3.1. Related work
Fault tolerance approaches for NoCs have been focusing on the require-
ments of general purpose and high performance computing systems [160,
16, 81, 116, 82, 49, 80]. They usually consider that soft errors cause packet
corruption, loss or derouting, and that those effects are transient. How-
ever, according to results of the FMEA introduced in Chapter 2, besides
the standard effects usually considered in the literature, soft errors can
have static effects leading to continuous corruption and blocking scenarios
during runtime. Moreover, errors can propagate and indirectly affect the
background traffic [128, 129, 124]. Static effects cause the violation of in-
tegrity, resilience and (real-time) predictability requirements and, thereby,
the failure of the system.
In safety critical real-time systems, non-transient errors have a fatal im-
pact on the latency and, by extension, the predictability, leading to the
failure of the entire system. Figure 3.2 illustrates the latency of a traffic
stream observed over time on two different NoCs: a resilient predictable
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NoC; and a baseline NoC which is non-resilient and only predictable in
the absence of errors. The latency does not include retransmission. Both
NoCs operate correctly and present latencies within maximum lmax and
minimum lmin bounds until soft errors occur at time t1 and t2. In the
resilient design, the effect is transient and its impact is bounded (lerr). In
the baseline, soft errors cause static effects that result in very high laten-
cies (L). After the error at t1, which could be caused by the derouting
of a packet from another traffic stream, the non-resilient design is able to
recover. After t2, however, it remains blocked: affected packets accumu-
late in the routers’ buffers and backpressure propagates throughout the
network, leading to permanent blocking of the NoC. The NoC design must
rule out static effects without triggering a network reset or handling them
as hard errors and ensure controlled impacts (lerr).
time
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at
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cy
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Non-resilient
0
l
 err
l
 max
l
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Figure 3.2.: Performance of a traffic stream in a resilient and a non-resilient
NoC over time.
The objective of existing approaches is to increase the overall reliabil-
ity of the network. Most of the work [82, 49, 80] target packet-switched
networks, providing reliability and guaranteed delivery of packets in the
lower network layers based on hop-by-hop retransmission (between adja-
cent routers) [147]. Recovering from packet corruption and loss consists of
retransmitting a correct copy from the previous router. The task of han-
dling packet derouting is usually delegated to the dynamic routing, which
delivers the packet through a different route after the packet has derouted.
Variants with end-to-end retransmission and/or forward error correction
and hybrids between both are also possible. In forward error correction
[147], Error-Correcting Codes (ECCs) are employed to correct the data at
the destination instead of retransmitting. Faster wormhole-switched net-
works have also been similarly addressed [81, 116].
The current state of the art in fault-tolerance for NoCs is well suited
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to increase the overall reliability of the network but does not satisfy the
requirements of high assurance real-time systems. This is because the
techniques either:
• Rely on dynamic routing [82, 49, 80]: the local routing decision vi-
olates the real-time requirements since it severely impairs the pre-
dictability of the NoC. This is further aggravated by traffic deflec-
tion, which allows unexpected traffic overhead in the network – pre-
dictability requires static routing [103, 125];
• Address packet-switched or wormhole-switched NoCs with dynamic
VC allocation [81, 116]: traffic from different classes in real-time sys-
tems requires sufficient independence, i.e., isolation between different
traffic classes, since they have potentially different treatment, e.g.,
priorities – this requires static VC allocation [103, 129];
• Use an insufficient error model [16, 160]: it has been shown that
transient faults can lead to static effects [129], leading to unexpected
blocking scenarios during runtime – all possible impacts and dura-
tions of error effects must be taken into account.
To overcome the gap between resilient NoCs and real-time systems, the
NoC should target high dependability systems from the very beginning, as
is the case of the IDA NoC [103, 7]. As a starting point, the NoC should
be predictable and satisfy the real-time requirements in the absence of
errors. Then, the appropriate mechanisms must be introduced to attain
the desired dependability.
3.2. Overview of the proposed architecture
To attain high dependability and meet resilience, integrity and real-time
requirements, the resilient NoC approach starts by subjecting the NoC
to an FMEA-based analysis of [129]. The results of that analysis was
introduced in Chapter 2, including a comprehensive error model. The
baseline NoC is then hardened against the identified vulnerabilities to soft
errors. Those vulnerabilities are addressed by three mechanisms: Fault
Containment (FC), Resilient Router Design (RR), and Reliable Transport
(RT). These three mechanisms operate in different layers of the NoC and
allow to address the requirements of high assurance systems as shown in
Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1.: Requirements addressed in the different layers of the NoC
OSI Layer
Requirements
Integrity Resilience Real-time
4-7. Transport - App. RT
3. Network FC FC
2. Data-link FC RR RR, FC
1. Physical RR RR
Fault containment is responsible for ensuring the integrity of the packets
in the network. It is also responsible for containing the error to the affected
router, preventing its propagation throughout the network and ensuring
the predictability of the NoC. The policy for fault containment is packet
dropping. Whenever a corrupt or derouted packet is detected, the packet
is dropped. A distinction between the integrity of the packet’s routing
data and the integrity of the payload exists. The routing data’s integrity
is checked on a hop-to-hop basis, the payload’s integrity is checked on an
end-to-end basis, since the payload is only relevant upon its delivery.
The resilient router design is responsible for limiting the effects of soft er-
rors in time, ensuring that resilience and predictability are satisfied. When-
ever an error affects a component in the router, its resilient design ensures
that the component will recover in a bounded period of time.
The reliable transport of data is then responsible for guaranteeing the
packet delivery and payload integrity, since packets may be dropped due to
errors. The reliable transport is flexible and can be implemented to operate
transparently in the transport layer or explicitly in the layers above. An
example of the latter is a hardware component such as the Direct Memory
Access (DMA) controller, which can implement its own protocol.
The mechanisms introduce new components to the NoC routers extend-
ing the IDA NoC architecture. The extension is depicted by the highlighted
elements in Figure 3.3. In the sequel, each mechanism is addressed indi-
vidually.
3.3. Fault containment
To contain the propagation of an error-affected flit, the router is equipped
with ingress filters in its input ports, as shown in Figure 3.3. The filter is
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Figure 3.3.: The resilient router architecture.
VC Flit Type Route Tile Port CRC PayloadHF/SF
Size 3 bits 2 30 3 3 99
VC Flit Type CRC LOP PayloadBF/TF
Size 3 bits 2 2 3 130
Figure 3.4.: Single Flit (SF), Head Flit (HF), Body Flit (BF) and Tail
Flit (TF) formats.
responsible for deciding whether the flit is valid and may be safely prop-
agated or not. If not, the error-affected flit is dropped before altering the
router’s state. It executes in parallel with the existing route management
logic.
The ingress filter must contain flits affected by errors in the upstream
router. This boils down to detecting corruption and derouting, similarly to
[80]. At the routers, only the routing data (flit header) is checked against
corruption.
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3.3.1. Containing corrupt flits
To detect corruption, the flits are equipped with Error-Detecting Code
(EDC). EDCs, such as parity bit and Hamming code, differ on their detec-
tion capability. Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) is chosen due to its error
detection capabilities that cover not only uncorrelated bit flips but also
bursts of errors, a typical effect of crosstalk (corruption in links). The 3-bit
CRC generator polynomial 0x5 = (x3 +x+ 1) and the 2-bit 0x2 = (x2 + 1)
are employed. They are able to detect a single bit flip or a burst of up to 3
and 2 erroneous bits, respectively [83]. That suffices given that the CRC is
expected to be checked before a second error occurs. Applying other EDCs
or other CRC polynomials at design time is also possible. Configuration
registers in hardware for the CRC are not required.
Figure 3.4 shows the CRC bits added to the flits, in the first phit of
HF/SFs and in the second phit of HF/SFs. Only the flit header is protected
because it allows corruption to be detected without requiring the whole flit
to be received and processed. Detection can be performed in parallel with
route management and can effectively prevent the flit from taking part in
the next arbitration cycle without additional delay or stage in the pipeline.
Due to the route management at each router, the CRC code of HF/SFs
must be updated accordingly. The new hash is calculated by CRC Gen
(see Figure 3.3) after the route has been updated and must be ready only
when the flit is leaving the buffer. When the flit transmission starts, the
old CRC hash is overwritten with the new one. BF/TF headers are not
modified, thus their CRCs are not updated.
In addition to the cases concerning corruption due to transport, corrup-
tion during processing must also be accounted for. Regarding the trans-
mission of an already-forwarded flit, the CRC stored in the buffer must be
invalidated after being used, so that, in case the same flit is erroneously
forwarded a second time, it may be detected and contained. Regarding the
route management, the CRC must be calculated based on a trusted copy
of the updated route.
3.3.2. Containing derouted flits
The detection of derouted flits is not trivial because one must distinguish
between a correctly routed flit and a flit forwarded in the wrong direction,
despite their correct header routing data. To distinguish them, the detec-
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tion checks the Last Output Port (LOP) traversed by the flit. Although the
principle is the same, due to their different formats HF/SFs and HF/SFs
are addressed separately below.
In case of a HF/SF, the flit contains the route encoded as a series of runs
(output port and a hop counter). At the input port, the ingress filter will
check whether the current input port is the one connected with the output
port requested in the last router, the LOP. For instance: the SF’s requests
the output port “North” (N) and in the next router is processed at the
input port “East” (E), which characterizes a derouting, since it should be
processed at an input port “South” (S). The input port knows at design
time to which output port it is connected – e.g., S connected to N, E to
W, and so on. The LOP can be found in the first or in the last position in
the route, due to route rotation, and is determined at run-time.
In case of a BF/TF, the checking works in the same way but a field
containing the LOP is added to the flit header (see Figure 3.4). The field
is updated at each hop (similarly to the above-mentioned CRC update):
the LOP stored at the input buffer overwrites the field in the flit when the
flit is being transmitted. The flit’s LOP field does not need to be covered
by the CRC because, in the event of an error corrupting the LOP field, it
will not be valid at the next input port and the flit will be dropped. This
way, the CRC of the BF/TF remains unchanged along the route. Notice
that the correct operation of the mechanism requires the integrity of the
LOP stored at the input buffer, which can be achieved, e.g., by storing the
value twice, one copy for the flit header and another actually for routing
purposes.
Uplinks are a special case. When the flit goes from the network interface
into the network, no checking is necessary since no derouting is possible so
far. When the flit leaves the network and reaches the network interface,
the network interface checks whether the last requested port is equal to its
port number.
3.4. Resilient router design
To achieve a resilient router it is necessary to eliminate scenarios where
soft errors lead to static effects. Although this thesis prefers discussing
the architecture, the design plays an important role to achieve resilience.
The approach requires the components to be designed in a way that they
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continue responding in each arbitration cycle independently from the suc-
cess of the previous arbitration cycle. Next, each component is addressed
separately.
3.4.1. Pre-processing
The pre-processing contains the route management and the newly added
CRC generator and input filter, discussed in the previous section. A soft
error in the pre-processing may cause flit corruption and derouting. The
effects are transient since the state is reset at the arrival of each flit.
3.4.2. Input buffer
The component is responsible for receiving and storing flits, and in parallel,
interacting with the arbitration logic and forwarding flits. A soft error in
the input buffer may cause transient flit corruption, loss, and derouting.
Soft errors cause static effects in this component when implementing the
buffer as one memory (Data Buffer in Figure 3.3). This is the case, for
instance, when optimizing the design for FPGAs. In such a design, the
VC queues are stored in the memory and each queue is managed through
its read and write pointers. The data required for routing decisions (e.g.,
output port, flit type) are additionally kept in a queue in the Control Buffer
due to the limited access to the memory. The static effect (corruption)
happens when the control and data buffers have two pointers and an error
causes them to desynchronize or to continuously access the memory with a
wrong offset. To prevent this, the Control Buffer must store the pointer and
the Data Buffer derives its pointer from that one when required. Similar
attention is required when handling the flit as phits. In addition, flits
received when a VC queue is full must be dropped while keeping the queue
data and state unaltered.
3.4.3. Crossbar switch
The crossbar switch connects input buffers to output ports. The connec-
tions are configured by the switch arbiter. A faulty crossbar causes flit
corruption, loss, and derouting. The effects are however transient, since
the crossbar state is reset at each arbitration by the switch arbiter.
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3.4.4. Switch arbiter
The arbiter has two stages [99]. The first stage arbitrates in parallel, for
each output port, one input buffer that requests access. The second stage,
in each input buffer, arbitrates a flit from one of the VCs that received
a grant from the first stage. Each stage arbitrates following the Round
Robin policy. In wormhole switching, the arbiter is also aware of the VC
reservation states managed by the VCAC.
An error affecting the arbiter may cause flit derouting, flit loss, and
priority loss. Derouting and loss occur when an error corrupts the arbiter
when a grant is being accepted or when it is configuring the crossbar. Those
effects are guaranteed to be transient because the grant and configuration
data is new at each arbitration cycle. Priority loss occurs when an error
affects the state of a round robin arbiter.
A faulty round-robin arbiter may cause priority loss. To ensure that
the priority loss is transient (i.e., transient blocking instead of static), the
arbiter must detect invalid priorities and advance to a valid priority. En-
coding priorities (Most Recently Served) as one-hot already serves the pur-
pose: when no bits or more than one bit is “hot”, the priorities are reset
to an initial state, ensuring a resilient arbiter.
The same applies to priority-based arbiters, where VCs have different
priorities. In that case, an error affecting the arbiter may similarly cause
flit derouting, flit loss, and priority loss. Those effects are transient since
the grants and requests per priority are new at each arbitration cycle.
However, depending on the tie-breaking policy implemented by the arbiter
(e.g., round-robin arbitrates requests of same priority to the same output
port), the considerations above must also be taken into account.
3.4.5. Virtual channel access controller
The VCAC manages the access to VCs at each output port1. Due to
wormhole switching, an input buffer has exclusive access to a VC at an
output port, creating a “hole” that starts with the first flit of the packet
and closes with the last one (the “worm”). A fault affecting the VCAC
leads to an improper VC release or an improper reservation. Both may
1Alternatively, one might consider the VCAC to manage the access to VCs on links.
Both perspectives are equivalent.
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Figure 3.5.: The Resilient VC Flow Control: Mealy state machine.
result in static blocking in the router. An improper VC reservation leads
to packet blocking ranging from transient to static since it can only be
detected upon arrival of a new packet from a certain direction, which is
not guaranteed, or by knowing the state of the upstream routers.
To prevent blocking effects, a resilient virtual channel flow control is
proposed. Figure 3.5 presents the state machine defining the resilient vir-
tual channel flow control. The state machine is an extension of the state
machine presented in Section 2.3.4 (Figure 2.4). The extension is depicted
with bold lines. The transitions are shown in the Mealy format: con-
dition/output. Detecting an improper VC reservation requires either a
timeout or knowing the state of the upstream router. Since timeouts for
managing virtual channels are not really an option2, additional wires be-
tween routers are adopted. The scheme requires one wire per VC that
implements wormhole switching to inform a router of the VC reservation
state of the upstream router.
The regular VC reserve/release operation in Figure 3.5 comprises the
transitions 1 to 4, as well as transition 7, which refuses access to a VC
reserved to another input buffer. An example is given in Figure 3.6b:
first, packets in input N and W request access to the same VC in output
E; N wins the reservation first and its flits are being transmitted (trans.
2 and 3) while the packet in W waits (trans. 7); finally, the transfer
is completed, the VC is released (trans. 4), and W may continue. In
2For instance, finding a suitable timeout value, which depends on the traffic. Values
too large result in high latencies; values too small result in packet loss/corruption.
3Transitions 1, 2, 4 and 6 also release in all output ports reservations of the respective
VC to the input buffer in question.
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Figure 3.6.: Examples of resilient VC reservation handling, considering one
VC and two streams traversing the router as shown in a. b:
regular operation; c: improper release; d,e,f : improper reser-
vation.
addition to the regular behavior, the state machine specifies the behavior
for faulty scenarios, which are divided in two categories: improper release
and improper reservation.
“Improper release” represents cases where flits without routing data are
at the head of the VC queue at the input buffer and no VC is reserved
for it. These are handled by transition 5, which signals the input buffer to
drop the flit. Examples are head-less packets and premature VC releases
caused by transient faults. The former is shown in Figure 3.6c, where the
flits of the head-less packet in N are discarded.
“Improper reservation” represents cases where the VC is not correctly
released. Upon an improper reservation, one of two scenarios can occur:
either the VC queue in the input buffer for the improperly reserved VC
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is empty or it is not empty. Transitions 4 and 6 handle the case where
the queue is not empty: a HF/SF tries to reserve a VC and it is already
reserved for his own input buffer, the reservation is handed over to the new
packet and the router resumes regular operation (trans. 3 or 4). Transition
8 handles the case where the queue is empty: the VC is released if it is
empty and the VC upstream is released. If the VC is reserved upstream,
no safe assumption can be made since the rest of the packet may be still
coming.
Figures 3.6d and 3.6e show examples for transitions 8 and 6, respectively.
In 3.6d, a tail-less packet in N is forwarded and the queue is empty after-
wards; when the upstream reservation is released, the respective VC is also
released. In 3.6e, a tail-less packet in N is followed by a second packet,
which takes over the reservation (trans. 6) and resumes regular operation.
In addition, transitions 1, 2, 4 and 6 must also release the VC in all output
ports where they are reserved for the same input buffer. Figure 3.6f shows
an example for such a case, where a VC is improperly reserved in output
port S. The reservation is released by the packet in N (trans. 2) before
resuming regular operation.
With the proposed resilient virtual channel flow control, soft errors result
only in transient effects since they will last only until one of the transitions
1, 2, 4, 5, 6 or 8 occur.
3.4.6. Link
The link has control and data signals that can be affected by faults. Soft
errors affecting the data signals cause flit corruption, which are detected in
the ingress filter of the next router. Soft errors in the control signals may
cause one-flit loss or blocking lasting one arbitration cycle, depending on
whether the valid signal or the flow-control is affected.
To prevent multi-flit loss due to synchronization issues when transmitting
flits as phits, a start-of-flit signal must be employed instead of a simple
valid signal. In the former, the signal is enabled only when transmitting
the first phit of a flit, while in the latter the signal is enabled during the
transmission of all phits.
The concept is illustrated in Figure 3.7, where a flit f is composed of 4
phits (f.1 to f.4) transmitted subsequently on the Data bus. The first phit
of a flit is highlighted with thick lines. In regular operation, Figure 3.7a,
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Figure 3.7.: Comparison of link input signals and the registered data using
start-of-flit and valid signals. a: regular operation; b,c: error
cases.
start-of-flit and valid signals have the same effect: the flit is received as
intended by the sender, the registered data. In case of an error causing the
start-of-flit to be set (or propagated) high one cycle later, only the affected
flit will be lost when transmitting flits back-to-back. This is seen in 3.7b
where the first received flit starts with the second phit but the subsequent
flit is received correctly. However, in the case of the valid signal, it is not
possible to identify the end of a flit and start of the next one. This is seen
in 3.7c, where first received flit starts with the second phit and includes
the first phit of the second flit, since the receiver expects four phits after
the valid signal is first set high. The same occurs to the subsequent flits,
resulting in the loss of all flits transmitted back-to-back on that link after
the error. Corrupt flits are discarded by the ingress filter (cf. Section 3.3
and Section 3.6).
Faults affecting the VC reservation signals introduced above may cause
the loss of a packet when it enables the transition 8 in Figure 3.5.
3.5. Between lower and upper layers
Before introducing the reliable transport, this section discusses what has
been achieved with the hardening so far.
As summarized in Table 3.1, the proposed fault containment ensures: in-
tegrity of the data utilized in the lower layers of the NoC (the flit header);
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and part of the real-time requirement as it prevents the error from prop-
agating to other traffic streams and to other routers. The resilient router
design ensures the resilience and the remaining part of the real-time re-
quirement by ruling out static effects and providing for a predictable re-
covery that can be limited in time.
The behavior of the network before applying the reliable transport can
be summarized as follows. On the end-to-end perspective at the NI, a
packet sent through the NoC and affected by an error is either:
1. delivered correctly,
2. delivered correctly with a small delay lrec,
3. delivered with corrupt payload,
4. or dropped/lost.
The reliable transport is responsible for guaranteeing the packet delivery
and guaranteeing the integrity of the transported data – i.e., the payload.
3.6. Reliable transport
Aiming at flexibility, the approach provides guaranteed delivery and pay-
load integrity on an end-to-end basis. Thus, the reliable transport is im-
plemented in the transport layer or above. It relies on EDCs or ECCs for
error detection and possibly correction and relies on protocols such as ARQ
and multipath routing for guaranteeing packet delivery.
The approach enables the system controller or application to config-
ure at runtime in the NI the appropriate configuration (combination of
protocol+EDC/ECC) for each transaction according to its characteristics,
reducing unnecessary overheads, both in terms of traffic and power con-
sumption. For instance, a DMA transfer may use its own optimized proto-
col, while a command to an actuator could use Stop-and-Wait ARQ. When
a retransmission cannot be afforded due to a deadline miss, multipath rout-
ing can be employed. Besides, periodic sensor readings may require only
integrity guarantee with EDC/ECC and no delivery guarantee. Moreover,
the above-described, diverse traffic may co-exist in the NoC.
Formal guarantees for ARQ-based protocols operating in the transport
layer of wormhole-switched NoCs will be introduced in Chapter 4. Three
protocols will be addressed: Stop-and-Wait, Go-Back-N and DMA ARQ,
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Figure 3.8.: Maximum latency of an 8kB DMA on different ARQ protocols
and error scenarios (cf. Section 4.4).
a protocol optimized for DMA transfers. Formal guarantees for other pro-
tocols, such as multipath routing, can be similarly derived. As will be seen
in Chapter 4, the latency overhead introduced by the protocols’ handshak-
ing is acceptable and they perform very well with typical real-time on-chip
traffic, provided that the appropriate configuration is employed. As an ex-
ample, the latency of an 8kB DMA transfer when using different protocols
and configurations is plotted in Figure 3.8 (further details on the setup in
Section 4.4). In the figure, in the error free case (0-error), the handshaking
overhead of ARQ is almost negligible for Go-Back-N with N = 4 (GBN4)
and the DMA ARQ (DMA).
To provide minimum performance guarantees, formal analyses assume
a given number of errors that the system may experience in a given time
interval, the so called k-error scenario [130, 13]. In the NoC, it translates to
errors affecting a given packet or transmission. k depends on the BER to
which the NoC is subjected and can be calculated using methods, e.g., in
[67]. k must be selected so that the probability that the packet or transmis-
sion experiences more than k errors, i.e., a failure, is negligible according
to compliance levels of safety standards [72, 69, 35]. The k-error scenario
is then used to calculate the worst-case latencies and response times of the
system under errors. Usually, at most one error will be considered since
the probability of two errors within a hundred clock cycles is negligible.
Finally, the end-to-end latencies in the NoC under errors depend on the
specific protocol.
Figure 3.8 shows latencies in scenarios with 0, 1 and 2 errors. Error
occurrences imply slightly longer latencies due to timeout triggering the
retransmission and the retransmission itself. Nonetheless, that does not
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prevent the use of ARQ in a real-time system. Alternatively, the error case
can be modeled as an overload scenario in typical worst-case response time
analysis [57]. However, exploring that idea is out of the scope of this work.
N.B. regarding the delay lrec: when employing retransmission protocols,
it is not necessary to know the exact value of lrec. The formal guarantee
under errors only requires lrec to be smaller than the time to retransmit
the packet (see Chapter 4).
3.7. Experimental evaluation
The resilient NoC was evaluated with respect to reliability, performance
under errors and implementation overhead when compared to the baseline
NoC. The performance under errors is evaluated with synthetic random
traffic as well as a real-world use case. The evaluation considers a NoC in a
2D-mesh topology with different sizes, 5 VCs, and one up-link per router.
From the reliable transport layer, only EDCs are employed to ensure the
payload integrity.
The objective of the experiments is to evaluate the predictability and
reliability of the NoC under soft errors. Thus, impact of bit-flips in the
NoC or the performance of ARQ-based protocols are not addressed here.
On the impact of soft errors in NoCs, the interested reader can refer to
Chapter 2. Transport protocols have well know properties and can be
applied on top of the resulting NoC. On that topic, the interested reader
can refer to Chapter 4.
3.7.1. Reliability
First, the reliability metric R(t) is evaluated, which is the probability that
the NoC does not fail during a time interval [0, t] [67]. In a high dependabil-
ity mixed-critical real-time system, the failure is defined as the violation of
integrity, resilience or real-time latency guarantees due to errors, including
static effects leading to blocking. Packet loss is not considered as a failure
since it is handled in the transport layer. In practice, expected BERs4
are in the order of 10−12 bit-flips per hour [6]. The design must however
4BERs derived for sequential and combinational logic [61] with data from [6] for 65nm
CMOS SRAM. Masking effects [41] are not taken into account.
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Figure 3.9.: Reliability comparison of the resilient NoC and non-resilient
ones. A 5x5 NoC size is considered.
consider higher rates as a safety margin [91]. Here, BERs from 10−12 up to
10−9/hour are considered. Additionally, a permanent fault rate of 10−11/h
per router5 is considered.
Figure 3.9 plots the analytical R(t) for the non-resilient, baseline NoC
and the proposed, resilient NoC considering a 5x5 2D-mesh topology. Two
variants of the baseline NoC with CRC checking (Base+CRC) and with
TMR (Base+TMR) are also plotted. The TMR is non-reparable with an
ideal voter [67]. It is clear that, independently of the BER, regular non-
resilient NoCs are limited in time due to errors from which they cannot
recover. Employing ingress filters (Base+CRC) improves the reliability but
it continues limited. Moreover, contrary to common sense, triplicating the
NoC does not make it more reliable with respect to soft errors. In time,
the more-than-double area overhead of the TMR has more impact than the
initial advantage of withstanding one error. The proposed hardening en-
ables the NoC to drastically increase the reliability in time by appropriately
containing soft errors and recovering from them.
Notice that the reliability of the resilient NoC in time, plotted in Fig-
ure 3.9, does not vary with the BERs. That is a consequence of the high
resilience to transient faults. Since the probability that the NoC fails due
to transient faults is so small, permanent faults become the dominating fac-
tor independently of the BER. In fact, at about 108 hours, the occurrence
probability of a permanent fault becomes significant and the reliability
starts decreasing. Notice that for the other NoCs (Baseline, Base+CRC,
5The occurrence of a permanent fault leads directly to failure. The fault rate per router
is inspired from processor failure rates in [111].
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Table 3.2.: Comparison of FIT rates
BER/h 3x3 NoC 5x5 NoC 8x8 NoC
Baseline
10−12 1.86 · 103 1.65 · 104 1.16 · 105
10−9 1.86 · 106 1.65 · 107 1.16 · 108
Base+CRC
10−12 2.02 · 102 1.78 · 103 1.24 · 104
10−9 2.01 · 105 1.78 · 106 1.24 · 107
Base+TMR
10−12 2.24 · 103 1.98 · 104 1.39 · 105
10−9 2.24 · 106 1.98 · 107 1.39 · 108
Resilient
10−12 9.0 · 10−2 2.5 · 10−1 6.4 · 10−1
10−9 9.0 · 10−2 2.5 · 10−1 6.4 · 10−1
and Base+TMR), a failure due to transient faults will certainly occur be-
fore a permanent fault occurs.
The FIT metric measures the number of failures in a billion hours of
device-hour operation [67]. Table 3.2 reports the FIT rates for different
NoC sizes and BERs. Even in small topologies, non-resilient NoCs present
very high failure rates. Besides, TMR leads to more failures than no re-
dundancy. To put the values in perspective, high dependability systems
(e.g., in the automotive domain) must present less than 10 random hard-
ware failures in time when implementing critical functionality with SIL 4,
the highest safety integrity level [69]. In a system providing less critical
functionality with SIL 1, the lowest integrity level, up to 104 FITs are ac-
ceptable [69]. Notice that a final FIT rate for the MPSoC must consider
other components, resulting in even larger FITs. As a component of the
final system, the MPSoC requires a dependable and resilient NoC.
Despite the NoC’s high reliability, errors still have an impact on the traf-
fic latency while the routers recover from them. That impact is evaluated
next.
3.7.2. Performance under errors: random traffic
The performance of traffic under errors was evaluated by means of error
injection experiments carried out in the OMNeT++ simulator [153]. For
that, uniform random traffic consisting of 3-flit packets was injected in the
NoC, with the injection rate varying with the experiment. The NoC oper-
ates with a clock period of 2ns and has a flit transmission time of 1 clock
cycle. The errors listed in Table 3.3, which were derived from the results of
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Table 3.3.: Error model
Component
Fault Effects on flits
Corruption Loss Derouting Blocking
IB X X X
Crossbar X X X
SA X X X
VCAC X
Link X X X
Section 2.3, were injected randomly6 into the NoC. The occurrence proba-
bility of an error depends on the affected data structure and the BER. The
employed BERs range from 10−9 up to 10−5/h. The high BERs are em-
ployed to stress the resilient NoC and evaluate and validate its behavior in
extreme scenarios that serve as lower bound for the expected performance
in lower error rates. Permanent faults are not modeled.
In the first experiment, faults were injected randomly throughout the
entire NoC. Figure 3.10 shows the observed worst-case performance of the
proposed NoC, as the load increases, for different NoC sizes, packets sizes
and BERs. Performance degradation is minimal even when experiencing
high error rates. By design, errors also cause packets to be dropped when
corrupted or derouted. On average, 1.11 · 10−14% of the packets were
dropped under BER 10−5, 1.11 · 10−16% under 10−7, and 1.11 · 10−18%
under 10−9.
The impact of errors on latency in the hardened NoC depends on the
number of errors that affect a packet in the network and on the current load
of the router where the error occurs. The load depends on the mapping,
the routing algorithm and indirectly on the NoC size – a larger NoC may
present higher loads in central routers, up to the maximum load a router is
able to handle. This can be seen in Figure 3.10a where maximum latencies
both in the error free and in the error cases increase with the load until
congestion occurs in the network – e.g., 0.33 in 5x5 NoC. Notice that the
latencies reported in Figure 3.10 comprise neither the retransmission nor
the time spent in the NI in case of congestion, only the time spent inside
the network.
Moreover, the experiment shows that the performance degradation is
6To speed-up simulation, errors were injected in active areas without impairing the
evaluation.
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Figure 3.10.: Observed worst-case NoC performance under random uni-
form traffic as the load increases, varying NoC sizes,
packet sizes and error rates.
predictable even under very high load and BER and that increasing the
packet size does not have major impact on the latency under errors. This
can be seen in Figure 3.10b, which shows the NoC performance when dou-
bling the packet size (6-flit packets).
In a second experiment, the error propagation between affected and un-
affected VCs were evaluated. Therefore, errors were injected only in the
central router and its links. The traffic streams were then classified into
affected, whose packets traversed the faulty router, and unaffected streams,
whose packets were not on VCs that were affected in the faulty router. It
was observed that error effects do not propagate between different VCs as
the latency, integrity and delivery of packets in unaffected VCs are not
affected. Considering that different traffic classes and criticalities are allo-
cated to different VCs in a mixed-critical system, that means that sufficient
independence is achieved in the presence of errors. The same behavior was
observed across different network sizes.
In a third experiment, the performance of the proposed NoC in time
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Figure 3.11.: Performance in time of the resilient NoC and a non-resilient,
baseline one. 5x5 NoCs, 3-flit packets, traffic injection rate
0.2 (flit/cycle/node) and BER=10−6.
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is evaluated and compared with a baseline one as errors are injected ran-
domly throughout the entire NoC. The results are reported in Figure 3.11,
where each plotted point represents a time interval of two thousand hours.
Figure 3.11a shows the number of failed streams in time, from a total of
25 traffic streams in the NoC. The definition of failure from Section 3.7.1
is employed. The resilient NoC is able to recover from errors, as it ensures
that soft errors have only transient effects. In contrast, the baseline NoC
is not able to do so and traffic streams become blocked when certain errors
occur. Notice that not all errors lead to a stream failure (see Section 2.3).
The packet delivery is reported in Figure 3.11b. The metric consists
of the overall number of packets delivered among all traffic streams in
the NoC relative to the error free case (100%). With time, the baseline
NoC delivers less packets as a result of blocking and static effects. In the
resilient NoC, on the other hand, packets are delivered continuously albeit
with expected loss (1.39 ·10−15%) due to the forward error recovery nature
of the approach.
The maximum latency observed in time in the resilient and baseline NoCs
are given in Figures 3.11c and 3.11d, respectively. The latencies are given
for each traffic stream, 25 in total (some lines overlap). The predictability
of the proposed NoC is seen as the maximum latency varies seldom and
within a limited range. In contrast, the unpredictable behavior of a non-
resilient NoC presents very high latencies or blocking (latencies equal 0).
Moreover, Figures 3.11c and 3.11d show the observed experimental trend
that was previously only illustrated in Figure 3.2.
In case of a NoC in a TMR configuration, latencies and packet delivery do
not vary under errors. The voter ensures that a packet sent is delivered as
soon as its delivery is correctness is confirmed – i.e., the packet is delivered
by 2-out-of-3 NoC instances. A longer latency in one of the NoC instances
shows that its behavior diverges from the others instances, indicating its
failure. That contrasts with the performance of the resilient NoC where
errors can cause the latency to vary. However, the unaffected latency and
packet delivery hold only as long as the TMR itself does not fail – i.e.,
2-out-of-3 instances survive. After the failure, depending on the voter, the
same behavior of the baseline NoC is observed.
In addition to the presented experiments, the proposed NoC has been
evaluated in many other experiments (thousands), where we vary the packet
sizes, traffic patterns, network sizes, and error rates. The experiments em-
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Figure 3.12.: Overview of the FMS application [40].
ployed benchmarks as well as randomly generated mappings and loads,
the latter as an effort to stimulate worst-case scenarios. Compared to the
results shown here, similar or better performance was observed across all
experiments – i.e., no worse case was observed including setups with dif-
ferent traffic patterns and packet sizes.
3.7.3. Performance under errors: FMS use case
The resilient NoC was also evaluated with a real-world use case, Thales’
FMS [40]. The Flight Management System is a high dependability embed-
ded application in modern avionics that automates several in-flight tasks.
It is widely found in civilian as well as in military aircraft. A functional
overview of Thales’ FMS [40] is shown in Figure 3.12 (arrows indicate the
data flow). The application consists of 6 task groups: Sensors, Localization,
Flightplan, Nearest, Trajectory and Guidance. The tasks in the groups are
executed periodically, when in automatic mode. Some of them can also be
triggered aperiodically through a manual intervention by the pilot. In our
evaluation, we focus on the Localization task group.
The Localization task group is responsible for periodically computing the
Best Computed Position (BCP), the most probable position of the aircraft,
using data from sensors, such as the Global Positioning System and the
Pure Inertia Reference System, received from the Sensors task group. The
task group is detailed in Figure 3.13 (arrows indicate the data flow). The
BCP computation also must account for settings that can be modified by
the pilot, captured in Figure 3.13 by the aperiodic tasks LOCA1, LOCA2
and LOCA3. The execution follows the Acquisition-Execution-Restitution
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Figure 3.13.: FMS: Localization task group [40].
task model, where at the end of each execution, the output of a task is
written to the dependent tasks’ buffers [40]. The FMS has, among others,
a requirement at the application level stating that a task can execute at
most 3 times without receiving new valid input data. In that case, the
last valid input data is used. After the third time, the task enters an error
mode – i.e., fails. Corrupt data is discarded and not considered as valid.
When mapped to an MPSoC, the tasks’ outputs are transferred over traf-
fic streams over the NoC. Table 3.4 list the traffic streams associated with
the periodic tasks of the Localization task group. For instance, the output
of LOCC1 is transferred to LOCC2’s buffer through stream C1→ C2 every
200ms on an 11-flit-long packet. To obtain a safe upper bound on the fail-
ure probability, this evaluation considers that each pair of communicating
tasks are mapped to the two tiles that lie the most distant from each other,
i.e., the corners of the NoC in a 2D-Mesh topology. That results in the
longest NoC traversal for each traffic stream.
Since the application tolerates data loss, the traffic streams only employ
EDCs to guarantee integrity in the reliable transport – i.e., traffic streams
do not employ a reliable transport protocol to guarantee delivery. For
other cases, such as application initialization which might require guaran-
teed data delivery, e.g., through DMA, the interested reader can refer to
Chapter 4.
The failure probability of the Localization task group due to soft errors
in the NoC is reported per stream and per task group in Table 3.4. The
failure probability in the resilient NoC equals to the probability that three
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Table 3.4.: Performance of localization computing tasks under BER 10−6/h
Traffic
Stream
Period
[s]
Size
(flits)
Failure probability (3 subseq. lost packets)
3x3 NoC 5x5 NoC 8x8 NoC
C1→ C2 0.2 11 1.31 · 10−39 2.57 · 10−39 5.64 · 10−39
C2→ C3 1.6 11 1.31 · 10−39 2.57 · 10−39 5.64 · 10−39
C2→ C4 1.6 11 1.31 · 10−39 2.57 · 10−39 5.64 · 10−39
C3→ C1 5 3 3.37 · 10−42 1.13 · 10−41 3.81 · 10−41
Task group overall: 3.94 · 10−39 7.71 · 10−39 1.69 · 10−38
subsequent packets are lost or corrupt while in the NoC. The evaluation
considered a BER of 10−6/h and different NoC sizes, and safely assumed
that each stream traverses the longest route in the NoC. Due to the NoC’s
properties, such as fault containment, and as shown in previous experi-
ments, it suffices to consider errors directly affecting the packets under
evaluation, which includes errors affecting the packet contents and regis-
ters critical to packet transmissions in the network. The worst-case packet
latencies were obtained from the application activation patterns and their
mapping in the NoC with [125].
The results per stream and per task group are listed in Table 3.4. The
very low failure probabilities per stream and also for the whole task group
show that this type of traffic can be safely transported in the network
without the use of transport protocols even under high BERs. It results
in less traffic in the network, since there is no overhead from transport
protocols, and consequently in lower power consumption. This type of
traffic is also typically seen in transmissions of periodic sensor readings.
3.7.4. Implementation overhead
The resilient NoC was implemented in VHDL and synthesized in Xilinx
ISE targeting a Virtex-6 FPGA (xc6vlx760) and a frequency of 100MHz.
The evaluation and comparison involved a 5-port router of the proposed
and the baseline NoCs. In comparison with baseline, the router size in
the resilient NoC increases 5.39% when accounting for total data stored
in the router. Optimized for FPGAs, the data buffers instantiate 5 Block
RAMs. Thus, the total data in the router corresponds to bits stored in
registers and in the BRAMs. Figure 3.14 details the resource usage and
total power for the router and its internal components. In the figure, the
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Figure 3.14.: Synthesis results for a 5-port router of the baseline NoC (B)
and the resilient NoC (R).
input buffer is divided into two categories: the control buffer and ingress
filter (CB+CRC+LOP) and the remaining components of the input buffer
(IB). Notice that the 5 BRAMs are not included in the figure.
The implementation overhead of the resilient NoC when compared to the
baseline is caused mainly by the ingress filter and by the resilient VC flow
control. Indeed, the ingress filter (CB+CRC+LOP) is responsible for most
of the additional register bits (43.73%) and 36.06% logic (LUTs). However,
such an ingress filter is a standard component in many approaches, such as
[80, 82] for NoCs and [98] for (off-Chip) Ethernet, and can be considered
as a necessary baseline resiliency cost. The overhead that is unique to the
proposed resilient approach is mainly introduced by the resilient VC flow-
control. The resilient VC flow-control (VCAC) requires additional wires in
the links and control logic, corresponding for 10.40% additional registers
and 34.92% additional logic. Other minor overheads are caused, e.g., by
the packet-dropping logic in the input buffer (IB).
The energy consumption was evaluated with Xilinx Power Analyzer
[156]. Under full load (random traffic with random payload), the resilient
router consumes 37.68% more energy than baseline (cf. Figure 3.14). When
idle (no traffic), the overhead is 0.28% (not shown in the Figure). Under
regular operation, the router load is expected to be closer to the latter than
to the former.
Figure 3.15 compares the overhead of the resilient NoC with the TMR
7Not including the data buffers, synthesized as Block RAMs.
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Figure 3.15.: Comparison of resilience overhead per router (Virtex-6
FPGA).
approach and related work [80]. The reader should keep in mind that,
despite the comparison, the two approaches are not equivalent (cf. Sec-
tion 3.1). Before discussing the results in Figure 3.15, two considerations
are required. First, the baseline router employed in the evaluation is very
lean, implemented with the minimal functionality required. Second, the
synthesis tool optimally maps the data buffers (28Kb each) to Block RAMs
of the FPGA, leading to an apparent large overhead with respect to the
register usage. To put it into perspective, our router stores over 17 times
more data than [80]’s. Nonetheless, our absolute overhead when synthe-
sized to the same Virtex-6 FPGA family is similar to [80]’s.
Considering the total data stored in the router including data buffers,
the relative overhead of resilient is only 5.39% as opposed to [80]’s 22.04%.
In comparison to TMR, not only is the resilience approach much more
efficient with respect to resource usage (area) and power but also more
effective (cf. Section 3.7.1). The resilience approach achieves predictability
and much higher reliability with only a fraction (5.39%) of TMR’s total
relative overhead of >200%. Moreover, the resilient NoC requires at most
37.68% (in a traffic peak) additional power while TMR has a constant
twofold power overhead. Besides, TMR implies a substantial increase in
interconnecting wires, leading to design routing complications, potential
congestion and lower frequencies.
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3.8. Summary
This chapter presented a resilient wormhole-switched NoC hardened against
soft errors. In contrast to the state-of-the-art, the proposed NoC aims at
the integrity, resilience and real-time requirements of high dependability
mixed-critical systems and addresses, at the same time, the challenge of
silent data corruption. To achieve that, the approach takes into account
all possible durations and impacts of soft errors, uncovered by means of an
FMEA. Errors are detected and handled by three mechanisms distributed
in different layers of the network stack. For the sake of predictability and
integrity, error-affected packets are dropped and guaranteed packet delivery
is selectively provided on an end-to-end basis. The resilient NoC presents a
predictable behavior even under very high error rates with formal guaran-
tees and acceptable hardware overhead, made evident by an experimental
evaluation that includes an industrial avionics use case.

4. ARQ Protocols for NoCs
ARQ protocols are widely used in practice to guarantee the delivery of
data transmissions over unreliable or noisy communication channels. They
can be employed in the data-link layer – over a link between two adjacent
network nodes – as well as in the transport layer – between sender and
receiver, across potentially multiple networks and nodes [147, 90]. Those
strategies are also known as Hop-to-Hop (H2H) and End-to-End (E2E),
respectively [13, 130].
The most traditional application of ARQ is on the transmission over a
single noisy communication channel – i.e., H2H [90]. In that case, ARQ
ensures a high level of reliability across a single transmission hop. As com-
munication lines became less noisy, ARQ protocols have been implemented
more often at the edges of the network to provide E2E reliability in the
transmission of packets over multiple hops in a network – i.e., over multi-
ple communication channels and network nodes [90]. The basic elements of
ARQ protocols consist of: information packets (DATA), which transfer the
user packets; control packets – Acknowledgements (ACKs) and Negative
Acknowledgements (NACKs); EDCs or ECCs – such as the CRC; and
timeout mechanisms. The basic elements are depicted in Figure 4.1.
ReceiverSender
DATA
ACK
Packet sequence
Error-free
packet sequence
ACK
DATA
Information packet
Control packet
EDC data header
EDCheader
timeout 
mechanism
Figure 4.1.: Basic elements of ARQ (adapted from [90]).
This chapter addresses the use of E2E ARQ protocols on real-time NoCs.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 discusses
the state of the art, followed by the modeling of E2E protocols on NoCs
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with Compositional Performance Analysis (CPA), a formal real-time anal-
ysis method, in Section 4.2. Next, Section 4.3 discusses three E2E protocol
variations in the context of NoC and formally analyzes them with respect
to worst-case latencies with CPA:
• Stop-and-Wait ARQ – the simplest variation;
• Go-Back-N ARQ – an extension of Stop-and-Wait for higher through-
put;
• DMA ARQ – variation optimized for bursty DMA transfers.
The first two are classic variations of ARQ, DMA ARQ is introduced in
this thesis. Section 4.4 presents the evaluation with simulation as well as
analytical results. Finally, Section 4.5 summarizes the chapter.
4.1. Related work
Many mechanisms for increasing the reliability of the NoC have been
proposed throughout the years. They have been compared in terms of
power and area overheads as well as their resulting reliability improve-
ment. [16, 43] investigate the energy-reliability trade-off between different
soft error detection and recovery strategies at the data-link layer. Kim et al.
and Murali et al. present analyses of NoC designs with respect to perfor-
mance, reliability and energy perspective. They allow a good comparison
between different design choices and error recovery schemes applied in both
data-link and transport layers. The latency estimations however are either
based on queueing theory [81] or simulation [104], and thus cannot provide
the bounds required in the real-time domain [79].
In real-time systems, formal performance analyses play an important role
by guaranteeing responsiveness in time. For NoCs as well as networks in
general, formalisms such as Network Calculus, schedulability and response-
time analyses, and dataflow analysis can be employed to provide minimum
performance guarantees [79]. Those guarantees are usually with respect
to latency and backlog, which address performance as well as resource
dimensioning.
Network calculus is a mathematical framework for deriving worst-case
bounds on latency and backlog in a single node as well as a network of
nodes. It is similar to conventional system theory, where a system is de-
scribed as a set of input, transfer and output functions. In network calculus,
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those functions are referred to as arrival, service and output curves, respec-
tively. Its theory was pioneered by Cruz in [29, 30] and further developed
by Chang and Le Boudec and Thiran with the min-plus algebra, where ad-
dition and multiplication from conventional system theory are replaced by
minimum and addition, respectively. In the context of NoCs, worst-case flit
and packet delays per traffic stream were obtained for wormhole-switched
and packet-switched NoCs [119, 120]. Relevant extensions of network cal-
culus are stochastic network calculus [73] and real-time calculus [25].
Schedulability and response time analysis is a mathematical formalism
for investigating the timing properties in real-time systems [79]. Origi-
nally proposed for the analysis of uniprocessor systems [92], schedulability
analysis has been greatly extended over the years to cover more general
workload models as well as multiprocessing and NoCs [14, 142]. In schedu-
lability analyses, workloads consist of tasks that are activated according
with activation models – e.g., periodic and sporadic are two examples of
models, where tasks are released at regular, periodic intervals or released
at arbitrary times with a specified minimum distance between activations,
respectively. Besides the activation model, tasks have other attributes,
such as, the Worst-Case Execution Time (WCET) and the relative dead-
line – i.e., how much work the task requires and when the work must be
finished the latest, respectively. Given the mapping of tasks to resources
and their scheduling policies, the schedulability analysis can test whether
the system is schedulable or not. Besides testing for schedulability, re-
sponse time analyses also report metrics such as Worst-Case Response
Time (WCRT) and maximum number of pending activations – those cor-
respond to worst-case latency and backlog in networks, respectively. In
the context of NoCs, many analyses have been developed, being the most
recent ones [125, 23, 71, 70, 158].
Relevant to this work is CPA [62]. The CPA framework has been widely
used for modeling off-Chip communication, such as switched Ethernet [31,
148] and CAN buses [11]. CPA is a response-time analysis framework with
event models that resemble Network Calculus and it will be introduced
with details in Section 4.2.1.
A formal communication time analysis of wormhole-switched NoCs with
two-stage arbitration was proposed in [33]. Based on CPA, the analysis
provides latency bounds for individual traffic streams on the network. The
work has been extended in [125] to support the sharing of virtual channels
by traffic streams. The analysis and its guarantees are valid in the real-
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time domain but they have the implicit assumption that no errors affect
the network, and hence, the transmission.
ARQ protocols have been formally analyzed by Axer et al. for general
packet-switched networks. They address the variants Stop-and-Wait ARQ
and Go-Back-N ARQ. The CPA-based analysis models the protocols on
the transport layer and considers both the error-free and the error cases.
The analysis however cannot be directly applied to NoCs, whose more
advanced designs feature wormhole-switching. In wormhole-switched net-
works, packets are composed of flits and the arbitration is performed in a
flit granularity [125]. Thus, an integration of the transport layer analysis,
operating on a packet basis, with the NoC analysis, operating on a flit
basis, is required. To the best of my knowledge, no formal analysis has
addressed the use of ARQ-based protocols for NoCs.
4.2. Modeling end-to-end transport protocols
Transport protocols, such as DMA ARQ and Go-Back-N ARQ, introduce
an additional flow control to the communication. That comes from pack-
ets that are retained, e.g., due to the protocol’s handshaking or due to
a retransmission – i.e., until ACKs from previous packets are received or
until a timeout occurs, respectively. A circular dependency is then formed
where the performance of the transport layer depends on the network per-
formance, which in turn depends on the traffic injected by the transport
layer. The problem of providing formal performance bounds for such net-
works is solved here using CPA, which provides for an easy integration of
both network and transport layer analyses due to its compositional nature.
4.2.1. Compositional Performance Analysis (CPA)
CPA relies on independent local analyses of system resources, such as router
ports and CPUs, and a global analysis loop, which aggregates the local
results [62]. It provides worst-case response times and jitter of tasks. The
system model is based on resources providing services, tasks consuming
these services, and event models specifying task activation patterns. Task
activations are triggered by an external source or by events propagated from
other tasks (predecessor tasks). The activations in an event model are given
by event arrival curves η−(∆t) and η+(∆t), which return the minimum
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and maximum number of events that can arrive in a given time interval
∆t, respectively. Their pseudo-inverse counterparts δ+(q) and δ−(q) return
the maximum and minimum time interval between the first and last events
in any sequence of q event arrivals, respectively.
The conversion between η+(∆t) and δ−(q) can be performed as follows
[109]:
η+(∆t) = max
q∈N+
{q : δ−(q) ≤ ∆t} (4.1)
δ−(q) = inf
∆t∈R+0
{∆t : η+(∆t) ≥ q} (4.2)
The conversion between η−(∆t) and δ+(q) is omitted but can be similarly
derived [135, 109]. It is worth mentioning that event arrival curves are
non-decreasing and that the upper bound η+(∆t) is sub-additive [87]. The
minimum distance function δ−(q) is therefore non-decreasing and super-
additive [109].
The analysis is carried out in a local step and a global loop. In the
local step, the local analysis uses the busy window approach [149] to derive
each task’s response time and output event model. In the global loop, the
analysis propagates the output event models of tasks to their dependent
tasks, which are activated by the completion of other tasks, becoming then
their input event models. The analysis stops when all event models are
stable – i.e., a fix point is reached – or when predefined constraints are
violated – e.g., the maximum response time or maximum latency of a
traffic stream.
4.2.2. Transport and network layer modeling
The analysis problem is modeled in CPA based on the modelling of [13] and
illustrated in Figure 4.2. The analysis’ starting point is the traffic stream
producing packets at the sender according to a given packet-based event
model δtx. The packets are handled at the transport layer by an arbitrary
transport protocol. A protocol instance is modeled as a single task τarq
whose response time reflects the protocol behavior. The transport layer
then injects traffic into the lower layers of the NoC according to the output
event model δarq of that task.
As illustrated in Figure 4.2, a protocol with handshaking is a bidirec-
tional communication stream. In the NoC, it is mapped as two unidirec-
tional streams: one for the transmitted data (DATA, sender → receiver)
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Figure 4.2.: Modeling of transport layer protocol and the underlying NoC
in CPA.
and the other for the acknowledgements (ACK, receiver → sender). The
lower layers of the NoC, also referred to as the underlying NoC, are mod-
eled in CPA as in [125]: each output port of a router is mapped as a
resource, and traffic streams are chains of tasks mapped to resources. The
resource arbitration depends on the router arbitration policy. For details
on the analysis of the underlying NoC, the interested reader is referred to
[125].
The transport layer operates on a packet granularity and so does its
analysis – i.e., δtx and δarq model packet arrivals. The analysis of the
NoC, however, can be performed on a packet or flit granularity depending
on whether the network is packet- or wormhole-switched. Thus, an appro-
priate conversion between the two domains is required. That is shown in
Figure 4.2 between the sender and the NoC, and between the NoC and the
receiver.
The conversion from a packet-based event model δ−pkt,i(q) to a flit-based
one δ−flt,i(q) is given by:
δ−flt,i(q) = max
{
(q − 1) · dmin ,
δ−pkt,i
( dq ÷ sizeie )+ [(q − 1) mod sizei] · dmin} (4.3)
where the index i refers to a traffic stream i, sizei is the size of any data
packet in stream i (in flits), and dmin is the minimum distance between two
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consecutive flits [125]. The q-th flit activation depends on the activation
of the packet containing the q-th flit plus an offset depending on the flit’s
position in the packet (second term). The first term enforces the minimum
distance between q flit activations. For q ≤ 1, δ−flt,i(q) = 0.
The conversion from a flit-based event model δ−flt,i(q) to a packet-based
one δ−pkt,i(q) is given by:
δ−pkt,i(q) = δ
−
flt,i
(
(q − 1) · sizei + 1
)
(4.4)
The q-th packet activation depends on the activation of the first flit of the
q-th packet. For q ≤ 1, δ−pkt,i(q) = 0.
The relation between flit-based and packet-based event models and the
relation between the event-arrival and the minimum distance functions of
CPA are illustrated in Figure 4.3. Figure 4.3a plots the minimum distance
function δ−pkt,i(q), which represents packet arrivals. Figure 4.3b plots the
respective flit-based function δ−flt,i(q) derived from δ
−
pkt,i(q) considering a
packet size sizei = 2 flits. For every packet activation in δ
−
pkt,i(q), there
are two flit activations of δ−flt,i(q). The relation between the event-arrival
functions and their pseudo-inverse, minimum distance functions, can be
seen then between Figures 4.3a and 4.3c and between Figures 4.3b and
4.3d. The conversion between functions is performed with Equations 4.1
and 4.2.
The ACKs are injected back in the network by the receiver δack, seen
at the right-hand side in Figure 4.2. Protocols acknowledging each packet
individually, such as Stop-and-Wait, inject ACKs in the network whenever
a packet arrives – i.e., δack = δrx. Protocols that acknowledge blocks of
packets instead must perform an event model conversion from δrx to δack.
The acknowledgement event model δack is derived from the receiver’s input
event model δrx as follows:
δ−ack,i(q) = δ
−
rx,i
(
(q − 1) · gi + 1
)
(4.5)
where gi is the number of packets that the protocol receives before sending
an ACK. For q ≤ 1, δ−ack,i(q) = 0.
The analysis is then carried out in two local steps and a global loop,
extending the regular CPA flow with one additional step for the transport
layer (cf. Section 4.2.1). First, the NoC analysis computes the worst-case
network latency 1 . Then, the transport analysis derives the worst-case
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Figure 4.3.: Relation between packet-based and event-based event-models
(a↔b and c↔d) and between the event-arrival and the mini-
mum distance functions (a↔c and b↔d).
transport latency and updates the output event models accordingly 2 .
The global loop proceeds as usual in CPA.
The transport layer analysis and derived metrics – e.g., latency – depend,
naturally, on the specific protocol that is being modeled. The analysis and
metrics of specific protocols are introduced in Section 4.3.
The underlying NoC analysis is arbitrary. That is, the analysis of a
two-stage round-robin NoC [125] or the analysis of a NoC with priority-
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based arbitration can be used without changing the transport layer anal-
ysis. Therefore, the interface between the transport and network analyses
is defined next.
4.2.3. Interface with the underlying NoC analysis
The inputs for the NoC analysis are the event models δarq,i and δack,i,
which model the traffic in the data stream i and its ACK stream iack,
respectively. The event model conversion shall be appropriately applied
where required, as discussed above.
The output of the underlying NoC analysis is used as input to the
transport layer analysis in the form of best- and worst-case Round-Trip
Times (RTTs).
Definition 4.1. (Round-Trip Time)
The Round-Trip Time comprises the time it takes for a packet to be trans-
mitted by the sender and received by the receiver plus the time it takes for
the respective acknowledgement to be created and transmitted by the receiver
and to be received back at the sender.
RTT−i and RTT
+
i are lower and upper bounds on the Round-Trip Time,
respectively. The upper bound RTT+i is obtained from the worst-case la-
tency of a data packet L+i and the worst-case latency of its acknowledge-
ment L+iack as follows:
RTT+i = L
+
i + L
+
iack
(4.6)
Similarly, the lower bound RTT−i is calculated using best-case latencies:
RTT−i = L
−
i + L
−
iack
(4.7)
The best- and worst-case latencies L−i and L
+
i of any packet in a stream
i is then defined as follows:
L−i = l
−
i (sizei) (4.8)
where l−i (sizei) is the best-case latency to transmit sizei flits in the NoC;
and
L+i = l
+
i (sizei) (4.9)
where l+i (sizei) is the worst-case latency to transmit sizei flits in the NoC.
Both l−i (sizei) and l
+
i (sizei) are provided by the underlying NoC analysis
as seen in [125].
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4.3. Formal analysis of ARQ protocols
4.3.1. Stop-and-Wait ARQ
ARQ-based protocols are widely used to guarantee packet delivery [147]. In
its simplest variant Stop-and-Wait [147, 90], for each transmitted packet,
the sender waits for an ACK from the receiver before transmitting the next
packet or, in case of error, retransmitting after a timeout.
An illustrative example is shown in Figure 4.4, where a sender transmits
packets one after the other. Stop-and-Wait sends a packet at time 1 and
waits for an ACK. The receiver acknowledges the successful delivery of the
packet at time 2 . At time 3 , packet 3 is not successfully delivered due
to an error in the network. After a timeout 4 , the sender retransmits the
packet. Out-of-order and duplicated packets are discarded.
Sender
Receiver
time
1
1
ACK
2
2
RTT
3 3
timeout
1 3 4
3
2
4
4
Figure 4.4.: A transmission under Stop-and-Wait ARQ: example 1.
The receiver only accepts and acknowledges packets in-order. However,
there are special cases where, due to a lost ACK, the sender retransmits
a packet. This is illustrated in Figure 4.5, where, at time 1 , packet 3
is successfully received but the ACK is lost due to an error. When the
timeout expires 2 , the sender retransmits the packet. Since the packet
was already accepted by the receiver, at time 3 the packet is discarded
but acknowledged nonetheless.
The RTT, also depicted in the figures above, is highly relevant in ARQ-
based protocols due to its impact on performance. The timeout of the ARQ
must be chosen based on the RTT, so that a retransmission will be triggered
only in case of an actual error and not because of latency fluctuations. In
Stop-and-Wait ARQ, RTT has also a direct impact on the throughput as
4.3. Formal analysis of ARQ protocols 91
Sender
Receiver
time
1
1
ACK
2
2
RTT
3 3
timeout
1 3
D
2
4
43
Figure 4.5.: A transmission under Stop-and-Wait ARQ: example 2.
it limits the rate at which a packet can actually be transmitted. In case
the RTT becomes a limiting factor, more complex protocols can be used,
such as the Go-Back-N.
The timeout is crucial for any handshake-based protocol. It is defined
next, for easy reference throughout the chapter.
Definition 4.2. (Timeout)
The timeout period is larger than the worst-case RTT (Definition 4.1).
The Stop-and-Wait protocol can be seen as a special case of the Go-
Back-N protocol, which is introduced in the sequel. The interested reader
can refer to Appendix A for more details on Stop-and-Wait ARQ.
4.3.2. Go-Back-N ARQ
The limited throughput of Stop-and-Wait is improved in Go-Back-N [147].
Go-Back-N allows n packets to be sent before stopping and waiting for an
acknowledgement, thus, allowing the transmission of bursts of packets with
periods shorter than the RTT. To achieve that, it introduces the concept
of a send window with a parameterizable size, usually denoted n.
An illustrative example is shown in Figure 4.6. Go-Back-N sends n = 3
packets at time 1 before waiting for an ACK. The receiver acknowledges
the successful delivery of each packet 2 . In 3 , packet 7 is not successfully
delivered. After a timeout tout, the sender retransmits all unacknowledged
packets 4 . Out-of-order and duplicated packets are discarded. Notice that
Stop-and-Wait can be seen as a case of Go-Back-N with a send window of
size n = 1.
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Figure 4.6.: A transmission under Go-Back-N ARQ (n=3): example 1.
A similar situation as seen in Stop-and-Wait (Figure 4.5) occurs in Go-
Back-N. Although the receiver only accepts packets in-order, there are
special cases where, due to a lost ACK, the receiver will acknowledge the
same packet twice. This is illustrated in Figure 4.7, where, at time 1 ,
packets 7, 8 and 9 are successfully received but an ACK is lost due to an
error. Upon the timeout expiration, at time 2 , the sender retransmits,
starting with the earliest unacknowledged packet. Since packets 7, 8 and 9
were already accepted by the receiver, at time 3 the packets are discarded
but acknowledged nonetheless.
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Figure 4.7.: A transmission under Go-Back-N ARQ (n=3): example 2.
Thanks to the modelling proposed in this thesis, the transport layer
analysis for NoCs can reuse existing analysis for general packet-switched
networks. For the sake of completeness and discussion of experimental
results later on, relevant parts of analysis of Go-Back-N ARQ of Axer are
reproduced in Appendix A along with more details about the protocol.
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4.3.3. DMA ARQ
Go-Back-N ARQ performs well for traffic without or with very small bursts.
With bursts, as in the case of DMA transfers, it requires large send windows
to deliver good performance [147], implying large retransmission buffers
and, thus, area and power overheads [104]. To achieve lower latencies with
reduced area overhead, an ARQ protocol optimized for DMAs, the DMA
ARQ, is proposed. The protocol is a variation of Go-Back-N, where the
send window is increased to match the transfer size. In case of errors,
packets are selectively repeated, similar to Selective Repeat [147]. The
protocol’s implementation is enabled by exploiting two properties found in
DMA transfers.
First, it exploits the fact that the number of packets in a DMA transfer,
the transfer size ndma, is known beforehand. That allows the protocol to
acknowledge the whole transfer instead of each packet individually. As
a result, the throughput of a transfer is not limited by the protocol. In
case the transfer was not successful, a NACK is sent, selectively requesting
the retransmission of missing and corrupt packets. Correct packets can be
processed and have their contents forwarded to the memory controller as
soon as they arrive, since the memory address of each packet’s contents
can be inferred from the transfer’s initial address.
Second, due to the nature of DMA transfers, it is not necessary to keep
packets in a retransmission buffer. In case of retransmission, the data from
missing or corrupt packets can be read from the sender’s local memory.
Notice that this is only possible for DMA traffic. In general traffic, the data
is not accessible – e.g., a non-blocking uncached write issued by a processor.
The protocol implementation avoids overhead in area but increases the
overhead in time in case of a retransmission, requiring an additional time
tmem to read from the local memory. Furthermore, the protocol assumes
that memory consistency is guaranteed independently by a mechanism in
software or hardware, as seen in modern systems.
An illustrative example of an error free scenario is shown in Figure 4.8.
The sender starts a transfer with size ndma = 9 at time 1 . All packets are
immediately transmitted back-to-back. At the end of the transfer 2 , the
receiver acknowledges the entire transfer. After receiving the acknowledge-
ment that finishes the transaction 3 , the protocol is ready for a second
transfer, which starts after some time 4 .
A second example illustrates in Figure 4.9 the protocol operating un-
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Figure 4.8.: Transmission under DMA ARQ: example 1.
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Figure 4.9.: Transmission under DMA ARQ: example 2.
der the occurrence of two errors. The sender starts a transfer with size
ndma = 9 at time 1 . All packets are immediately transmitted back-to-
back. Eventually, a packet is not successfully delivered 2 , and the receiver
sends a NACK at the end of the transfer. The data to be retransmitted,
which was transported in packet 7, is read from the local memory and the
packet is retransmitted at time 3 . Packet 7 is received but the acknowl-
edgement is lost. After a timeout 4 , the sender retransmits the last packet
of the transfer. The duplicate packet is dropped but still acknowledged,
and the transfer ends.
The interested reader can refer to Appendix A for more details on DMA
ARQ, including its finite state machine.
The worst-case communication time analysis of DMA ARQ is presented
in two parts. First, it addresses the protocol behavior in the error-free sce-
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nario. Then, the worst-case impact of errors on a transmission is evaluated
and incorporated into the analysis. The analysis models the data transfer
itself, corresponding to a write DMA transfer. A write differs from a read
in that the latter has a request packet that starts the transfer. The analysis
assumes that the network interface itself is not faulty and that it is able to
detect packet corruption – e.g., using CRC-based integrity check.
4.3.3.1. Formal analysis: the error-free case
To obtain the worst-case end-to-end latency of a packet under DMA ARQ,
it is necessary to derive, among others, the contribution of the protocol to
the latency. That is captured by the WCRT of DMA ARQ R+dma,i, which
is the largest period of time in which a packet is retained by the protocol.
The analysis relies on the busy window approach [149]. Therefore, the
analysis starts by deriving the busy period for the protocol.
The busy period wdma,i is the largest time interval in which packets
arrive at the transport layer and need to be queued while the DMA ARQ
protocol is waiting for ACKs of previous packets. It is given by:
wdma,i =
⌊
η+tx,i(wdma,i)− 1
ndma
⌋
·RTT+i (4.10)
Equation 4.10 forms an integer fixed point problem typical in busy-window-
based analyses – wdma,i is present on both sides of the equation. The prob-
lem can be solved iteratively, starting with a very small  > 0 (wdma,i = ).
Lemma 4.1. The busy window is upper bounded by Equation 4.10.
Proof. The proof is by direct deduction. In DMA ARQ, all packets are
transmitted as soon as they are generated. The only blocking that can be
caused by the protocol to a packet is when a transfer ends. At the end of
each transfer, the protocol waits for an acknowledgement before starting
the next one, taking at most RTT+i per complete transfer of ndma packets.
That is exactly what is captured by wdma,i in Equation 4.10, which is
therefore an upper bound.
The Worst-Case Multiple Packet Forwarding TimeB+dma,i(q) is the largest
time interval to forward a sequence of q packets, here assuming error-free
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conditions. Considering that the first packet of a sequence is starting a
transfer, the B+dma,i(q) of a stream i is given by:
B+dma,i(q) =
⌊
q − 1
ndma
⌋
·RTT+i + δ−tx,i(q) (4.11)
Lemma 4.2. The Worst-Case Multiple Packet Forwarding Time B+dma,i(q)
given by Equation 4.11 is an upper bound.
Proof. The proof is by induction. When q = 1, the packet can be forwarded
immediately, since it is starting a transfer and the protocol is idle. In a
subsequent q + 1-th activation, the packet can be immediately forwarded
unless it belongs to a subsequent transfer, i.e., it is the first packet q =
x · ndma + 1 of a subsequent transfer x > 1. In that case, Equation 4.11
must account for the delay due to waiting for an ACK, which takes at
most time RTT+i , every subsequent new transfer, i.e., every ndma packets.
Additionally, the packet cannot be forwarded before its arrival δ−tx,i(q).
That results in Equation 4.11.
The Best-Case Multiple Packet Forwarding Time B−dma,i(q) is the small-
est time interval to forward q packets. Considering that the first packet is
starting the transfer, it is given by:
B−dma,i(q) =
⌊
q − 1
ndma
⌋
·RTT−i (4.12)
Lemma 4.3. The Best-Case Multiple Packet Forwarding Time B−dma,i(q)
given by Equation 4.12 is a lower bound.
Proof. The proof is omitted for brevity, since it follows the same reasoning
as the proof of Lemma 4.2, but considering the best-case round-trip latency
RTT−i instead of RTT
+
i .
The Worst-Case Response Time R+dma,i is the largest time interval that
any packet is delayed by DMA ARQ before being forwarded to the network.
The R+dma,i of a stream i is bounded by:
R+dma,i = max
1≤q≤η+tx,i(wdma,i)
{B+dma,i(q)− δ−tx,i(q)} (4.13)
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Theorem 4.1. R+dma,i (Equation 4.13) provides an upper bound on the
response time of an arbitrary packet in the traffic stream i transmitted
under DMA ARQ.
Proof. The WCRT of an arbitrary packet in the traffic stream i is obtained
with the busy window approach [149]. The response time of the q-th packet
is the time between its arrival (δ−tx,i(q), a lower bound) and its injection
in the network (B+dma,i(q), an upper bound). The WCRT is then found
as the maximum among the response times of activations occurring inside
the busy window wdma,i [149]. It remains to prove that the busy window
is correctly captured by Equation 4.10, and that the blocking captured in
Equation 4.11 is an upper bound. Those are proved in Lemmas 4.1 and
4.2, respectively.
The event model capturing the traffic injection in the network by DMA
ARQ can now be derived. The output event model δ−dma,tx propagated by
the transport layer, under error-free conditions, is obtained as follows:
δ−dma,tx(q) = max{δ−tx(q)−R+dma +R−dma, B−dma(q − 1)} (4.14)
Theorem 4.2. The minimum distance function δ−dma,tx(q) given by Equa-
tion 4.14 is a lower bound.
Proof. Packets can leave DMA ARQ as soon as they arrive and are pro-
cessed but not faster than the DMA ARQ is able to process them. That is
captured by the max function. The proof is by cases, with two cases that
must be lower bounds. The first case is when the packets leave the DMA
ARQ as fast as they are arrive. Since packets can be affected by delay in the
DMA ARQ resulting in a jitter (R+dma−R−dma) that is propagated with the
output event model. That is guaranteed to be a lower bound. The proof
is given in [137]. The second case is that any q packets cannot be closer to
each other than what the DMA ARQ is able to process. That is captured
by B−dma(q− 1), which is proved to be a lower bound in Lemma 4.3. Since
both cases are lower bounds, Equation 4.14 is also a lower bound.
Finally, the time it takes to complete a transfer using DMA ARQ can
be bounded. The overall latency L+dma,i(q) of a transfer comprising q data
packets in a stream i is given by:
L+dma,i(q) = δ
−
tx,i(q) + L
+
i +R
+
dma,i (4.15)
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where one complete transfer consists of q = ndma packets.
Theorem 4.3. Equation 4.15 gives an upper bound on the overall latency
to complete a transfer of q data packets.
Proof. The proof is by direct deduction. The latency consists of the time
it takes for the sender to create q packets (δ−tx,i(q)), plus the latency it
takes for the last (q-th) packet to be delivered by the network, plus the
worst-case delay for that packet introduced by the protocol (R+dma,i). Due
to causality – i.e., packets cannot bypass each other – all previous packets
must have been received by the time the last packet is received. Thus,
Equation 4.15 is a valid upper bound.
4.3.3.2. Formal analysis: the error case
In this section, the error-free assumption is removed and the analysis is
extended to consider scenarios where a number of errors affect the trans-
mission, the so-called k-error scenario [8, 13]. A k-error scenario is a sce-
nario where during the transmission of q packets, k error occurrences are
assumed. The formal analysis conservatively assumes that each error oc-
currence has the worst-case impact.
As described in Chapter 2, errors can have several types of effects in
the NoC, such as latency increase, packet corruption, and packet loss.
This analysis assumes that the wost case impact of an error is packet
loss. Moreover, the analysis assumes that errors are transient. Those
assumptions have the following consequences. Packet corruption can be
seen as a case of packet loss – corruption causes the packet to be eventually
discarded by the receiver after an integrity check. An error-induced latency
increase is assumed to be lower than and bounded by the time it takes to
retransmit a lost packet. In case the assumptions above do not hold during
operation – for example due to a permanent fault or a transient fault with
static effects –, their violation can be detected and reported by monitoring
the protocol’s performance during runtime. That is, if an application is
dimensioned to allow a maximum of k = 2 errors in a given transmission,
the occurrence of k > 2 error occurrences, which could lead to timing
violations, can be monitored and reported to the system controller or OS
as hardware failure.
The worst-case impact of a packet loss on a transfer under the DMA
ARQ protocol is when the ACK packet is lost right before being delivered,
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similar to Go-Back-N (cf. Section A.2.2 and [13]). It causes the maximum
load in the network and the maximum delay. The intuition is given by
means of an example in the sequel, followed by a proof in Lemma 4.4.
Figure 4.10 illustrates the three possible candidates for a 1-error scenario.
The error can either affect a control packet (ACK) (cf. Figure 4.10a), a
data packet (cf. Figure 4.10b), or a trailing data packet (cf. Figure 4.10c).
A 2-error scenario affecting control packets is shown in Figure 4.10d.
The 1-error worst-case scenario is shown in Figure 4.10a. After 1 all
ndma = 9 data packets of the transfer arrive at the receiver, the ACK
packet is lost 2 . That causes 3 a retransmission of the last data packet
(local memory access tmem plus RTT
+
i ), which is triggered after a timeout
tout. The ACK is then received and the transfer ends successfully at time
4 . In the worst case, tout + tmem +RTT
+
i additional time is required. In
a 2-error scenario (Figure 4.10d), a second retransmission occurs after a
timeout 4 due to a second error, after which the transfer ends successfully
5 . In summary, in the worst case, k · (tout + tmem + RTT+i ) additional
time is required for k errors.
For the sake of completeness, Figure 4.10b illustrates an alternative 1-
error scenario where the error affects a data packet 2 . In that case, at
the end of the transfer 3 the receiver sends a NACK requesting the re-
transmission of the missing data packet. That requires tmem + 2 · RTT+i
additional time, which is, by definition, smaller than tout + tmem +RTT
+
i
(cf. Definition 4.2). The third possible 1-error scenario is shown in Fig-
ure 4.10c, where the error affects the trailing data packet 2 . In that case,
the receives no ACK and retransmits the trailing data packet after a time-
out 3 . That requires tout + tmem +RTT
+
i additional time, similar to the
aforementioned worst case. Notice, however, that the scenario injects less
traffic in the network than the aforementioned worst case, as one less ACK
packet is transmitted. The general k-error worst-case scenario is featured
in Lemma 4.4, including a proof.
Lemma 4.4. The worst-case impact of a packet loss on a transfer is when
the ACK packet is lost right before being delivered (cf. Figures 4.10a and
4.10d). It assumes that the loss of any data packet does not cause the failure
of the entire transmission. In the worst case, k · (tout + tmem + RTT+i )
additional time is required for k errors.
Proof. The proof is by direct deduction.
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Figure 4.10.: Transmission under DMA ARQ: error scenarios.
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Table 4.1.: Different ways errors can affect a DMA ARQ transmission.
Affected packet Consequence Additional time
Data packet (first) retr. + mem. tmem+RTT
+
i
Data packet (subseq.) retr. + mem. tmem
Trailing data packet timeout + retr. + mem. tout+tmem+RTT
+
i
Retrans. data packet
(first)
timeout + retr. + mem. tout+tmem+RTT
+
i
Retrans. data packet
(subseq.)
retr. + mem. tmem
Trailing retrans.
data packet
timeout + retr. + mem. tout+tmem+RTT
+
i
Control packet
(ACK/NACK)
timeout + retr. + mem. tout+tmem+RTT
+
i
The possible ways an error can affect a DMA ARQ transmission is sum-
marized in Table 4.1, which shows what packet was affected by the error,
what is the consequence in the protocol execution (timeout, retransmis-
sion, and memory access) and what is the additional time required. Notice
that some scenarios are only possible in case of multiple errors – e.g., an
error affecting a retransmitted data packet – those are emphasized in italic.
Moreover, the table differentiates between a first occurrence of an error and
subsequent ones, which present different timing impact – e.g., retransmit-
ting a second data packet in a same burst requires less additional time since
it reuses the acknowledgement already required for the first retransmitted
data packet.
From all possible error impacts, an error (1-error scenario) affecting ei-
ther a trailing data packet, a retransmitted data packet, a trailing retrans-
mitted packet or a control packet present the most drastic consequence: a
timeout event triggers a retransmission requiring a memory access. That
corresponds to tout + tmem + RTT
+
i additional time in the transmission
that was directly affected by the error.
When considering a k-error scenario, the worst-case impact is when each
of the k error occurrences result in tout + tmem + RTT
+
i additional time.
Thus, the k-error scenario results in k·(tout+tmem+RTT+i ) total additional
time.
Finally, since the choice of the aforementioned scenarios is arbitrary in
terms of protocol execution, one scenario is chosen to represent the worst-
case scenario. Due to its simplicity and due to the fact that it results in the
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largest number of packets1 injected in the NoC, the scenario where every
error in a k-error scenario affects a control packet (ACK) is chosen as the
worst-case scenario. Losing the ACK packet causes the retransmission of
the last packet is triggered after a timeout tout (cf. Figure 4.10a at time
3 ). The retransmission requires a local memory access with time tmem plus
time RTT+i for sending a data packet and receiving its acknowledgement.
Similarly, a second error causes a second retransmission after a timeout
(cf. Figure 4.10d at time 4 ). The resulting additional time is k · (tout +
tmem +RTT
+
i ), for k errors.
First, the impact of errors is integrated into the busy period. The k-error
busy period wdma,i(k) is now given by:
wdma,i(k)=k · (terr +RTT+i ) +
⌊
η+tx,i(wdma,i(k))− 1
ndma
⌋
·RTT+i (4.16)
where terr = tout + tmem. In the worst case, in addition to the error-free
busy window, each error leads to a timeout tout and a retransmission RTT
+
i
(data packet and ACK).
Lemma 4.5. The k-error busy period wdma,i(k) given by Equation 4.16 is
an upper bound.
Proof. The proof is by direct deduction. Equation 4.10 presents the busy
window in the error-free case and Lemma 4.1 shows that it is an upper
bound. Lemma 4.4 shows that the worst-case impact of k errors is k ·(tout+
tmem +RTT
+
i ). Equation 4.16 extends the busy window of Equation 4.10
(error-free) with the worst-case impact of k errors. Thus, Equation 4.16 is
also an upper bound.
Similarly, the multiple packet forwarding time under errors is derived,
accounting for the impact of k errors on the transfer. The k-error Worst-
Case Multiple Packet Forwarding Time B+dma,i(q, k) is given by:
B+dma,i(q, k) = k · (terr +RTT+i ) +
⌊
q − 1
ndma
⌋
·RTT+i + δ−tx,i(q) (4.17)
1See Figures 4.10a, 4.10b and 4.10c for the 1-error scenario. A proof for this argument
is not given since it is not essential for the proof of Lemma 4.4.
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In addition to B+dma,i, in the worst case, each error leads to a timeout
and a retransmission whose impact is also bounded by tout +RTT
+
i , as in
Equation 4.16.
Lemma 4.6. The k-error Worst-Case Multiple Packet Forwarding Time
B+dma,i(q, k) given by Equation 4.17 is an upper bound.
Proof. The proof is by direct deduction. Equation 4.11 presents the busy
window in the error-free case and Lemma 4.2 shows that it is an upper
bound. Lemma 4.4 shows that the worst-case impact of k errors is k ·
(tout + tmem + RTT
+
i ). Equation 4.17 extends Equation 4.11 (error-free)
with the worst-case impact of k errors. Thus, Equation 4.17 is also an
upper bound.
The k-error Worst-Case Response TimeR+dma,i(q) is derived from Eq. 4.13
to account for the k-error versions of the functions wdma,i(k) andB
+
dma,i(q, k):
R+dma,i(k) = max
1≤q≤η+tx,i(wdma,i(k))
{B+dma,i(q, k)− δ−tx,i(q)} (4.18)
Theorem 4.4. R+dma,i(k) (Equation 4.18) provides an upper bound on
the response time of an arbitrary packet in the traffic stream i transmitted
under DMA ARQ and a k-error scenario.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the error-free version in Theorem 4.1, but
considering the k-error variant of the functions.
Finally, the time it takes to complete a transfer using DMA ARQ under
errors is bounded. The k-error overall latency L+dma,i(q, k) of a transfer
comprising q data packets in a stream i is given by:
L+dma,i(q, k) = δ
−
tx,i(q) + L
+
i +R
+
dma,i(k) (4.19)
Besides the latency in the error-free case (Equation 4.15), in the k-error
scenario, Equation 4.19 must account for the latency overhead. This is
included by the last term, the k-error worst-case response time R+dma,i(k).
Theorem 4.5. Equation 4.19 gives an upper bound on the overall latency
to complete a transfer of q data packets under a k-error scenario.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the error-free version in Theorem 4.3, but
considering the k-error variant of the functions.
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Figure 4.11.: The node graph annotated with communication bandwidth
requirements (MB/s), and mapping of the MPEG decoder
application.
4.4. Experimental evaluation
The experiments evaluate in a real-time context the performance of mem-
ory traffic of the MPEG decoder (Figure 4.11) on a NoC implementing
end-to-end Stop-and-Wait, Go-Back-N, and DMA ARQ. First, the perfor-
mance of the general memory traffic analyzed and compared with simu-
lation results. Then, the performance of the memory traffic is evaluated
when parts of it consist of DMA transfers. The analyses were implemented
in PyCPA [34] and the simulations were carried out in the OMNeT++
network simulator [154].
The employed NoC consists of 3x4 nodes in a 2D-mesh topology. Each
node consists of a tile, a router, and a network interface connecting both.
Links connect the routers and network interfaces. The NoC implements
wormhole-switching, virtual channel flow control, XY source-routing and
SLIP arbitration in the routers. The frequency of operation is 800MHz.
The underlying NoC analysis [125] is utilized with overhead parameters
per hop Or and per path Op set to 0.
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The MPEG decoder [152] employed in the experiments is presented in
Figure 4.11a, which shows the node graph and the bandwidth requirements
(MB/s) between the communicating nodes. In the experiments, the data
flows from the memories to the nodes. The nodes have been mapped to
a 3x4 NoC as depicted in Figure 4.11b [105]. Each arrow represents the
source and destination of a traffic stream. A traffic stream referred to as
node.X, where node is the processing element and X is the memory: 1 for
sram1, 2 for sram2, and S for sdram. For instance, rast has two streams:
rast.1 and rast.S.
4.4.1. General traffic
The first part of the experiments evaluates the performance of traffic streams
consisting of periodic, non-bursty accesses to memory. It is assumed that
the traffic in real-time systems exhibits well understood and predictable
patterns – e.g., streaming applications [152] or predictable execution mod-
els such as superblocks [138, 117]. Therefore, the size of the data accesses
of each MPEG node is varied in three different scenarios: 64, 128 and
256Bytes transported in a packet with 5, 9 and 17 flits, respectively. The
frequency of the data accesses is derived to match the specified bandwidth
– e.g., 500 MB/s (risc.2 ) corresponds to 64B every 128ns (102 cycles at
800MHz).
Figures 4.12a, b and c show the maximum observed and analytical worst-
case latencies for a packet in a given traffic stream for increasing access
sizes. For Stop-and-Wait, analysis (SNW) provides valid bounds to simu-
lation (SimSNW) for all accesses sizes, as it is to be expected. The margin
over simulation is noticeably higher for traffic to/from the sdram. That
comes from the underlying NoC analysis: all traffic streams coexist in
the NoC in that setup and share the same network interface to access the
sdram, constituting a bottleneck. Moreover, the values from simulation are
observed maxima. The true worst-case lies somewhere between the values
from the analysis and the observed ones.
Switching from Stop-and-Wait to Go-Back-N n = 2 (GBN2) and further
increasing the send window (n > 2, not shown in the figures) does not
decrease latency. This type of traffic is characterized by the quasi absence
of bursts. As a result, small retransmission buffers can be employed for
general traffic without compromising performance. Not only that, but if
the distance between two packets being injected in the network is smaller
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Figure 4.12.: Maximum end-to-end packet latencies for Stop-and-Wait (ob-
served in simulation SimSNW, and analytical SNW) and Go-
Back-N with n = 2 (analytical GBN2). Error-free scenarios
in (a,b,c), error scenario in (d).
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than the RTT, Go-Back-N has no gain over Stop-and-Wait, and a single-
slot retransmission buffer can be employed. However, that decision can
critically affect the performance of bursty traffic, such as DMA transfers.
The impact of errors on transmissions is shown in Figure 4.12d for 64B
accesses and Stop-and-Wait. The figure shows the worst-case latency when
employing a safe, equal timeout tout for all streams (1-error), and when op-
timizing the timeout individually per stream (1-error opt), which is slightly
larger than its latency bound. Since the worst-case retransmission is largely
dominated by the timeout, optimizing it results in up to 38% lower latencies
in a 1-error scenario.
4.4.2. DMA traffic
The second part of the experiments analyzes the performance of bursty
memory traffic, which is characteristic of DMA transfers. That type of
traffic is predominant in safety-critical MPSoCs platforms [138]. Therefore,
it is assumed that nodes with high throughput to the sdram use DMA to
be more efficient – i.e., streams rast.S, upsp.S, and vu.S. Three scenarios
are evaluated where transfers have 4KB, 8KB and 16KB. The frequency
with which the transfers occur are set to match the specified bandwidth.
Each transfer consists of 32, 64, and 128 9-flit-long packets, respectively for
each scenario. It is assumed that the DMA transfers are synchronized in
software or hardware, such that one transfer is performed at a time. That
reflects real hardware limitation and programming model. The non-DMA
streams2 are configured as 64B, Stop-and-Wait general traffic.
Figures 4.13a, b and c show the maximum latency bounds for entire
DMA transfers in the error-free case. For transfers of same size (e.g., 8KB)
maximum latency varies more than 300%. The extra delay is caused by
background traffic, specially by the stream from upsp.S, and is captured
by the underlying NoC analysis. Stop-and-Wait is not suitable for bursty
transfers, resulting in very high latencies and in the unschedulability of
upsp.S with 16KB transfers (Figure 4.13c). Go-Back-N’s performance im-
proves as its send window is increased. Nonetheless, DMA ARQ presents
the lowest latency bound in all cases. Only for vu.S, due to very low net-
work interference, Go-Back-N is able to achieve the same performance at
the expense of a large retransmission buffer (send window 4). Despite the
2All other streams already evaluated in Section 4.4.1 except rast.S, upsp.S, and vu.S,
which are here configured as DMA traffic.
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Figure 4.13.: Worst-case end-to-end latency of DMA transfers for Stop-
and-Wait (SNW) and Go-Back-N with n = 2, 3 and 4 (GBN2,
GBN3, GBN4) and DMA ARQ (DMA). Error-free scenarios
in (a,b,c), error scenarios in (d).
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Figure 4.14.: Comparison of the performance of ARQ-based protocols, nor-
malized to Stop-and-Wait.
latency variations for the DMAs, the latency bounds for the non-DMA
streams (not shown in the figure) remain the same when varying the pro-
tocols.
When considering error scenarios, DMA ARQ outperforms all protocol
configurations except for stream vu.S, detailed in Figure 4.13d. That is
explained by the fact that DMA ARQ requires extra time to read from the
local memory when retransmitting. Since in the error-free case (0-error)
GBN3, GBN4 and DMA deliver similar latency bounds, DMA presents
slightly higher latencies in error scenarios (5% higher than GBN4 in 1-
error). The analysis considers tout = 60 and tmem = 40 cycles.
4.4.3. Comparison
The third part of the experiments evaluates the impact of the different
transport protocols on the system. Figure 4.14 shows the latency improve-
ment, area overhead, and error overhead when varying the protocol con-
figuration. The values are normalized to a 3x4 NoC with Stop-and-Wait.
Area overhead metric covers retransmission buffer requirements.
The results show that extending the send window in Go-Back-N in-
troduces more area overhead than it increases performance, specially for
smaller transfer sizes. Notice that the reported area overhead scales with
the system – i.e., the values in the Figure are multiplied by the number
of nodes in the NoC. Notice also that, for DMA and general traffic to
transmit in parallel, a node would require at least two protocol instances.
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Error overhead measures the additional time required to finish the trans-
fer in a 1-error scenario. In the worst-case, it takes Go-Back-N the same
time as Stop-and-Wait. DMA ARQ, on the other hand, presents a ma-
jor performance improvement (6.6x on average) while avoiding additional
buffers. That comes at the price of additional time overhead when recov-
ering from an error, since the data must be fetched from the local memory
instead of a retransmission buffer. That penalty, however, is only seen
during error occurrences and does not increase with transfer length.
4.5. Summary
This chapter addressed the use of ARQ-based protocols in real-time NoCs.
An analysis framework was introduced by integrating existing formal anal-
yses of the transport layer and analyses of the network layer. The frame-
work can be used to provide formal latency guarantees for on-chip traffic
in real-time systems and it can be easily composed with different protocols
and NoC models. Moreover, the chapter also introduced DMA ARQ, a
variation of Go-Back-N ARQ optimized for DMA transfers, including its
formal analysis. The experimental evaluation included the protocols Stop-
and-Wait, Go-Back-N, and DMA ARQ for typical memory traffic scenarios
found in real-time systems. The results showed that the simple protocol
Stop-and-Wait ARQ suffices for general memory traffic but not for DMA
traffic. For DMA transfers, which are bursty in nature, an optimized pro-
tocol (DMA ARQ) pays off providing latency bounds 6.6x lower.
5. A Low-overhead Fault-tolerant
NoC
The discussion on resilient NoCs for real-time systems has so far focused on
ensuring the proper operation of the system under errors. That approach
yields a highly reliable NoC that is capable of operating under timing
constraints up to high error rates. However, a more lightweight approach
that presents smaller overhead but reduced resiliency in comparison to
that approach is very attractive if it still is able to meet the requirements
of mixed-critical real-time embedded systems. Errors are seldom and the
overhead should be minimized following a “good enough” strategy.
Regulated by safety standards [72, 35, 69], such systems must meet strict
real-time, resilience and integrity requirements. In that context, threats
to the intended functionality of the system must be detected and handled
appropriately to meet the specified requirements. In case of errors, threats
must be detected and contained to ensure integrity; a recovery might be
performed if possible and if resilience is required for reaching high reliability
levels; and all must be done in a timely and predictable manner under real-
time constraints.
Fast, hardware-based recovery is not always necessary in cross-layer and
hierarchical fault-tolerance approaches, where ensuring the system’s in-
tegrity is paramount. In fact, lossless recovery in hardware requires ad-
ditional circuitry that can introduce substantial power consumption and
latencies – e.g., retransmission buffers in ARQ (cf. Chapter 4). Recovery
can be performed much more efficiently in higher levels of abstraction, as
seen in cross-layer approaches with replicated execution [127, 10]. Such
techniques exploit the abundant hardware available in multi- and many-
core platforms to increase reliability and provide error recovery capabilities
in software. Error detection is performed with hardware support, since
software-only error detection is ineffective and inefficient. The decision to
recover and the error recovery itself are delegated to software.
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Nevertheless, the hardware behavior must be predictable since it is a
real-time system, and it must detect errors fast enough to allow the system
to isolate them and prevent their propagation. That ensures that the re-
covery, if and as desired, can be carried out in the proper granularity and
ensures the integrity of the rest of the system. That reveals two require-
ments to the hardware operating under soft errors: integrity and real-time
(predictability).
This chapter presents the Advanced Integrity Q-service (AIQ), an end-
to-end mechanism to provide integrity and real-time guarantees of NoC
transactions under errors. The mechanism is inspired by the idea of keeping
track of transactions in distributed systems and Hardware Transactional
Memory (HTM). Upon error detection, error handling and recovery are
delegated to software, which may react according to an arbitrary strategy
in a cross-layer approach. AIQ is proposed and evaluated in a many-core
research platform [103] considering aspects such as performance and im-
plementation costs. Although the idea of keeping track of transactions in
distributed systems is not novel, to the best of my knowledge, its applica-
tion in hardware in the context of predictable real-time systems has not
been explored and evaluated.
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows. A review of relevant
related work is given in Section 5.1. The AIQ approach is introduced in
Section 5.2. Section 5.3 presents the formal analysis of the mechanism.
The evaluation is presented in Section 5.4. Finally, Section 5.5 summarizes
the chapter.
5.1. Related work
The idea of managing transactions has been widely applied in different
fields of computer science and engineering, such as databases, memories and
distributed systems. The main objective of those techniques is to ensure
the correct execution of memory or database transactions in a concurrent
system while increasing performance and parallelism.
In database-management systems [55], transactions are employed to pro-
vide the properties of atomicity, consistency, isolation and durability. In
that context, the concept is used to increase the level of concurrency, and,
thus, performance, in processing numerous simultaneous transactions ac-
cessing a single, large database. Thus, transactions might be executed with
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speculative data accesses and its changes to the database/system are only
committed after a validation phase [85]. Speculative means that read and
write operations of different transactions are performed concurrently and
are not synchronized, which creates a race condition in the event that two
transactions access the same data. If an illegal interleaving of reads and
writes to the database occurred due to the race condition, the respective
transaction is rolled-back and restarted without changing the state of the
system.
Inspired by transactions in database-management systems and existing
work on HTM [65], Hammond et al. proposed the Transactional Memory
Coherency and Consistency (TCC) as an alternative to traditional mem-
ory consistency and coherency models [58]. TCC aimed at simplifying
parallel software programming and increasing the concurrent performance
of shared memory multiprocessors. Unlike traditional consistency models,
accesses to critical sections of the code – i.e., lock-based access to shared
memory – must not be explicitly specified, but are carried out by trans-
actions. Transactions are atomic from the point of view of consistency.
Unlike traditional coherency approaches, data status synchronization can
be performed only at the end of a transaction instead of every memory ac-
cess1. Further extensions to the model include the nesting of transactions
[102] – e.g., caused by the use of libraries. A good overview of transactional
memories is given in [60]. As of 2015, four processors featured hardware
transactional memories: IBM Blue Gene/Q, IBM zEnterprise EC12, Intel
Core 4th generation, and IBM POWER8 [106]. In the context of mixed-
critical real-time systems, HTM has also been researched. In the context
of mixed-critical real-time systems, HTM has been explored as hierarchical
HTM on distributed embedded system spanning over on-Chip and off-Chip
networks [114].
In the context of fault tolerance, HTM was explored as a hardware-
assisted mechanism for error detection and recovery in replicated software
execution. The hardware-assisted fault tolerance approach (HAFT) em-
ploys instruction-level redundancy for error detection and HTM for re-
covery with compiler-based code instrumentation [86]. Before committing
a transaction to memory, error detection is performed by comparing the
instruction-level redundant execution. In case of error, recovery is carried
out by rolling-back the transaction with HTM. Similarly, FaulTM also
employs instruction-level redundancy and HTM but proposes hardware ex-
1The actual operation depends on the actual coherency scheme.
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tensions, instead of a software-only approach [159]. Those approaches are
types of replicated execution [127, 10]. However error detection requires all
tasks/threads in the system to be protected and to execute redundantly.
A single unprotected task/thread may cause system failure and violate
integrity.
In this chapter, the concepts of transactions and ARQ are employed
in NoCs to monitor, detect random hardware faults during runtime and
ensure system integrity while not jeopardizing system performance. The
difference with previous work lies in that all communication in the NoC is
covered instead of only replicated tasks, does not require replicated execu-
tion and does not depend on the components of a tile – i.e., whether the
tile has a processor with caches, only an IP or an external-memory con-
troller. The hardware ensures that any error in a transaction is detected
and delegates to software the task of handling the error and choosing the
best strategy to do so. The strategy may involve rolling-back, restarting
or killing a task/thread or failing, when no other strategy can be safely
applied – e.g., as seen in [127, 10]. Upon failure of a task, the effects of
the error are isolated in order to ensure the integrity of the rest of the
system. Upon failure of the system, the failure should be signaled before
any erroneous output is performed.
5.2. The AIQ approach
5.2.1. Overview
The AIQ approach is a NoC service inspired by memory transactions and
ARQ-based protocols. AIQ works as a service that keeps tracks of transac-
tions across the NoC with respect to integrity and timing. Figure 5.1 gives
an overview of how the approach is integrated into the NoC. The AIQ
service operates in the transport layer in the NoC and is located between
the interfaces of the NI to the tile internals and the lower layers of NoC.
AIQ detects soft and hard hardware errors and reports it to the software
layer. The error report signaling path is depicted with the dashed arrows.
The AIQ approach delegates to software the task of deciding and recover-
ing from an error in favor of less overhead in hardware. Since recovery is
not required, power-hungry retransmission buffers are avoided.
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Figure 5.1.: Overview of the AIQ as a NoC service.
5.2.2. Transactions in the NoC
The mechanism keeps track of transactions in the NoC in principle by
acknowledging successful transactions. However, given the stringent power
and area constraints of small-scale on-Chip networks, a closer look at how
transactions take place over the NoC is required.
A regular, unprotected transaction is usually initiated by a master who
sends a request to a slave, which will receive the request and respond after it
has been completed. For example, tile t1 synchronizes with t2 by polling the
value of a shared variable in the local memory of t2. Figure 5.2a illustrates
such a read transaction, where 1 t1 sends a read request packet and waits
for the response. 2 t2’s NI receives the request packet and forward the
request to the tile. After some time, depending on the resource contention
in the tile, 3 the response is packed and sent. The response packet is
then received by t1 4 , which resumes its execution. Notice that the lower
layers of the NoC protocol stack are abstracted away for the sake of clarity.
Notice also that the same pattern occurs in the case of a write operation or
in case of message passing, which may include or not a response (blocking
or non-blocking). Whether a response is required depends on the memory
and communication models.
The master might present overlapping memory transactions depending
on the memory consistency model, where support for non-blocking reads
and writes exist. The master might also support DMA transfers, which
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(b) AIQ-protected
Figure 5.2.: Example of a transaction over the NoC, consisting of a request
(REQ) and a response (RESP).
will overlap with regular memory transactions when appropriately used.
A slave will potentially receive multiple concurrent requests indepen-
dently of the memory model since more than one master can send a request
concurrently. The slave can then support single or overlapping requests.
In the former case, one request is received and processed at a time, sub-
sequent requests are not accepted by the slave until the completion of the
current one. In the latter case, more than one request can be processed at
a time. Potentially, in both cases, arriving requests will queue up in the
NoC causing backpressure and head-of-line blocking, impacting the arrival
of subsequent requests and responses. Resource sharing management is a
technique that allows the predictable management of shared resources, as
might be required in the slave. However, that will not be further discussed
here, and the interested reader is referred to [84] for more details. For the
sake of simplicity, the discussion in this work assumes single transaction
support in slaves, unless stated otherwise. That is assumed without loss
of generality since the support for multiple concurrent transactions, from
AIQ’s perspective, would simply generate bursts of packets.
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5.2.3. Error model
The transactions are composed of packets, which can suffer a series of
different impacts due to random hardware faults in the NoC. A compre-
hensive description of the impact of soft errors featuring the results of an
FMEA-based analysis is given in Chapter 2. AIQ’s functional error model
was derived based on those results.
On an end-to-end communication stream, as seen by the NIs, the impact
of random hardware faults can be summarized as follows (packet and data
are used interchangeably):
1. Data corruption
• Correct delivery of corrupt data: packet is delivered corrupted
to the correct destination;
• Incorrect delivery of data: correct packet is delivered to the
wrong destination;
2. Data loss: packet is not delivered;
3. Delayed data delivery : packet is delivered with abnormally longer
latency.
The error-free case and the case where the error has no noticeable impact
are intentionally left out. Notice that errors 2 and 3 also capture the case
where the NoC becomes partially blocked/unavailable due to a soft error
with static effects (cf. Chapter 2).
Hard errors have the same impacts on an end-to-end basis as the ones
listed above but with a different occurrence pattern. While soft errors are
transient or intermittent in nature and affect traffic randomly according
with a probabilistic distribution, hard errors are permanent and, upon
occurrence, affect the traffic continuously. Thus, the difference between
soft and hard errors is captured in the error model by the frequency in
which a certain error effect occurs. The difference between hard errors and
soft errors with static effects is that the latter disappear when the NoC is
reset.
5.2.4. Protocol
AIQ relies on two well known error detection mechanisms in computer
networks: packet integrity check and packet delivery confirmation. The
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former is based on EDCs and ECCs and can be realized in hardware, or in
some cases delegated to software. The latter is realized in hardware with
watchdogs and acknowledgment messages, as seen in ARQ-based protocols.
AIQ aims at decoupling the data transport over the NoC from the pro-
cessing in the tiles, as depicted in the example of Figure 5.2b. The reason
for it is that being predictable and providing timing bounds that include
the processing in the tiles creates a complex circular dependency. The traf-
fic in the network depends on the processing in the tiles and vice versa.
The AIQ approach should be applicable without previous knowledge of the
tile internals. Thus, AIQ tracks requests and responses independently in
the NoC instead of keeping track of the entire transaction. That is vital
for achieving low error detection latencies and effectively limiting the er-
ror impact. Moreover, that enables the formal performance analysis and
guarantees of the approach.
The objectives of AIQ are:
• Detect all relevant soft and hard random hardware faults in the NoC;
• Operate independently of:
– The tiles’ contents and operation;
– The NoC topology;
• Report detected errors with very low latencies;
• Minimize the NoC’s performance overhead.
AIQ keeps locally a tracking table common for both requests and re-
sponses with n entries, as illustrated in Table 5.1. Every request (resp.
response) transmitted by the master (resp. slave) requires an entry in the
table. The entry is kept until the sender confirms the successful transmis-
sion of the request (resp. response) or until an error affecting the request
(resp. response) is detected. Each entry has a sequence number that identi-
fies the request/response; a flag indicating the entry’s state; the request/re-
sponse type – e.g., read response; a timer; the source and destination of
the request2; and the address of the request/response. Some fields are used
for tracking and others enable the diagnosis after error detection.
The AIQ protocol is divided in two parts, as illustrated in the example in
Section 5.2.2: a master instance for sending requests and a slave instance
2The source identifies the interface generating the request/response (cf. Figure 5.1).
The destination can be deducted from the accessed address by accessing the NI’s
address translation table. Alternatively, it can be stored as VC+route.
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Table 5.1.: AIQ request/response tracking table
Tracking Diagnosis
Entry State Type Timer Src/Dst2 Address
1 Used Req1 . . . 0 0xaffd0000
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
n Free . . . 0 0 0x00000000
for sending responses. A summary of the different scenarios is given in
Table 5.2. They are described individually in the sequel.
Table 5.2.: AIQ error notification scenarios
REQ RESP
loss corrupt loss corrupt
Sender (master) X X X X
Receiver (slave) X OPT OPT
5.2.4.1. Requests
AIQ must account for two cases when tracking requests: loss and corrup-
tion.
Loss is monitored with a handshaking mechanism, as seen in ARQ pro-
tocols. When the request is sent, the timer associated with the request is
triggered. When the request is correctly received, the slave’s AIQ sends
an ACK packet back to the sender. If the ACK is correctly received, the
respective timer is stopped and the request is marked as not pending, re-
leasing the respective entry. The scenario is illustrated in Figure 5.2b. If
the ACK is not received, a timeout will trigger the error detection activ-
ities. That occurs if the request itself was lost or if the ACK was lost.
In the former case, the slave is unaware of the failed request and remains
unaffected by the error. That is illustrated in Figure 5.3a. In the latter
case, the slave received the request and will process it correctly whereas
the master cannot be certain that the request was received3. Thus, in both
cases, only the master is notified with a hardware interrupt in order to take
appropriate action.
Upon loss detection, four actions are carried out at the master :
3The master must be able to handle the “orphaned” responses.
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(b) Case 2: corruption
Figure 5.3.: Illustration of error affecting requests (REQ).
• the information necessary for error diagnosis is stored in dedicated
registers in the AIQ;
• the respective request table entry is released;
• the interface that issued the affected request is notified to abort the
transaction in order to allow the further operation of the system;
• and a hardware interrupt is triggered so that appropriate action can
be taken in software.
For example, fault containment can be performed by the Real-Time Op-
erating System (RTOS) and error recovery can be performed, e.g., by a
replica manager, as seen later in Chapter 6. Unaffected tasks may con-
tinue executing normally.
Corruption is verified with an integrity check using EDC and possibly
ECC, both at the slave and at the master. The integrity check is manda-
tory for control fields and optional for data4. Requests with corrupt control
fields are immediately dropped to keep the integrity of the node – e.g., pre-
vents unintended access and modification (corruption) of memory contents.
As illustrated in Figure 5.3b, upon integrity of control fields 2 the request
is forwarded to the slave tile. The integrity check of the data (when en-
abled) is performed on-the-fly as the data is forwarded to the tile. That
improves performance and reduces hardware overhead by avoiding the use
of large buffers. The result of the integrity check is available when the
last data word of the request traverses the AIQ. Thus, possibly part of
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the data might have already reached the tile (e.g., memory) by the time
the corruption is detected and signaled. Nonetheless, the signaling 3 will
occur before the last word of the request leaves the slave’s NI. The error
is also signaled back to the master 4 with a NACK packet.
Upon corruption detection, the following actions are carried out at the
slave:
• the information necessary for error diagnosis is stored in dedicated
registers in the AIQ;
• the interface receiving the affected request is notified to abort the
transaction in order to allow the further operation of the system;
• a hardware interrupt is triggered locally so that appropriate action
can be taken;
• a NACK is sent to the master in order to trigger the error detection
actions.
Upon the receipt of a NACK, the following actions are carried out at the
master :
• the information necessary for error diagnosis is stored in dedicated
registers in the AIQ;
• the respective request table entry is released;
• the interface receiving the affected request is notified to abort the
transaction in order to allow the further operation of the system;
• a hardware interrupt is triggered locally so that appropriate action
can be taken in software.
In case the NACK is not successfully received, e.g. due to the failure of
the NoC, the case will be handled as a request loss.
5.2.4.2. Responses
Similarly to requests, AIQ needs to account for two cases when tracking
responses: loss and corruption. In both cases, error detection occurs with
the same approach and mechanisms as for requests. The difference lies in
4It is optional for data for cases where the written data will be checked for integrity
already in software. The data integrity check can be configured during runtime in
a memory range granularity, extending the configuration capabilities of the IDAMC
platform. The address is considered a control field and its integrity check is manda-
tory.
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the error reporting.
The loss of a response must be reported back to the master. It can
be optionally5 reported locally to the slave. Upon the loss detection, the
following actions are carried out at the slave:
• a NACK is sent to the master in order to trigger the error detec-
tion actions; the NACK will be transmitted following Stop-and-Wait
ARQ.
Optionally, the following actions can be carried out at the slave to trigger
a reaction locally:
• the information necessary for error diagnosis is stored in dedicated
registers in the AIQ;
• a hardware interrupt is triggered locally so that appropriate action
can be taken.
Upon the receipt of a NACK, the following actions are carried out at the
master :
• the information necessary for error diagnosis is stored in dedicated
registers in the AIQ;
• the interface receiving the affected request is notified to abort the
transaction in order to allow the further operation of the system;
• a hardware interrupt is triggered locally so that appropriate action
can be taken in software;
• the NACK is acknowledged (Stop-and-Wait ARQ).
The corruption of a response is detected and reported locally to the
master. Upon corruption detection, the following actions are carried out
at the master :
• the information necessary for error diagnosis is stored in dedicated
registers in the AIQ;
• the interface receiving the affected request is notified to abort the
transaction in order to allow the further operation of the system;
• a hardware interrupt is triggered locally so that appropriate action
can be taken.
5The lost response can be used to detect the failure of the NoC due to hard errors or
static effects, in which case the master will most likely fail to receive the NACK.
The tile contents are, however, unaffected by the loss and requires no further action.
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5.2.5. Discussion
Due to the size and resource restrictions in a NoC in comparison with an
off-Chip network, two points were identified during implementation that
can impact the correct operation and the performance of the approach.
The identified points concern the limitations of the interfaces of the NI in
handling received requests and the limitations of the input buffers in the
physical and data-link layers of the NI.
When handling received requests, the NI handles each request sequen-
tially instead of handling them in parallel or buffering the requests, which
would be too costly and unnecessary in most cases. Thus, subsequent
requests and packets can potentially be blocked due the backpressure. Fig-
ure 5.4 shows a block diagram of the NI including the AIQ mechanism
(corruption detection with CRC is shown separately). The backpressure
is illustrated with the red arrow 1 . A request is received by the Mst if
interface and blocks the following packets as indicated by the arrow. That
interface will only accept a next request after the current one has been
served. That can make the timing of the approach dependent on the work-
load and on the internal details of the tile. The key impact on AIQ is that
the blocking introduces additional delay to requests/responses, which are
expected to be acknowledged as soon as they arrive at the NI. Thus the
latency becomes dependent not only on the NoC topology and interfering
traffic, but also on the internal performance of the tile.
The first point is addressed in this work by bounding the maximum time
that an interface in the NI can take to process a request. The bound must
be realized by the NI and tile designs – e.g., the NI might abort the request
if it is not completed by the tile within the specified bound; alternatively
the tile can be designed to accept multiple concurrent requests.
The second identified architectural limitation is related with the NI’s
input buffer (buffer phit2flit), which reassembles flits from phits and buffers
them until they can be forwarded to the upper layers of the protocol stack.
The flits of different VCs are stored in different queues. It can happen
that a control message of AIQ (ACK or NACK) experiences head-of-line
blocking depending on the arbitration policy and depending on the type of
packets queued in front of it. That is illustrated by arrow 2 in Figure 5.4.
The situation can escalate to a deadlock, which will be detected as a NoC
failure, since no ACKs are being received by AIQ. The deadlock occurs
when the Mst if is ready to respond a request but no entries are available
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Figure 5.4.: Block diagram of NI: identified limitations.
in AIQ’s tracking table (cf. Table 5.1). The ACK that releases a table
entry is then blocked in the buffer phit2flit due to backpressure from Mst -
if. Thus, Mst if can only progress when an ACK is received but the ACK
is blocked by Mst if.
The deadlock can be ruled out by using separate VCs for control packets
and for requests/responses. Alternatively, it can be ruled out by ensuring
that the number of concurrently received requests in a tile is limited and
do not block the control packets. That can be achieved by using a resource
manager, such as [84], which manages the concurrent access of applications
to shared resources in the platform. This work adopts the former solution.
5.3. Formal analysis of AIQ
As seen in Chapter 4, transport protocols, such as Go-Back-N ARQ and
the proposed AIQ, introduce additional flow control to the communication.
That comes from packets that are retained due to handshaking or due to
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retransmissions with timeouts (in ARQ). It creates a circular dependency
where the performance of the transport layer depends on the network la-
tency, which in turn depends on the traffic injected by the transport layer.
In this section, AIQ is modeled using CPA [62] based on the transport
layer analysis introduced in Chapter 4.
The formal timing analysis of AIQ is presented in three parts. First,
the modeling in CPA is introduced. Then, the protocol behavior in the
error-free scenario in analyzed. Finally, the error case is addressed with an
analysis of the worst-case latency in error reporting.
5.3.1. Modeling in CPA
The modeling in CPA, following the terminology introduced in Section 4.2.1,
is illustrated in Figure 5.5. An interface in the sender’s NI produces pack-
ets in a traffic stream according with a given packet-based event model δtx.
The packets are handled at the transport layer by AIQ, which is modeled
as a resource. The analysis assumes that packets transmitted from dif-
ferent interfaces within a NI are arbitrated according with Strict Priority
Non-Preemptive (SPNP) and also assumes that ACKs and NACKs have
the highest priority. Each interface producing packets is modeled as a task
τ mapped to that resource – the interface under analysis is depicted as τaiq
whereas a lower priority one and a higher priority one are depicted as τlp
and τhp , respectively. Packets generated by AIQ are captured by a dedi-
cated task – e.g., ACKs transmitted by the sender NI are captured by τack .
AIQ then injects traffic into the lower layers of the NoC according to the
output event model δaiq. Notice that only one interface (or AIQ itself) can
transmit a packet at a time and therefore only one output traffic stream is
depicted for the sender even though several traffic streams can co-exist in
the NoC and possibly originate in the same sender.
A protocol with handshaking, such as AIQ, is a bidirectional commu-
nication stream [130]. As illustrated in Figure 5.5, the communication is
mapped in the NoC as two unidirectional streams: one for data and one
for acknowledgements in the feedback path. As in Chapter 4, the under-
lying NoC analysis is arbitrary. This analysis assumes, without loss of
generality, [125] as the underlying NoC analysis, which models the NoC in
CPA as follows: each output port of a router is mapped as a resource, and
traffic streams are chains of tasks mapped to resources. Resource arbitra-
tion depends on the router arbitration. The output of the underlying NoC
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Figure 5.5.: Modeling of AIQ as a transport layer protocol and the under-
lying NoC in CPA.
analysis used by the transport analysis is the worst-case latency L+i of a
packet transmitted in a traffic stream i. The interested reader can refer to
[125, 130] for further details.
The analysis supports both packet-switched and wormhole-switched NoCs.
Packet-switched NoCs are supported by default. For wormhole-switched
ones, however, a conversion between event models is necessary, as seen
in Chapter 4. That is depicted by the light blue elements in Figure 5.5.
The conversion between packet-based and flit-based event models can be
performed with the Equations 4.3 and 4.4 of Section 4.2.2.
5.3.2. Formal analysis: the error-free case
At first sight, the timing behavior of AIQ seems similar to Go-Back-N
ARQ, seen in Chapter 4. However, AIQ differs from ARQ in that one
instance in a NI is shared among traffic streams whereas, in the latter, each
traffic stream has its own protocol instance. That makes a big difference.
The latter simplifies the analysis by exploiting the fact that all worst-case
processing delays and RTTs are the same for the same traffic stream. In the
former, worst-case processing delays and RTTs of interfering packets are
potentially different, resulting in the more complex problem of multi-server
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queues [155, 94]. The analysis of multi-server queues is a hard problem,
with a worst-case that is difficult to tightly bound, and it is thus usually
handled with Queueing Theory [79, 155, 94].
The worst-case analysis of AIQ can be simplified in four ways: 1 by
assuming that there is only one entry in the tracking table (cf. Table 5.1);
2 by assuming that there are more entries than packets being transmitted
(unlimited number of entries), but where the maximum number of entries
required can be bound; 3 by assuming that all traffic streams have the
same delays (RTTs and processing delays, which is related to the packet
sizes); or 4 by assuming that there is no local interference from other traffic
streams. 1 and 3 leads to unrealistically pessimistic results. 4 assumes a
scenario that is simply unrealistic in practice. Thus, the adopted strategy
is 2 , which might not be a match in all cases, but allows one to find out the
number of entries required to achieve the bounded performance. Similar
analysis approaches are seen in the literature [33, 125].
The analysis also assumes that packets transmitted from different inter-
faces within a NI are arbitrated according with SPNP (cf. Figure 5.1).
ACKs have the highest priority.
To obtain the worst-case end-to-end latency of a packet protected by
AIQ it is necessary to derive the interference of other traffic in the NI and
the contribution of the AIQ protocol to the latency. That is captured by
the WCRT of AIQ R+aiq,i, which is the largest period of time in which a
packet is retained by the protocol. The analysis relies on the busy window
approach [149]. The first step is to derive the Worst-Case Multiple Packet
Queuing Delay.
The Worst-Case Multiple Packet Queuing Delay Q+aiq,i(q) is the longest
time interval from the arrival of the first packet until the q-th packet re-
ceives service. The Q+aiq,i(q) of stream i is given by:
Q+aiq,i(q) = I
+
lp,i+ I
+
hp,i(Q
+
aiq,i(q)) + I
+
acks,i(Q
+
aiq,i(q)) + (q−1) ·O+aiq,i (5.1)
where
I+lp,i = max
j∈lp(i)
{O+aiq,j} (5.2)
I+hp,i(∆t) =
∑
j∈hp(i)
η+tx,i(∆t) ·O+aiq,j (5.3)
I+acks,i(∆t) =
∑
j∈acks
η+tx,i(∆t) ·O+aiq,ack (5.4)
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and where O+aiq,j is the maximum time that AIQ requires to forward a
packet of stream j; O+aiq,ack is the maximum time that AIQ requires to
create and forward an ACK; lp(i) and hp(i) are the set of all lower and
higher priority streams mapped to the same AIQ as stream i, respectively;
and η+tx,i(∆t) is the maximum event arrival curve (cf. Section 4.2.1). Equa-
tion 5.1 results in a fixed-point problem. It can be solved iteratively, start-
ing with a very small, positive .
Lemma 5.1. Equation 5.1 gives an upper bound on the Worst-Case Mul-
tiple Packet Queuing Delay Q+aiq,i(q).
Proof. The proof is by induction. When q = 1, stream i’s packet can
be blocked by one non-preemtable, lower priority packet that just started
transmitting, assumed to be the largest one causing the longest delay; while
queued, the packet can also be blocked by arriving higher priority pack-
ets; additionally, the packet can also be blocked by ACKs, which are sent
with highest priority, generated due to receiving packets. That is captured
in Equation 5.1 by the terms I+lp,i, I
+
hp,i(Q
+
aiq,i(q)), and I
+
acks,i(Q
+
aiq,i(q)),
respectively.
In a subsequent q + 1-th activation, the packet has to additionally wait
for its own previous q packets to be forwarded. That takes O+aiq,i per
packet, potentially increasing the interference caused by higher-priority
packets and acknowledgements already captured by I+hp,i(Q
+
aiq,i(q+1)) and
I+acks,i(Q
+
aiq,i(q + 1)), respectively. That results in Equation 5.1.
The Best-Case Multiple Packet Queueing Delay Q−aiq,i(q) is the short-
est time interval from the arrival of the first packet until the q-th packet
receives service. It is given by:
Q−aiq,i(q) = (q − 1) ·O−aiq,i (5.5)
where O−aiq,i is the minimum time that AIQ requires to forward a packet
of stream i.
Lemma 5.2. Equation 5.5 gives a lower bound on the Best-Case Multiple
Packet Queueing Delay Q−aiq,i(q).
Proof. The proof is by induction. When q = 1, stream i’s packet can be
forwarded as soon as it arrives. In a subsequent q + 1-th activation, the
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packet must wait for the previous q packets to be forwarded. That results
in Equation 5.5.
The Worst-Case Multiple Packet Forwarding TimeB+aiq,i(q) is the longest
time interval from the arrival of the first packet until the forwarding of the
q-th packet. It extends Q+aiq,i(q) until the q-th activation completes. The
B+aiq,i(q) of stream i is given by:
B+aiq,i(q) = Q
+
aiq,i(q) +O
+
aiq,i (5.6)
Lemma 5.3. The Worst-Case Multiple Packet Forwarding Time B+aiq,i(q)
given by Equation 5.6 is an upper bound.
Proof. The proof is by direct deduction. Under SPNP, the time to forward
q packets corresponds to the time until the q-th packet is about to receive
service and the time it takes to forward the q-th packet, which is non-
preemtable. That is captured by the first and second terms of Equation 5.6,
respectively. Both terms are upper bounds and Equation 5.6 is thus an
upper bound.
The Best-Case Multiple Packet Forwarding Time B−aiq,i(q) can be sim-
ilarly derived. It is the shortest time interval from the arrival of the first
packet until the q-th packet is forwarded. B−aiq,i(q) is given by:
B−aiq,i(q) = Q
−
aiq,i(q) +O
−
aiq,i (5.7)
Lemma 5.4. The Best-Case Multiple Packet Forwarding Time B−aiq,i(q)
given by Equation 5.7 is a lower bound.
Proof. The proof is omitted. It is similar to Lemma 5.3, but using lower
bounds instead.
The busy period waiq,i is the longest time interval in which packets of
stream i arrive at AIQ before the previous packet has been transmitted.
That is, it is a half-open interval starting with the first activation and
ending when activation q completes before the arrival of the q+1 activation.
The busy period waiq,i is given by:
waiq,i = max
q≥1,q∈N
{
B+aiq,i(q) |Q+aiq,i(q+1) ≥ δ−tx,i(q+1)
}
(5.8)
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Lemma 5.5. The busy window is upper bounded by Equation 5.8.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there is a busy window w˘aiq,i
longer than waiq,i. In that case, w˘aiq,i must contain at least one activation
more than waiq,i, i.e., q˘ ≥ q + 1. From Equation 5.8, Q+aiq,i(q˘) < δ−tx,i(q˘),
i.e., q˘ is not delayed by the previous activation. Since that violates the
definition of a busy window, the hypothesis must be rejected.
The Worst-Case Response Time R+aiq,i is the longest time interval that
any packet of a stream i is delayed by AIQ before being forwarded to the
network. It is bounded by:
R+aiq,i = max
1≤q≤η+tx,i(waiq,i)
{B+aiq,i(q)− δ−tx,i(q)} (5.9)
Theorem 5.1. R+aiq,i (Equation 5.9) provides an upper bound on the re-
sponse time of an arbitrary packet in the traffic stream i transmitted under
AIQ.
Proof. Proof omitted due to similarity with proof of Theorem 4.1.
The event model capturing the traffic injection of stream i in the network
by AIQ can now be derived. The output event model δ−aiq,tx,i propagated
by a NI with AIQ is obtained as follows:
δ−aiq,tx,i(q) = max
{
δ−tx,i(q)−R+aiq +R−aiq, B−aiq(q − 1)
}
(5.10)
Theorem 5.2. The minimum distance function δ−aiq,tx,i(q) given by Equa-
tion 5.10 is a lower bound.
Proof. Proof omitted due to similarity with proof of Theorem 4.2.
The time it takes to transfer q packets can now be bounded, where q
might range from a single small packet to a long DMA transfer6. The
overall latency L+aiq,i(q) of transmitting q data packets in a stream i is
given by:
L+aiq,i(q) = δ
−
tx,i(q) + L
+
i +R
+
aiq,i (5.11)
where L+i is the worst-case NoC latency of any packet in stream i (cf.
Section 4.2.3).
6DMA transfers can consist of a single, very long packet or multiple smaller packets
depending on the NoC architecture and configuration
5.3. Formal analysis of AIQ 131
Theorem 5.3. Equation 5.11 gives an upper bound on the overall latency
to transmit q data packets under AIQ.
Proof. Proof omitted due to similarity with proof of Theorem 4.3.
Finally, the time it takes to perform a NoC transaction consisting of
request and response under AIQ can be bounded. The transaction latency
L+trans(qreq, qresp) of a transfer comprising qreq request packets and qresp is
given by:
L+trans(qreq, qresp) = L
+
aiq,req(qreq) +O
+
proc + L
+
aiq,resp(qresp) (5.12)
where the request and the response consist of qreq and qresp packets, respec-
tively, and O+proc is an upper bound of the time it takes for the transaction
to be processed and responded (see Section 5.2.5).
Theorem 5.4. Equation 5.12 gives an upper bound on the overall latency
to complete a transaction.
Proof. The proof is by direct deduction. The latency of a transaction
consists of the latency to transmit the request, the time it takes for the
receiver to process the request and generate a response, and the latency
to transmit the response. That is captured by the first, second and third
terms of Equation 5.12. From Theorem 5.3, the first and third terms are
upper bounds. The second term (O+proc) is an upper bound by definition.
Thus, Equation 5.12 is a valid upper bound.
5.3.3. Formal analysis: the error case
In this section, AIQ is analyzed with respect to its error detection latency
guarantees. In contrast to the ARQ-based protocols, introduced in Chap-
ter 4 and which guarantee packet delivery, AIQ does not provide error
recovery and thus does not introduce itself additional latency due to er-
rors. Error recovery might be performed in software and will certainly
incur additional processing time, whose worst-case behavior under errors
has been analyzed, e.g., by [127]. As summarized in Table 5.2, two cases
must be detected by AIQ – loss and corruption. Upon detection, the error
must be notified to the local tile or to the remote tile depending on whether
the the affected packet was a request or a response.
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The worst-case impact of an error on the detection latency is when the
error causes a request/response loss, where the detection of a packet loss
occurs upon the timeout event of a timer. In contrast with the detection of
corruption, which occurs at the arrival of a request/response, the detection
of packet loss will always take longer due to the timeout. Such worst-case
error impact is similarly seen in ARQ-based protocols (cf. Chapter 4 and
Appendix A). In the sequel, the worst-case detection latency is analyzed
with respect to transient faults. The impacts of permanent faults and
permanent effects is discussed afterwards.
In case of request loss, only the local tile must be notified (cf. Table 5.2).
The Worst-Case Error Detection Latency for local reporting L+erraiq,i (q) is the
longest time interval between the transmission of a request on stream i until
the notification that its transmission on the NoC failed. It is given by:
L+erraiq,i (q) = δ
−
tx,i(q) +R
+
aiq,i + tout,i +O
+
aiq,int (5.13)
where tout,i is the timeout value for the request packet of stream i and
O+aiq,int is the maximum delay from timeout detection until a hardware
interrupt is raised. Similar to ARQ protocols, the timeout must be chosen
larger than the worst-case RTT, usually including a safety margin – i.e.,
tout,i > RTT
+
i (cf. Definition 4.2).
In case of a response, a remote notification with a NACK is required,
which extends the notification latency. That is captured by the Worst-Case
Error Detection Latency for remote reporting L+err remaiq,i (q) and is given by:
L+err remaiq,i (q) = δ
−
tx,i(q) +R
+
aiq,i + tout,i + L
+
nack +O
+
aiq,int (5.14)
where tout,i is the timeout value for the response packet of stream i, and
L+nack is the worst-case NoC latency of the NACK packet (cf. Section 4.2.3).
It is possible that the NACK is delivered to the master only after retrans-
mission attempts, which can occur in multiple error scenarios in very high
error rates. In that case, k · tout,NACK can be appended to Equation 5.14
to account for the k additional retransmissions with timeout tout,NACK .
In case of permanent faults or transient faults with static effects causing
the failure of the NoC, it is possible that the NACK is not delivered at
all. AIQ is also able to detect NoC failures by monitoring the frequency of
error occurrences and by detecting the failure of a remote notification. In
case of network failure, a dedicated error single-wire signal, shared among
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all nodes, can be employed to notify the failure to the otherwise unreach-
able system controller. The controller can then reset the NoC, which will
cause the unavailability of the NoC for some time, called Mean Down
Time (MDT), whose length depends on the hardware/software implemen-
tation. Moreover, the reset of the NoC must be carried out in such a way
that the remaining transactions are allowed to finish, so that only the tasks
whose transactions failed due to an error will trigger recovery in software.
Otherwise, a the reset could induce the failure of all pending transactions
and lead therewith to an undesirable scenario.
5.4. Experimental evaluation
AIQ has been evaluated with respect to performance, implementation over-
head, and the achieved reliability and availability. The main objective of
the experiments is to evaluate the impact of AIQ on the regular perfor-
mance of the MPSoC. On the impact of errors on NoCs, the interested
reader can refer to the investigations of Chapter 2.
The performance was evaluated with the many-core platform IDAMC
[103]. Benchmark applications as well as an avionics use case were exe-
cuted on two versions of the platform: a baseline version; and a version
with AIQ. Moreover, two different mapping configurations are used to
stimulate an extreme application scenario and one expected application
scenario. In the first scenario, the applications are executed remotely in-
ducing the direct impact of the NoC latencies on the application perfor-
mance – i.e., the application code and data are mapped to memory in
remote tiles. In the second scenario, the application nodes execute locally,
emulating a Logical Execution Time execution model with inter-core com-
munication for synchronization and DMA for data transfers – i.e., code
and data mapped to local memory, and shared memory communication
and code download from memory in remote tiles. The two scenarios pro-
vide a valuable contrast between AIQ’s impact on the NoC traffic and the
impact of the NoC performance on the application’s execution. Finally,
the hardware implementation overhead of AIQ is evaluated, followed by a
reliability assessment and discussion. The results presented in this section
regard a VHDL design of the IDAMC platform and AIQ simulated in RTL
with QuestaSim [101], synthesized for FPGA with Xilinx Vivado [157] and
synthesized for CMOS ASICs with Synopsys Design Compiler [145].
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Figure 5.6.: Mapping of the CHSTONE benchmark applications to the 3x3
NoC.
5.4.1. Performance evaluation: benchmark applications
The performance impact of AIQ was first evaluated with CHSTONE bench-
marks [59]. The benchmark applications were mapped to the IDAMC
platform as depicted in Figure 5.6. The applications’ code and data were
mapped to remote a remote memory, according with the first of the afore-
mentioned mapping configurations. In the setup, application tiles generate
traffic due to cache misses and evictions and due to uncached data accesses.
The applications were divided in two groups: one group (light gray) ac-
cesses the memory in tile DRAM1 and the other group (dark gray) accesses
the memory in tile DRAM2. The NoC is configured with XY routing for
requests, YX routing for responses, and a separate VC for each applica-
tion. The interested reader can refer to the overview in Chapter 1 for more
details on the IDAMC and on the NoC.
The results of the RTL simulations can be seen in Figure 5.7, which plots
the latencies of NoC transactions of the different applications as boxplots.
Furthermore, the plot compares latencies in an unprotected NoC (base)
with latencies in a NoC protected with AIQ. In a boxplot, the whiskers
represent the maximum and minimum, the box represents the second and
third quartiles, the horizontal line indicates the median value, and the
marker indicates the mean value. First, the minimum latency increased 9
cycles in all applications. That is due to the increase in the pipeline length
in the NI. As seen in Figure 5.4, by introducing AIQ and the CRC checker,
the pipeline was extended by four stages for a request and for a response.
On average, the latencies increased 16.1% across all applications. That is
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caused by the increased pipeline length as well as the additional feedback
traffic consisting of ACKs.
This experimental setup intentionally induces a high amount of traffic
whose performance strongly impacts the execution time of the applications.
Thus, execution time increase varied from 10.8% (ADPCM ) up to 15.5%
(Motion), depending on the application’s memory footprint. On average,
the execution times increased 12.6% across all applications.
Detailed results of the SHA application are shown in Figure 5.8. The
figure plots the trace of latencies of NoC transactions in time, comparing
the cases with the unprotected and the protected NoC. In the protected
NoC, the latencies are slightly longer and show a higher variance than in the
unprotected one due to the additional feedback traffic introduced by AIQ.
In fact, the average latency increases in about 14.9% from 94.94 to 109.11
clock cycles (cf. Figure 5.7). Due to high impact of the NoC latencies on
application performance artificially induced by the experimental setup, the
execution time of SHA increased 12.66%. That can be considered as upper
bound for the overhead caused by AIQ on cache-enabled executions. As
seen next, the impact on performance of executions with local memory is
much lower.
5.4.2. Performance evaluation: avionics use case
AIQ was also evaluated with a parallelized avionics application. Due
to the confidentiality of industrial developments, the experiments employ
an Artificial Demonstration Application (ADA) that mocks the dataflow
and workload of a Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning System
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Figure 5.7.: Boxplot of observed latency of NoC transactions of CHSTONE
benchmarks in a protected (AIQ) and unprotected NoC (Base).
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Figure 5.8.: Latency of transactions of the SHA application executing on
an unprotected NoC and on a NoC protected with AIQ.
(HTAWS) [44]. The HTAWS consists of multiple threads with DAL-C
[35] executing on an SMP with an RTOS. The main application dataflow,
depicted in Figure 5.9a, comprises four major pipeline stages. Two of the
stages (Decomp. and Draw) can be parallelized to increase performance by
exploiting the available data parallelism. A major frame must be processed
from input to output in at most 60ms. In the original single core applica-
tion, the four stages are executed sequentially, with a period of 60ms. In
the parallel version, the stages are executed in a pipeline to increase the
overall throughput.
The application is mapped to a 2x4 instance of IDAMC, as depicted
in Figure 5.9b. Stages 1, 3 and 4 are mapped to a single tile (L/I/D).
Three instances of stage 2 are mapped to different tiles (Decomp. #1,
#2 and #3 ). Additionally, interference is introduced in the platform by
node Stream. src, which generates DMA traffic to node Stream. dst with
4.8KB DMA transfers. The system controller (System Ctrl.+RM ) initial-
izes the platform and manages the access to shared network resources by
implementing a resource manager [84].
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(b) Mapping on 2x4 NoC.
Figure 5.9.: ADA application and its mapping to a 2x4 IDAMC, including
interfering applications.
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Figure 5.10.: Response time comparison of ADA with a protected NoC
(AIQ) and an unprotected one (Base).
Figure 5.10 reports the execution time of ADA under different setups in
RTL simulations of the IDAMC platform. When increasing the workload,
specified as number of batches, ADA takes between 1ms and 3.2ms to exe-
cute on IDAMC with an unprotected NoC (Base). With a NoC protected
with AIQ, the execution takes from 1.4% to 7.1% longer (cf. Figure 5.10b).
In contrast to the benchmark applications evaluated in the previous sec-
tion, these executions with AIQ present much lower overhead. That is due
to the more realistic setup expected in real-time multi- and many-core plat-
form environments, where a clearer separation between computation and
communication is required to limit interference, to achieve predictability
and to avoid prohibitive analytical over-approximations. That trend can
be seen in predictable execution models such as superblocks [138, 117].
Figure 5.11 reports the latencies of NoC transactions observed in the
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scenario with 4 batches. The plot shows, as boxplots, the observed la-
tencies of NoC transactions initiated by different ADA application nodes
with and without AIQ. The average transaction latency increases between
14.8% and 19.7% with AIQ. The minimum latency increases 15.5% due
to the additional cycles required by the extended pipeline in the NIs. The
observed maximum, however, decreased between 3.9% and 7.8%, i.e., be-
tween 4 and 13 clock cycles. That is due to a slightly different network
traffic patterns that result from the interaction with the feedback traffic
and that induces a scenario where some packets to experience less interfer-
ence. Nonetheless, one can observe that those scenarios are exceptional as
latency increases are the expected case.
5.4.3. Implementation overhead
The implementation overhead of AIQ was evaluated for FPGAs and ASICs.
The evaluation features a baseline NI and NIs protected with different
configurations of AIQ. For FPGAs, the designs were synthesized in Xil-
inx Vivado [157] targeting a Virtex-7 FPGA (xc7v2000tflg1925-1) and a
frequency of 80MHz. For CMOS ASICs, the designs were synthesized in
Synopsys Design Compiler [145] with UMC 65nm cell libraries (high and
low threshold voltage, worst-case corner 0.9V 125C) targeting a frequency
of 125MHz; and with TSMC 28nm cell libraries (high and standard thresh-
old voltage, worst-case corner 0.72V 125C) targeting a frequency of 1GHz.
The evaluation involved a NI configured with four interfaces:
• DMA if. for DMA transfers;
• Mst if. for remote NoC transactions;
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Figure 5.11.: Boxplot of observed latency of NoC transactions of ADA with
4 batches in a protected (AIQ) and unprotected NoC (Base).
5.4. Experimental evaluation 139
• Slv if. for initiating NoC transactions;
• IRQ if. for interrupt forwarding.
Figures 5.12 and 5.13 details the resource usage (FPGA) and cell area
(ASIC), respectively, of four different versions of the NI and their internal
components: baseline (B) and different configurations of AIQ (2, 4, and
8) where AIQ is equipped with tracking tables with 2, 4 and 8 entries,
respectively. In the figures, besides the four aforementioned interfaces,
the NI is further divided into multiplexer and demultiplexer (DE/MUX ),
which connects the interfaces to the lower layers of the NoC; the lower
layers of the NoC are captured by Others. The AIQ is subdivided into the
core AIQ and the CRC integrity check (CRC gen and CRC check). In the
ASIC, the results also show Addr.Transl., which contains the NoC routes
and VCs (source routing) as well as local and remote address mapping. In
the FPGA, Addr.Transl. is captured by Others.
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Figure 5.12.: FPGA synthesis results for a NI with AIQ (2, 4 and 8 entries)
and without it (U).
In the FPGA (Figure 5.12), the total amount of data in the NI increases
less than 2% with AIQ for all configurations. Optimized for FPGAs, the
configuration memory and buffers are mapped to a total of seven Block
RAMs: five with size 36Kb and two with size 16Kb. Notice that the num-
ber of BRAMs don’t vary with the different configurations and, thus, they
are not shown in the figure. The approach requires 15.7% additional regis-
ter bits and 28.4% additional logic in the NI to implement AIQ with 2 table
entries. The implementation overhead of AIQ is introduced by the main
7Not including the data buffers, synthesized as Block RAMs.
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AIQ component and the CRC integrity check. The main component (AIQ)
is responsible for most of the additional logic (19.7% additional LUTs), but
requires only 0.6% additional register bits. Notice that the main compo-
nent replaces the original multiplexer and demultiplexer (DE/MUX ) as it
already provides that functionality. The integrity check (CRC gen. and
CRC check) is responsible for most of the additional register bits (14.8%),
but requires only 4.7% additional logic (LUTs). When increasing the num-
ber of entries from 2 to 4, additional 2.3% register bits and 7.4% LUTs
are required. Further doubling the number of entries from 4 to 8 requires
additional 4.4% register bits and 9.5% LUTs. Notice, however, that some
of that apparent overhead is not caused by AIQ. Some variations can be
observed in the results that are caused by optimizations carried out by the
toolchain – e.g., varying number of LUTs used by Mst if despite being
independent of the number of entries of AIQ. Although FPGAs provide
for fast prototyping and experimentation, ASIC is still the technology with
which the work is expected to be applied.
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Figure 5.13.: ASIC synthesis results (65nm UMC) for a NI with AIQ (2, 4
and 8 entries) and without it (U).
In the 65nm UMC ASIC (Figure 5.13), a NI implementing AIQ with 2
table entries requires 9.6% additional silicon area (or NAND2-equivalent
additional gates). The implementation overhead of AIQ is introduced by
the main AIQ component and the CRC integrity check. In contrast to the
FPGA, the main contributors to the area increase is the integrity check
(CRC gen. and CRC check), which corresponds for approx. 82.9% of the
additional logic. The main component (AIQ) contributes with only approx.
17.1% of the additional logic, since it replaces the original multiplexer and
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demultiplexer (DE/MUX ). When increasing the number of entries from 2
to 4, 2.2% additional logic is required (in total, 12.0% additional logic from
U to 4). Further doubling the number of entries from 4 to 8 requires 4.2%
additional logic (in total, 16.7% additional logic from U to 8). Nonetheless,
both in the FPGA and in the ASIC, the resource and logic requirements of
AIQ are expected to decrease with more efficient implementations of the
NI and of AIQ itself.
Regarding maximum achievable frequency, the AIQ design does not im-
pact negatively the circuit. On the contrary. On the FPGA, the baseline
NI reached 78MHz whereas the version with AIQ reached just over 82MHz.
That is due to the reduced critical path obtained when replacing the multi-
plexer and demultiplexer with AIQ, which split that pipeline stage in two.
In the ASIC implementation, which reached 125MHz with 65nm UMC and
1GHz with 28nm TSMC, AIQ has no influence on the critical path. The
critical path was found to lie in one of the interfaces in all configurations.
The energy consumption was evaluated with Synopsys PrimeTime [146]
using the 65nm netlist. Under full load (single-word memory accesses with
random payload), the NI equipped with AIQ (with 2 entries) consumes
8.03% more energy than baseline. For a larger AIQ with 4 and 8 entries
the NI consumes 9.24% and 11.52% more energy than baseline, respectively.
When idle (no traffic), the overheads are 6.45%, 7.70% and 9.91% for AIQ
with 2, 4 and 8 table entries, respectiely.
The hardware cost of the AIQ approach is compared next with the re-
silient NoC approach, introduced in Chapter 3, and the DMR and TMR
approaches [67]. DMR is able to detect errors of the NoC but it is neither
able to pin-point nor to recover from them (cf. Section 1.5.2). As AIQ,
DMR can be used to detect errors and achieve integrity. TMR is able to
detect errors and also is able to detect which NoC instance is faulty. It can
tolerate one error and continue operating. Error recovery is possible, e.g.,
by resetting the faulty NoC.
Before presenting the results, three considerations are required. First,
the costs of DMR and TMR do not include the voter and recovery logic,
and the Resilient NoC’s NIs use AIQ as a lower bound for a full-featured
ARQ implementation. Second, the results do not account for the link
wires, which are highly dependent on the place and routing of the entire
MPSoC. And third, for the FPGA, the synthesis tool optimally maps
buffers and register banks to Block RAMs. The number of BRAMs is
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Figure 5.14.: Comparison of approach overhead for a 5x5 NoC (Virtex-7
FPGA).
not reported because it does not increase for the compared approaches
except for DMR and TMR, which duplicates and triplicates the number of
BRAMs, respectively.
Figure 5.14 shows the cost for FPGAs, in terms of resource usage, of
a 5x5 NoC, where every router is connected to a NI. The total cost of
implementing AIQ and ensuring the predictability and integrity of a 5x5
NoC is 17.02% in terms of logic and 9.73% in terms of registers when
equipping the NIs with AIQ instances with 2 table entries (AIQ 1). When
considering that two NIs are potential bottlenecks and require larger AIQ
instances with 8 table entries (AIQ 2), the cost raises slightly to 18.68%
in terms of logic and 10.30% in terms of registers. In contrast with DMR
and its >100% overhead, AIQ requires just a fraction of the resources
to provide the same guarantees. In order to further achieve resilience and
high reliability, the resilient NoC approach requires 46.77% additional logic
and 27.68% register bits. In comparison with AIQ, that is roughly three
times the overhead. Notice that the resource requirement reported might
exceed the ones available in the actual FPGA. Due to FPGA limitations,
the reported figures are an extrapolation from the individual components
required for implementing such a topology. As seen next, besides being the
target technology for such a design, ASIC provides a better perspective
with respect to the overheads.
Figure 5.15 shows the cost, in terms of area, for an ASIC implementa-
tion of the same scenario as above. In contrast with the FPGA, the cell
area metric in ASIC concentrates all requirements in terms of sequential
as well as combinational logic and provides, therefore, for a better over-
head comparison. Moreover, the figure shows the results for two different
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Figure 5.15.: Comparison of approach area overhead for a 5x5 NoC (65nm
UMC and 28nm TSMC ASICs).
technology nodes: UMC’s 65nm and TSMC’s 28nm. Notice that this fig-
ure is intended to compare the overhead of different approaches in a given
technology node. A comparison between the different technology nodes is
provided in the sequel.
In a 65nm UMC ASIC, the total cost of implementing AIQ and ensur-
ing the predictability and integrity of a 5x5 NoC is 3.74%, where NIs are
equiped with AIQ instances with 2 table entries (AIQ 1). Considering
the scenario with two larger AIQs (AIQ 2), the cost raises very slightly
to 4.08%. Even when all NIs feature large AIQs, the cost corresponds to
6.52% (not plotted). In the considered setup, the overhead of DMR and
TMR in ASIC does not differ from FPGA. When considering the resilient
NoC approach, high reliability demands an area overhead of 12.06%. In
comparison with AIQ, that is roughly three times the overhead. In com-
parison to TMR, not only is the resilient NoC much more efficient with
respect to resource usage (FPGA) and area (ASIC) and, thus, power but
also more effective. Besides, DMR and TMR imply a significant increase
in the number of interconnecting wires, which can lead to circuit routing
complications, potential congestion and lower frequencies.
In a 28nm TSMC ASIC (Figure 5.15), similar trends are observed albeit
with a slightly larger overhead. That comes from the fact that different
cells in a cell library – e.g., sequential, combinational, and their different
variations – have different sizes. When scaling down the technology node
from 65nm to 28nm, the corresponding cells in the library do not scale
equally. That results in the case where, e.g., sequential cells in the smaller
technology node are relatively larger than the combinatorial cells, in com-
parison with the larger technology node. Thus, although the synthesized
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Figure 5.16.: Gate-equivalent comparison of approach overhead in different
ASIC technology nodes (65nm UMC and 28nm TSMC) for a
5x5 NoC.
design is the same, the proportion between different cells (e.g., sequential
and combinatorial) in the implementation results in a different area over-
heads. A comparison between the two technology nodes can be seen in
Figure 5.16 with the gate equivalent metric. The gate equivalent aims at
measuring the manufacturing-technology-independent complexity of a dig-
ital circuit [75]. The gate equivalent unit corresponds to the design silicon
area divided by the area of a reference cell in the same technology node. A
two-input drive-strength-one NAND cell (NAND2), which is usually used
as reference, is employed here. The effects mentioned above can be ob-
served here also for the baseline design. Notice that the baseline design
requires relatively more silicon area (between 4% and 5%) in 28nm than in
65nm.
5.4.4. Reliability
To put into perspective what can be achieved with such overheads, the
resulting reliability is also evaluated. The reliability is evaluated by means
of the reliability metricR(t), which is the probability that the NoC does not
fail during a time interval [0, t] [67]. The definition of failure of Chapter 3
is reused, which states that failure in a high dependability mixed-critical
real-time system is the violation of integrity, resilience or real-time latency
guarantees due to errors, including static effects leading to blocking. Packet
loss is not considered as a failure for and AIQ and the Resilient NoC
because it is handled in the transport layer. The evaluation considers BERs
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Figure 5.17.: Reliability comparison of the resilient NoC and non-resilient
ones. A 5x5 NoC size is considered.
from 10−12 up to 10−9/hour, which accounts for the expected8 BERs in
practice [6] (in the order of 10−12 bit-flips per hour) and the design safety
margin [91] (up to 10−9/hour). Additionally, a permanent fault rate9 of
10−11/h per router is considered. The occurrence of a permanent fault
leads directly to failure.
Figure 5.17 plots the analytical R(t) for the unprotected, baseline NoC
and the NoC protected with AIQ considering a 5x5 2D-mesh topology, ex-
cluding the NIs. The plot also includes the Resilient NoC and variants of
the baseline NoC with DMR (Base+DMR) and TMR (Base+TMR). The
DMR and TMR have ideal voters and the latter is non-reparable [67]. Al-
though DMR can ensure the integrity of the system, the extra redundant
hardware implies higher susceptibility to errors and results in a less reliable
NoC than baseline. The same is seen for TMR, whose capability of with-
standing one error does not pay off the extra redundant hardware. On the
other hand, AIQ captures all violations of integrity and real-time require-
ments and is able to increase the reliability in about one order of magnitude
w.r.t. the baseline NoC. However, there still exists the possibility that a
soft error affects the state of the NoC and causes static effects, leading
to the blocking of the NoC (cf. Chapter 2), which limits the reliability
in time. That scenario can either be prevented with the Resilient NoC
approach or it can be handled by resetting the NoC back to a valid state
with a version of AIQ with NoC resetting capabilities (AIQ+R). AIQ+R
and Resilient achieve equally high reliability, since all soft errors in the
8BERs derived for sequential and combinational logic [61] with data from [6] for 65nm
CMOS SRAM. Masking effects [41] are not taken into account.
9The fault rate per router is inspired from processor failure rates in [111].
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NoC can be detected and handled by both techniques, at which point hard
errors become then the limiting factor.
Table 5.3.: Comparison of MTTFs in hours
BER/h 3x3 5x5 8x8
Base
10−12 5.36 · 105 6.07 · 103 8.65 · 103
10−9 5.36 · 102 6.07 · 101 8.65 · 100
Base+DMR
10−12 2.68 · 105 3.03 · 104 4.32 · 103
10−9 2.68 · 102 3.03 · 101 4.32 · 100
Base+TMR
10−12 4.47 · 105 5.06 · 104 7.20 · 103
10−9 4.47 · 102 5.06 · 101 7.20 · 100
AIQ
10−12 4.96 · 106 5.63 · 105 8.04 · 104
10−9 4.96 · 103 5.63 · 102 8.04 · 101
AIQ+R & 10−12 1.11 · 1010 4.00 · 109 1.56 · 109
Resilient NoC 10−9 1.11 · 1010 4.00 · 109 1.56 · 109
The conclusions above can also be seen in the results of Table 5.3, which
reports the MTTF in hours for different NoC sizes and BERs. Even in small
topologies, non-resilient NoCs present very low MTTFs and consequently
very high failure rates. On average, an 8x8 NoC is expected to be struck
by a soft error from every 360 days in a regular environment (BER 10−12)
up to every 8.65 hours in an aggressive environment (BER 10−9). Most
of those errors will present only transient effects that will be handled in
software. However, as mentioned above, some of them present static effects
and their recovery requires resetting the NoC’s state. Those are seldom and
are expected to occur, on average, every 80.4 hours under BER 10−9. The
recovery requires cycles of downtime and thus impacts the NoC availability,
which is evaluated next.
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Figure 5.18.: Unavailability of the NoC with AIQ+R when varying the
MDT.
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Figure 5.18 reports the unavailability of the NoC, as the complement of
its availability (U = 1−A) for different sizes and BERs when varying the
MDT. Even for very high BERs, with the MDT in the range of microsec-
onds, the NoC still presents very high availability. As the MDT approaches
a tenth of a second, the system experiences longer interruptions due to the
NoC recovery, which is likely to compromise its timeliness and violate,
already at design time, the real-time guarantees. Thus, fast software rou-
tines should be used with hardware support to ensure low MDTs and the
applicability of the approach. Alternatively, in case the availability is too
low due to a combination of long MDTs, high BERs and large NoC sizes,
the Resilient NoC approach, which ensures the availability of the NoC in
hardware, can be employed.
5.5. Summary
This chapter presented AIQ, an end-to-end mechanism to provide integrity
and real-time guarantees for NoC transactions under random hardware
faults. When integrated, the mechanism results in a low-overhead fault-
tolerant NoC capable of detecting errors and ensuring that their effects
are contained in time in order to maintain the system’s predictability and
integrity. AIQ explores the idea of keeping track of transactions of dis-
tributed systems in the context of NoCs for predictable real-time systems.
Upon error detection, error handling and recovery are delegated to soft-
ware, which may react according to an arbitrary strategy. The mechanism
was evaluated in the many-core research platform IDAMC considering as-
pects such as performance and implementation costs. AIQ operates with
high performance and low hardware overheads. The experimental evalua-
tion with an industrial avionics use case shows an overhead between 1.4%
and 7.1% in execution time. With respect to hardware overhead, AIQ
requires less than 4.1% additional silicon area in an 65nm CMOS ASIC
implementation of a 5x5 NoC. In a smaller technology node (28nm), AIQ
requires less than 5.2% additional silicon area.

6. Replica-aware Co-scheduling
for Mixed-criticality
Technology downscaling has increased the hardware’s overall susceptibility
to errors to the point where they became non-negligible. Hence, current
and future computing systems must be appropriately designed to cope with
errors in order to provide a reliable service and correct functionality. Spe-
cially in the real-time mixed-criticality domain, where applications with
different requirements and criticalities co-exist in the system. The system
must thus provide sufficient independence and prevent error propagation
between criticalities [72, 35] – e.g., timing violation and data corruption. As
previously seen in Chapter 2, depending on where and when errors occur,
their impact on software execution range from masked (no observable ef-
fect) to a complete system crash. To handle such errors, the approaches can
vary from completely software-based to completely hardware-based. The
former are able to cover only part of the errors [45, 38] and the latter result
in costly redundant hardware [64], as currently seen in lock-step dual-core
execution [110]. This chapter addresses a more effective and efficient cross-
layer approach that distributes the tasks of detecting errors and recovering
from them in different layers of software and hardware [64, 45, 38].
A cross-layer fault-tolerance solution for mixed-criticality that increases
the system’s reliability at a higher level of abstraction without resorting
to hardware redundancy has been developed in the ASTEROID project
[10, 38]. ASTEROID’s architecture is illustrated in Figure 6.1. The reli-
able software execution is realized by the operating system service Romain
[38]. Mixed-critical applications may co-exist in the system and they are
translated into protected and unprotected applications. Romain replicates
the protected applications and manage their execution. Error detection is
realized by a set o mechanisms whose main feature is the hardware assisted
state comparison, which compares the replicas’ state at certain points in
time [10, 38]. Error recovery strategies can vary depending on whether the
application is running in DMR or TMR [10, 9].
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Figure 6.1.: ASTEROID’s fault-tolerant architecture: the software side.
The performance of replicated execution has been analyzed by Axer
et al. in [12] and revised in [8]. The work supports Partitioned Strict Pri-
ority Preemptive (SPP) scheduling where tasks are mapped to arbitrary
cores, and assumes a single error model. The authors found that SPP,
although widely employed in real-time systems, provides very pessimistic
response time bounds for replicated tasks. Depending on the interfering
workload, replicated tasks executing serially (on the same core) present
in several cases better performance than when executing in parallel (on
distinct cores). That occurs due to the long time that replicated tasks
potentially have to wait on each core to synchronize and compare states
before resuming execution. That leads to very low resource utilization and
prevents the use of replicated execution in practice.
This chapter explores co-scheduling to provide small response times for
replicated tasks without hindering the remaining unprotected tasks. Co-
scheduling is a technique that schedules interacting tasks/threads to ex-
ecute simultaneously on different cores [113]. It allows tasks/threads to
communicate more efficiently by reducing the time they are blocked dur-
ing synchronization. In contrast to SPP [12, 8], the proposed approach
drastically minimizes delays due to the implicit synchronization found in
state comparisons. In contrast to gang scheduling [48], it rules out star-
vation and distributes the execution of replicas in time to achieve small
response times of unprotected tasks. Unlike standard Time-Division Mul-
tiplexing (TDM) and TDM with background partition [76], the approach
ensures that all tasks have formal guarantees. Moreover, in contrast to
related work, it supports different recovery strategies and accounts for the
NoC communication delay and overheads due to replica management and
state comparison.
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The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows. A review of relevant
related work is presented in Section 6.1. The replica-aware co-scheduling
for mixed-criticality is introduced next, in two parts: the approach in Sec-
tion 6.2 and the formal WCRT analysis in Section 6.3. The evaluation is
presented in Section 6.4. Finally, Section 6.6 completes the chapter with a
summary.
6.1. Related work
L4/Romain [38] is a cross-layer fault-tolerance approach that provides re-
liable software execution under soft errors. Romain provides protection at
the application-level by replicating and managing the applications’ execu-
tions as an operating system service. The error detection is realized by a
set of mechanisms [10, 38, 45] whose main feature is the hardware assisted
state comparison, which allows an effective and efficient comparison of the
replicas’ states. Pipeline fingerprinting [10] provides a checksum of the
retired instructions and the pipeline’s data path in every processor, detect-
ing errors in the execution flow and data. The state comparison, which is
reduced to comparing checksums instead of data structures, is carried out
at certain points in time. It must occur at least when the application is
about to externalize its state – e.g., in a syscall [38]. The replica generated
syscalls are intercepted by Romain, have their integrity checked and their
replicas’ states compared before being allowed to externalize the state [38].
Mixed-criticality, in the context of this work, is supported with different
levels of protection for applications with different criticalities and require-
ments (unprotected, protected with DMR1or TMR) and by ensuring that
timing constraints are met even in case of errors. For instance, Romain
provides different error recovery strategies [10, 9]:
• DMR with checkpoint and rollback : to recover, the replicas rollback
to their last valid state and re-execute;
• TMR with state copy : to recover, the state of the faulty replica is
replaced with the state of one of the healthy replicas.
This chapter focuses on the system-level timing aspect of errors affecting
the applications. It assumes thereby the absence of failures in critical
components [45, 126], such as the OS, the replica manager/voter (e.g.,
Romain) and the interconnect (e.g., NoC), which can be protected as in
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Chapters 3 and 5 and [66, 132].
The WCRT of replicated execution has been analyzed by Axer et al. in
[12], where replicas are modeled as fork-join tasks in a system implementing
Partitioned SPP. The work was later revised in [8] due to optimism in
the original approach. The revised approach is the version considered in
this thesis. In the approach, with deadline monotonic priority assignment,
where the priority of tasks decrease as their deadlines increase, replicated
tasks often perform worse when mapped in parallel than when mapped
to a single core. That is due to the state comparisons during execution,
which involves implicit synchronization between cores. With partitioned
scheduling, in the worst-case, the synchronization ends up accumulating
the interference from all cores to which the replicated task is mapped,
resulting in poor performance in higher loads. On the other hand, mapping
replicated tasks to the highest priorities results in long response times for
lower priority tasks and rules out deadline monotonicity. The latter causes
the unschedulability of all tasksets with at least one regular task whose
deadline is shorter than the execution time of a replicated task.
Gang scheduling [48] is a co-scheduling variant that schedules groups
of interacting tasks/threads simultaneously. It increases performance by
reducing the inter-thread communication latency. The authors in [78]
present an integration between gang scheduling and Global Earliest Dead-
line First (EDF), called the Gang EDF. They provide a schedulability
analysis derived from the Global EDF’s based on the sporadic task model.
In another work, [53] shows that SPP Gang schedulers are in general not
predictable, for instance, due to priority inversions and slack utilization.
In the context of real-time systems, gang scheduling has not received much
attention.
TDM-based scheduling [76] is widely employed to achieve predictability
and ensure temporal-isolation. Tasks are allocated to partitions, which are
scheduled to execute in time slots. Partitions can span across several (or
all) cores and can be executed at the same time. The downside of TDM is
that it is not work-conserving and underutilizes system resources. A TDM
variant with background partition [76] tackles that issue by allowing low
priority tasks to execute in other partitions whenever no higher priority
workload is executing. Yet, in addition to the high cost to switch between
1DMR per se can be used for system integrity only. However, DMR augmented with
checkpointing and rollback enables recovery and can be used to achieve integrity and
availability (state rollback followed by re-execution in both replicas) [10, 9].
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partitions, no guarantees can be given to tasks in the background partition.
The proposed replica-aware co-scheduling for mixed-criticality exploits
co-scheduling with SPP to improve the performance of the system. The
approach differs from [12, 8] in that replicas are treated as gangs and are
mapped with highest priorities, and are hence activated simultaneously on
different cores. In contrast to gang-scheduling [48, 53] and to [12, 8], the
execution of replicas is distributed in time with offsets to compensate for
the lack of deadline monotonicity thus allowing the schedulability of tasks
with short deadlines. The approach further provides for the worst-case
performance of lower priority tasks by allowing them to execute whenever
no higher priority workload is executing. However, in contrast to [76],
all tasks have WCRT guarantees. Finally, the analysis also models the
state comparison and the on-Chip communication overheads, and although
Romain is used as an example, it is also applicable to other approaches.
6.2. The proposed approach
This section introduces the replica-aware co-scheduling for mixed-criticality
including its assumptions, system, task, and event models. The modeling
is realized with CPA [62] to provide formal response time bounds.
6.2.1. System model
The system consists of a standard NoC-based many-core composed of pro-
cessing elements, simply referred to as cores.
There are two types of tasks in the system, as in [8]:
• independent tasks τi: regular, unprotected tasks; and
• fork-join tasks Γi: replicated, protected tasks.
The system implements partitioned scheduling, where the operating sys-
tem manages tasks statically mapped to cores. The mapping is assumed to
be given as input. The scheduling policy is a combination of SPP and gang
scheduling. When executing only independent tasks, the system’s behavior
is identical to Partitioned SPP, where tasks are scheduled independently on
each core according to SPP. It differs from SPP, when scheduling fork-join
tasks.
Fork-join tasks are mapped with highest priorities, hence do not suffer
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interference from independent tasks, and execute simultaneously on dif-
ferent cores, as in gang scheduling. Note that deadline monotonicity is
therefore only partially possible. To limit the interference to independent
tasks, the execution of a fork-join task is divided in smaller intervals called
stages, whose executions are distributed in time. At the end of each stage,
the states of the replicas are compared. In case of an error, i.e., states
differ, recovery is triggered.
Fork-join stages are executed with static offsets [115] in execution slots.
One stage is executed per slot. On a core with n fork-join tasks, there are
n + 1 execution slots: one slot for each fork-join task Γi and one slot for
recovery. The slots are cyclically scheduled in a cycle Φ. The slot for Γi
starts at offset φ(Γi) relative to the start of Φ and ends after ζ(Γi), the
slot length. The recovery slot is shared by all fork-join tasks on that core
and is where error recovery may take place under a single error assump-
tion (details in Sections 6.2.3 and 6.3.3). The recovery slot has an offset
φ(recovery) relative to Φ and length ζ(recovery). Lower priority indepen-
dent tasks are allowed to execute whenever no higher priority workload is
executing.
An example is shown in Figure 6.2, where two fork-join tasks Γ1 and
Γ2 and two independent tasks τ3 and τ4 are mapped to two cores. Γ1 and
Γ2 execute in their respective slots simultaneously in both cores. When
an error occurs, the recovery of Γ2 is scheduled and the recovery of the
error-affected stage occurs in the recovery slot. The use of offsets enables
the schedulability of independent tasks with short periods and deadlines,
such as τ3 and τ4. Note that, without the offsets, Γ1 and Γ2 would execute
back-to-back leading to the unschedulability of τ3 and τ4.
6.2.2. Task model
An independent task τi is mapped to core σ with a priority p. Once ac-
tivated, it executes for at most Ci, its WCET. The activations of a task
are modeled with arbitrary event models. Task activations in an event
model are given by arrival curves η−(∆t) and η+(∆t), which return the
minimum and maximum number of events arriving in any time interval ∆t.
Their pseudo-inverse counterparts δ+(q) and δ−(q) return the maximum
and minimum time interval between the first and last events in any se-
quence of q event arrivals. Conversion is provided in [135]. Periodic events
with jitter, sporadic events and others can be modeled with the minimum
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Figure 6.2.: Execution example with two fork-join and two independent
tasks on two cores.
distance function δ−i (q) as follows [135]:
δ−i (q) = max((q − 1) · dmin, (q − 1) · P − J ) (6.1)
where P is the period, J is the jitter, dmin is the minimum distance be-
tween any two events, and the subscript i indicates the association with a
task τi or Γi.
Fork-join tasks are rigid parallel tasks, i.e., the number of processors
required by a fork-join task is fixed and specified externally to the scheduler
[53], and consist of multiple stages with data dependencies, as in [8, 3].
A fork-join task Γi is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) G(V,E) where
vertices in V are subtasks and edges in E are precedence dependencies [8].
In the graph, tasks are partitioned in segments and stages, as illustrated
in Figure 6.4a. A subtask τσ,si is the s-th stage of the σ-th segment and
is annotated with its WCET Cσ,si . The WCET of a stage is equal across
all segments, i.e., ∀x, y : Cx,si =Cy,si . Each segment σ of Γi is mapped to a
distinct core. A fork-join task Γi is annotated with the static offset φ(Γi),
which marks the start of its execution slot in Φ. The offset also admits a
small positive jitter jφ, to account for a slight desynchronization between
cores and context switch overhead.
The activations of a fork-join task are modeled with event models. Once
Γi is activated, its stages are successively activated by the completion of all
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segments of the previous stage, as in [8, 3]. The proposed approach differs
from them in that it restricts the scheduling of at most one stage of Γi in
a cycle Φ, and the stage receives service at the offset φ(Γi). Note that the
event arrival at a fork-join task is not synchronized with its offset. The
events at a fork-join task are queued at the first stage and only one event
at a time is processed (FIFO) [8]. A queued event is admitted when the
previous event leaves the last stage.
The interaction with Romain (the voter) is modeled in the analysis as
part of the WCET Cσ,si , as depicted in Figure 6.3a. The WCET includes
the on-Chip communication latency and state comparison overheads, as
the Romain instance may be mapped to an arbitrary core. Those can be
obtained, e.g., with [130] along with task mapping and scheduler proper-
ties to avoid over-conservative interference estimation and obtain tighter
bounds.
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6.2.3. Error model
The error model assumes a single error scenario caused by SEEs (cf. Sec-
tion 2). It assumes that all errors affecting fork-join tasks (replicated, pro-
tected tasks) can be detected and contained, ensuring integrity. The over-
head of error detection mechanisms are modeled as part of the WCET (cf.
Figure 6.3a). Regarding independent tasks (regular, unprotected tasks), it
assumes that an error immediately leads to a task failure: an independent
task has no integrity guarantee, no explicit error detection and no error
recovery. It is assumed that the failure of an independent task will not vio-
late the integrity and the WCRT guarantees of the remaining tasks. Those
assumptions are met, e.g., by Romain2with mechanisms such as WCET
monitoring to contain execution overruns. Moreover, it assumes the ab-
sence of failures in critical components [45, 126], such as the OS, the replica
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manager/voter Romain and the interconnect (e.g., the NoC), which can be
protected as in Chapters 3 and 5 and [66, 132].
The model provides recovery2 for fork-join tasks, ensuring their availabil-
ity. With a recovery slot in every cycle Φ, the proposed approach is able to
handle up to one error per cycle Φ. However, the analysis in Section 6.3.3
assumes at most one error per busy window (the concept will be intro-
duced in Section 6.3). The assumption is reasonable since the probability
of a multiple error scenario in a busy window, which is usually shorter than
a second in practice, is very low and can be considered as an acceptable
risk [72]. A multiple error scenario occurs only if an error affects more than
one replica at a time or if more than one error occurs within the same busy
window.
6.2.4. Offsets
The execution of fork-join tasks in the proposed approach is based on static
offsets, which are assumed to be provided as input to the scheduler. The
offsets form execution slots whose sizes do not vary during runtime, as
seen in Figure 6.2. Varying the slots’ sizes would substantially increase the
timing analysis complexity without a justifiable performance gain. The
offsets must satisfy two constraints:
Constraint 6.1. A slot for a fork-join task Γi must be large enough to fit
the largest stage of Γi. That is, ∀s, σ: ζ(Γi) ≥ Cσ,si + jφ.
Constraint 6.2. The recovery slot must be large enough to fit the recovery
of the largest stage of any fork-join task mapped to that core. That is,
∀i, s, σ: ζ(recovery)≥Cσ,si,rec + jφ.
where a one error scenario per cycle is assumed and Cσ,si,rec is the recovery
WCET of subtask τσ,si (cf. Section 6.3.3).
Next, basic offsets that satisfy Constraints 6.1 and 6.2 are provided. The
calculation must consider only overlapping fork-join tasks, i.e., fork-join
tasks mapped to at least one core in common. Offsets for non-overlapping
fork-join tasks are computed separately as they do not interfere directly
with each other. The indirect interference, e.g., in the NoC, are accounted
2Romain is able to detect and recover from all soft errors affecting user-level appli-
cations. For details on the different error impacts and detection strategies, the
interested reader can refer to [10, 38].
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for in the WCETs. First, one must find the smallest slots that satisfy
Constraint 6.1:
∀Γi : ζ(Γi) = max∀σ,s {C
σ,s
i }+ jφ (6.2)
and the smallest recovery slot that satisfies Constraint 6.2:
ζ(recovery) = max
∀Γi,τσ,sj ∈Γi
{
Cσ,si,rec
}
+ jφ (6.3)
The cycle Φ is then the sum of all slots:
Φ =
∑
∀Γi
{ζ(Γi)}+ ζ(recovery) (6.4)
The offsets depend then on the order in which the slots are placed inside
Φ. Assuming that the slots φ(Γi) are sorted in ascending order on i and
that the recovery slot is the last one, the offsets are obtained by:
φ(x) =

0 if x = Γ1
φ(Γi−1) + ζ(Γi−1) if x = Γi and i > 1
Φ− ζ(recovery) if x = recovery
(6.5)
6.3. Formal response-time analysis
The analysis is based on CPA and inspired by [8, 115]. In CPA, the WCRT
is calculated with the busy window approach [149]. The response time of
an event of a task τi (resp. Γi) is the time interval between the event
arrival and the completion of its execution. In the busy window approach
[149], the event with the WCRT can be found inside the busy window.
The busy window wi of a task τi (resp. Γi) is the time interval where all
response times of the task depend on the execution of at least one previous
event in the same busy window, except for the task’s first event. The
busy window starts at a critical instant corresponding to the worst-case
scheduling scenario. Since the worst-case scheduling scenario depends on
the type of task, it will be derived individually in the sequel.
Before the analysis for fork-join and for independent tasks is derived,
Figure 6.4 introduces an example used throughout the section. The taskset
consists of 4 independent tasks and 2 fork-join tasks, mapped to two cores.
The task priority on each core decreases from top to bottom – e.g., τ1,11
has the highest priority and τ4 the lowest.
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Independent tasks
Fork-join task
 5 4 3
1 
1,1
1 
2,1
1 
3,1
1

1,2
1 
2,2
1 
3,2
1
segment 1
segment 2
stage 1 stage 2 stage 3
 2 
1,1
2 
2,1
2

1,2
2 
2,2
2
segment 1
segment 2
stage 1 stage 2
 6
(a) Taskset
core 1 core 2
 5
 6

3,2
1

2,2
1

1,2
1
1,1
1

2,1
1

3,1
1
 3
 4

2,2
2

1,2
2
1,1
2

2,1
2
(b) Mapping
Figure 6.4.: A taskset with 4 independent tasks and 2 fork-join tasks, and
its mapping to 2 cores. Highest priority at the top, lowest at
the bottom.
6.3.1. Fork-join tasks
Deriving the WCRT for an arbitrary fork-join task Γi requires identifying
the critical instant leading to the worst-case scheduling scenario. In case
of SPP, the critical instant is when all tasks are activated at the same time
and the tasks’ subsequent events arrive as early as possible [149]. In this
case, the critical instant must also account for the use of static offsets [115].
The worst-case scheduling scenario for Γ2 on core 1 is illustrated in Fig-
ure 6.5. Γ2 is activated and executed at the same time on cores 1 and 2
(omitted). Notice that, by design, fork-join tasks do not dynamically inter-
fere with each other. The critical instant occurs when the first event of Γ2
arrives just after missing Γ2’s offset. The event has to wait until the next
cycle to be served, which takes time Φ + jφ when the activation with offset
is delayed by a jitter jφ. Notice that the WCETs of fork-join tasks already
account for the inter-core communication and synchronization overhead
(cf. Figure 6.3a).
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Φ
1
2
t

1,1
1

2,1
1

3,1
1

1,1
2

2,1
2
ϕ(Γ2)
B2(1), R2(1)
δ2(2) R2(2)
core 1
DelayActivation with offsetEvent Execution
ϕ(Γ2)
Q2(2)
B2(2)
Critical instant
ϕ(Γ2)+jϕ
ϕ(Γ2)+jϕ
Figure 6.5.: Worst-case schedule for fork-join gang Γ2 on core 1 (cf. Fig-
ure 6.4).
Lemma 6.1. The critical instant leading to the worst-case scheduling sce-
nario of a fork-join task Γi is when the first event of Γi arrives just after
missing Γi’s offset φ(Γi).
Proof. A fork-join task Γi does not suffer interference from independent
tasks or other fork-join tasks. The former holds since independent tasks
always have lower priority. The latter holds due to three reasons: an
arbitrary fork-join task Γj always receives service in its slot φ(Γj); the
slot φ(Γj) is large enough to fit Γj ’s largest subtask (Constraint 6.1); and
the slots in a cycle Φ are disjoint. Thus, the critical instant can only be
influenced by Γi itself.
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that there is another scenario
worse than Lemma 6.1. That means that the first event can arrive at a
time that causes a delay to Γi larger than Φ + jφ. However, if the delay
is larger than Φ + jφ, then the event arrived before a previous slot φ(Γi)
and Γi did not receive service. Since that can only happen if there is a
pending activation of Γi and thus violates the definition of a busy window,
the hypothesis must be rejected.
The Multiple-Event Queueing Delay Qi(q) and Multiple-Event Busy
Time Bi(q), on which the busy window relies, are derived next. Qi(q)
is the longest time interval between the arrival of Γi’s first activation and
the first time its q-th activation receives service, considering that all events
belong to the same busy window [8, 89]. For Γi, the q-th activation can
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receive service at the next cycle Φ after the execution of q−1 activations
of Γi lasting si ·Φ each, a delay Φ (cf. Lemma 6.1) and a jitter jφ. This is
given by:
Qi(q) = (q − 1) · si · Φ + Φ + jφ (6.6)
where si is the number of stages of Γi and Φ is the cycle.
Lemma 6.2. The Multiple-Event Queueing Delay Qi(q) given by Equa-
tion 6.6 is an upper bound.
Proof. The proof is by induction. When q=1, Γi has to wait for service at
most until the next cycle Φ plus an offset jitter jφ to get service for its first
stage, considering that the event arrives just after its offset (Lemma 6.1).
In a subsequent q+ 1-th activation in the same busy window, Equation 6.6
must also consider q entire executions of Γi. Since Γi has si stages and only
one stage can be activated and executed per cycle Φ, it takes additional
si · Φ for each activation of Γi, resulting in Equation 6.6.
The Multiple-Event Busy Time Bi(q) is the longest time interval between
the arrival of Γi’s first activation and the completion of its q-th activation,
considering that all events belong to the same busy window [8, 89]. The
q-th activation of Γi completes after a delay Φ (cf. Lemma 6.1), a jitter jφ
and the execution of q activations of Γi. That is given by:
Bi(q) = q · si · Φ + jφ + Cσ,si (6.7)
where Cσ,si is the WCET of Γi’s last stage.
Lemma 6.3. The Multiple-Event Busy Time Bi(q) given by Equation 6.7
is an upper bound.
Proof. The proof is by induction. When q=1, Γi has to wait for service at
most until the next cycle Φ plus an offset jitter jφ to get service for its first
stage (Lemma 6.1), plus the completion of the last stage of the activation
lasting (si−1) · Φ + Cσ,si . This is given by:
Bi(1) = (si − 1) · Φ + Φ + jφ + Cσ,si
= si · Φ + jφ + Cσ,si
(6.8)
In a subsequent q+ 1-th activation in the same busy window, Equation 6.7
must consider q additional executions of Γi. Since Γi has si stages and only
one stage can be activated and executed per cycle Φ, it takes additional
si · Φ for each activation of Γi. Thus, Equation 6.7.
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Now the busy window and WCRT of Γi can be calculated. The busy
window wi of a fork-join task Γi is given by:
wi = max
q≥1, q∈N
{Bi(q) |Qi(q + 1) ≥ δ−i (q + 1)} (6.9)
Lemma 6.4. The busy window is upper bounded by Equation 6.9.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there is a busy window w˘i
longer than wi. In that case, w˘i must contain at least one activation more
than wi, i.e. q˘ ≥ q + 1. From Equation 6.9, we have that Qi(q˘) < δ−i (q˘),
i.e. q˘ is not delayed by the previous activation. Since that violates the
definition of a busy window, the hypothesis must be rejected.
The response time Ri(q) of the q-th activation of Γi in the busy window
is given by:
Ri(q) = Bi(q)− δ−i (q) (6.10)
The worst-case response time R+i is the longest response time of any
activation of Γi observed in the busy window.
R+i = max
1≤q≤η+i (wi)
Ri(q) (6.11)
Theorem 6.1. R+i (Equation 6.11) provides an upper bound on the worst-
case response time of an arbitrary fork-join task Γi.
Proof. The WCRT of a fork-join task Γi is obtained with the busy win-
dow approach [149]. It remains to prove that the critical instant leads to
the worst-case scheduling scenario, that the interference captured in Equa-
tions. 6.6 and 6.7 are upper bounds, and that the busy window is correctly
captured by Equation 6.9. These are proved in Lemmas 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and
6.4, respectively.
6.3.2. Independent tasks
Deriving the WCRT analysis of an arbitrary independent task τi requires
identifying two types of interference that affect them: interference caused
by higher priority independent tasks and by fork-join tasks. First, the
critical instant leading to the worst-case scheduling scenario where τi suffers
the most interference must be identified.
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Lemma 6.5. The critical instant of τi is when the first event of higher
priority independent tasks arrive simultaneously with τi’s event at the offset
of a fork-join task.
Proof. The worst-case interference caused by a higher priority (indepen-
dent) task τj under SPP is when its first event arrives simultaneously with
τi’s and continue arriving as early as possible [149].
The interference caused by a fork-join task Γj on τi depends on Γj ’s
offset φ(Γj) and subtasks τ
σ,s
j , whose execution times vary for different
stages s. Assume a critical instant that occurs at a time other than at the
offset φ(Γj). Since a task Γj starts receiving service at its offset, an event
of τi arriving at time t > φ(Γj) can only suffer less interference from Γj ’s
subtask than when arriving at t = 0.
Fork-join subtasks have different execution times for different stages,
which leads to a number of scheduling scenarios that must be evaluated
[115]. Each scenario is defined by the fork-join subtasks that will receive
service in the cycle Φ and the offset at which the critical instant suppos-
edly occurs. The scenario is called a critical instant candidate S. Since
independent tasks participate in all critical instant candidates, they are
omitted in S for the sake of simplicity.
Definition 6.1. Critical Instant Candidate S: the critical instant candi-
date S is an ordered pair (a, b) where a is a critical offset and b is a tuple
containing one subtask τσ,sj of every interfering fork-join task Γj.
The set of candidates that must be evaluated can then be defined.
Definition 6.2. Critical Instant Candidate Set S: the set containing all
possible different critical instant candidates S.
The worst-case schedule of the independent task τ4 from the example in
Figure 6.4 is illustrated in Figure 6.6. In fact, the critical instant leading to
τ4’s WCRT is at φ(Γ1) when τ
1,2
1 and τ
1,1
2 receive service at the same cycle
Φ, i.e. S = (φ(Γ1), (τ
1,2
1 , τ
1,1
2 )). Events of the independent task τ3 start
arriving at the critical instant and continue arriving as early as possible.
The interference IIi (∆t) caused by equal or higher priority independent
tasks in any time interval ∆t can now be bounded. The interference IIi (∆t)
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Figure 6.6.: The worst-case schedule for independent task τ4 on core 1
(cf. Figure 6.4).
can be upper bounded as follows [89]:
IIi (∆t) =
∑
∀τj∈hpI(i)
η+j (∆t) · Cj (6.12)
where hpI(i) is the set of equal or higher priority independent tasks mapped
to the same core as τi.
To derive the interference caused by fork-join tasks the Critical Instant
Event Model must be defined. The critical instant event model ηˇσ,si (∆t, S)
of a subtask τσ,si ∈ Γi returns the maximum number of activations observ-
able in any time interval ∆t, assuming the critical instant S. It can be
derived from Γi’s input event model η
+
i (∆t) as follows:
ηˇσ,si (∆t, S) = min
{
η+i
(
∆tS + Φ− φ(Γi)
)
, ψ
}−gt(sS , s, φS , φ(Γi)) (6.13)
ψ =
⌊
∆tS
Φ · si
⌋
+ ge
(
∆tS mod (Φ · si) , Φ · (s− 1)
)
(6.14)
∆tS = ∆t+ Φ · (sS−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
critical instant
stage
+ φS︸︷︷︸
critical instant
offset
(6.15)
where s is the stage of subtask τσ,si ; si is the number of stages in Γi; φ
S
is the offset in S; sS is the stage of Γi in S; gt(a, b, c, d) is a function that
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returns 1 when (a > b) ∨ (a = b ∧ c > d), 0 otherwise; and ge(a, b) is a
function that returns 1 when a ≥ b, 0 otherwise.
Lemma 6.6. ηˇσ,si (∆t, S) (Equation 6.13) provides a valid upper bound
on the number of activations of τσ,si observable in any time interval ∆t,
assuming the critical instant S.
Proof. The proof is by induction, in two parts.
First let us assume sS=1 and φS=0, neutral values resulting in ∆tS=∆t
and gt(sS , s, φS , φ(Γi)) = 0. The maximum number of activations of τ
σ,s
i
seen in the interval ∆t is limited by the maximum number of activations
of the fork-join task Γi because a subtask τ
σ,s
i is activated once per Γi’s
activation, and limited by the maximum number of times that τσ,si can
actually be scheduled and served in ∆t. That is ensured in Equation 6.13
by the minimum function and its first and second terms, respectively.
When sS > 1 and/or φS > 0, the time interval [0,∆t) must be moved
forward so that it starts at stage sS and offset φS . That is captured by
∆tS in Equation 6.15 and by the last term of Equation 6.13. The former
extends the end of the time interval by the time it takes to reach the stage
sS and the offset φS , i.e., [0,∆tS). The latter pushes the start of the
interval forward by subtracting an activation of τσ,si if it occurs before the
stage sS and the offset φS , resulting in the interval [∆tS −∆t,∆tS). Thus
Equation 6.13.
The interference IFJi (∆t, S) caused by fork-join tasks on the same core
in any time interval ∆t, assuming a critical instant candidate S, can then
be upper bounded as follows:
IFJi (∆t, S) =
∑
∀τσ,sj ∈hpFJ (i)
ηˇσ,sj (∆t, S) · Cσ,sj (6.16)
where hpFJ(i) is the set of fork-join subtasks mapped to the same core as
τi.
The Multiple-Event Queueing Delay Qi(q, S) and the Multiple-Event
Busy Time Bi(q, S) for an independent task τi, assuming a critical instant
candidate S, can be derived as follows.
Qi(q, S) = (q − 1) · Ci + IIi (Qi(q, S)) + IFJi (Qi(q, S), S) (6.17)
Bi(q, S) = q · Ci + IIi (Bi(q, S)) + IFJi (Bi(q, S), S) (6.18)
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where q · Ci is the time required to execute q activations of task τi.
Equations 6.17 and 6.18 result in fixed-point problems, similar to the
well known busy window equation (Equation 6.9). They can be solved
iteratively, starting with a very small, positive .
Lemma 6.7. The Multiple-Event Queueing Delay Qi(q, S) given by Equa-
tion 6.17 is an upper bound, assuming the critical instant S.
Proof. The proof is by induction. When q = 1, τi has to wait for service
until the interfering workload is served. The interfering workload is given
by Equations 6.12 and 6.16. Since η+j (∆t) and Cj are upper bounds by def-
inition, Equation 6.12 is also an upper bound. Similarly, since ηˇσ,sj (∆t, S)
is an upper bound (cf. Lemma 6.6) and Cσ,sj is an upper bound by defini-
tion, 6.16 is an upper bound for a given S. Therefore, Qi(1, S) is also an
upper bound, for a given S.
In a subsequent q + 1-th activation in the same busy window, Qi(q, S)
also must consider q executions of τi. That is captured in Equation 6.17
by the first term, which is, by definition, an upper bound on the execution
time. From that, Lemma 6.7 follows.
Lemma 6.8. The Multiple-Event Busy Time Bi(q, S) given by Equation 6.18
is an upper bound, assuming the critical instant S.
Proof. The proof is similar to Lemma 6.7, except that Bi(q, S) in Equa-
tion 6.18 also captures the completion of the q-th activation. It takes
additional Ci, which is an upper bound by definition. Thus Equation 6.18
is an upper bound, for a given S.
The busy window wi(q, S) of an independent task τi is given by:
wi(S) = max
q≥1, q∈N
{Bi(q, S) | Qi(q+1, S) ≥ δ−i (q+1)} (6.19)
Lemma 6.9. The busy window is upper bounded by Equation 6.19.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there is a busy window
w˘i(S) longer than wi(S). In that case, w˘i(S) must contain at least one
activation more than wi(S), i.e., q˘ ≥ q + 1. From Equation 6.19, we have
that Qi(q˘, S) < δ
−
i (q˘), i.e., q˘ is not delayed by the previous activation.
Since that violates the definition of a busy window, the hypothesis must
be rejected.
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The response time Ri of the q-th activation of a task in a busy window
is given by:
Ri(q, S) = Bi(q, S)− δ−i (q) (6.20)
Finally, the worst-case response time R+i is found inside the busy window
and must be evaluated for all possible critical instant candidates S ∈ S.
The worst-case response time R+i is given by:
R+i = max
S∈S
{
max
1≤q≤η+i (wi(S))
{Ri(q, S)}
}
(6.21)
where the set S is given by the following Cartesian products:
S = {φ(Γj), φ(Γk), . . .}× {σi(Γj)× σi(Γk)× . . .} (6.22)
where Γj ,Γk, . . . are all fork-join tasks mapped to the same core as τi and
σi(Γj) is the set of subtasks of Γj that are mapped to that core. When no
fork-join tasks interfere with τi, S = {(0, ())}.
Theorem 6.2. R+i (Equation 6.21) returns an upper bound on the worst-
case response time of an independent task τi.
Proof. We must first prove that, for a given S, R+i is an upper bound. R
+
i
is obtained with the busy window approach [149]. It returns the maximum
response time Ri(q, S) among all activations inside the busy window. From
Lemmas 6.7 and 6.8 we have that Equations 6.17 and 6.18 are upper bounds
for a given S. From Lemma 6.9 we have that the busy window is captured
by Equation 6.19. Since the first term of Equation 6.20 is an upper bound
and the second term is a lower bound by definition, Ri(q, S) is an upper
bound. Thus R+i is an upper bound for a given S. Since Equation 6.21
evaluates the maximum response time over all S ∈ S, R+i is an upper
bound on the response time of τi.
6.3.3. Error recovery
Designed for mixed-criticality, the approach supports different recovery
strategies for different fork-join tasks (cf. Section 6.1). For instance, in
DMR augmented with checkpointing and rollback, recovery consists in re-
verting the state and re-executing the error-affected stage in both replicas.
In TMR, recovery consists in copying and replacing the state of the faulty
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replica with the state of a healthy one. The different strategies are cap-
tured in the analysis by the recovery execution time, which depends on the
strategy and the stage to be recovered. The recovery WCET Cσ,si,rec of a
fork-join subtask τσ,si accounts for the adopted recovery strategy as illus-
trated in Figure 6.3b. Once an error is detected, error recovery is triggered
and executed in the recovery slot of the same cycle Φ. Figure 6.2 illustrates
the recovery of the s-th stage of Γ2’s i-th activation.
The error recovery can now be integrated into the analysis. For a fork-
join task Γi, the Multiple-Event Busy Time Bi(q) (Equation 6.7) must be
adapted to account for the execution of the recovery:
Breci (q) = q · si · Φ + jφ + φ(recovery)− φ(Γi) + Cσ,si,rec (6.23)
where Cσ,si,rec is the WCET of the recovery of last subtask of Γi. The recovery
of another task Γj does not interfere with Γi’s WCRT. Only the recovery
of one of Γi’s subtasks can interfere with Γi’s WCRT. Moreover, since the
recovery of a subtask occurs in the recovery slot of the same cycle Φ and
does not interfere with the next subtask, only the recovery of the last stage
of Γi actually has an impact on its response time. That is captured by the
three last terms of Equation 6.23.
For an independent task τi, the worst-case impact of recovery of a fork-
join task Γj is modelled as an additional fork-join task Γrec with one sub-
task τσ,1rec mapped to the same core as τi and that executes in the recovery
slot. The WCET Cσ,1rec of τ
σ,1
rec is chosen as the maximum recovery time
among the subtasks of all fork-join tasks mapped to that core:
Cσ,1rec = max∀τσ,sj ∈hpFJ (i)
{
Cσ,si,rec
}
(6.24)
With Γrec mapped, Equation 6.21 finds the critical instant where the re-
covery Cσ,1rec has the worst impact on the response time of τi.
6.4. Experimental evaluation
The approach was experimentally evaluated with real as well as synthetic
workload, focusing on the performance of the scheduler. First, MiBench
benchmark applications [56] are characterized and evaluated as fork-join
(replicated) tasks in the system. Then, the evaluation focuses on the per-
formance of independent (regular) tasks. Finally, the approach is evaluated
with synthetic workload when varying parameters of fork-join tasks.
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6.4.1. Evaluation with benchmark applications
6.4.1.1. Characterization
First, the execution times and number of stages are extracted from MiBench
automotive and security applications [56]. The applications were executed
with small input on an ARMv7@1GHz and a DDR3-1600 [18]. Table 6.1
summarizes the total WCET, observed number of stages and WCET of the
longest stage (max). A stage is delimited by syscalls (cf. Section 6.1). The
observed execution times are reported as WCETs. As pointed out in [8],
stages vary on number and execution time depending on the application
and on the current activity in that stage (computation/IO). This is seen,
e.g., in susan, where 99% of the WCET is concentrated in one stage (com-
putation) while the other stages perform mostly IO and are on average
3.34us long.
Table 6.1.: MiBench applications’ profile
WCET
[ms]
Observed stages Grouped stages
#stages max WCET[ms] #stages
max WCET
[ms]
basicmath 32.48 19738 0.02 5 6.50
bitcount 24.42 30 15.16 3 15.16
susan 9.63 12 9.59 1 9.63
blowfish 0.11 7 0.09 1 0.11
rijndael 13.17 93 0.37 3 5.91
sha 3.49 51 0.11 2 1.90
In the proposed approach, the optimal is when all stages of a fork-join
task have the same WCET. There are two possibilities to achieve that: to
split very long stages in smaller ones or to group small subsequent stages
together. The latter is exploited here as it does not require changes to
the error detection mechanism or to the proposed model. The result of
grouping stages is that several stages are concurrently executed in a cycle
Φ. Notice that it also includes several executions of state comparison since
that occurs at the end of every stage.
The results with grouped stages are shown on the right-hand side of Ta-
ble 6.1. The stages were first grouped without increasing the maximum
stage length. The largest improvement is seen in bitcount, where the num-
ber of stages reduces in one order of magnitude. In cases where all stages
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Figure 6.7.: WCRT of fork-join tasks with two segments derived from
MiBench.
are very short, the maximum stage length was then increased. When in-
creasing the maximum stage length in two orders of magnitude, the number
of stages of basicmath reduces in four orders of magnitude. The maximum
stage length was manually chosen. Alternatively, the problem of finding
the maximum stage length can be formulated as an optimization problem
that, e.g., minimizes the overall WCRT or maximizes the slack. Next,
the benchmark applications are mapped as fork-join tasks and have their
WCRTs evaluated.
6.4.1.2. Evaluation of fork-join tasks
Two applications at a time are mapped as fork-join tasks with two segments
(i.e., replicas in DMR) to two cores (cf. Figure 6.4). On each core, 15%
load is introduced by ten independent tasks generated with UUniFast [17].
The proposed approach is then compared with a TDM-based scheduler and
Axer’s Partitioned SPP [8]. In TDM, each fork-join task executes (and
recovers) in its own slot. Independent tasks execute in a third slot, which
replaces the recovery slot of the proposed approach. The size of the slots
are derived from the offsets of the proposed approach. For all approaches,
the priority assignment for independent tasks is deadline monotonic and
considers that deadline equals period. In SPP, the deadline monotonic
priority assignment also includes fork-join tasks.
The results are plotted in Figure 6.7, where ba.bi gives the WCRT of
basicmath when mapped together with bitcount. Despite the low system
6.4. Experimental evaluation 171
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
20
40
60
80
100
lo
a
d
b
a
si
c
m
a
th
+
ri
jn
d
a
e
l
Overall load [%]
S
ch
e
d
u
la
b
le
ta
sk
se
ts
[%
]
Proposed TDM SPP SPP/hp
Figure 6.8.: Schedulability as a function of the load of the system. Basic-
math and rijndael as fork-join tasks with two segments.
load, the proposed approach also outperforms SPP in all cases, with bounds
58.2% lower, on average. Better results with SPP cannot be obtained
unless the interfering workload is removed or highest priority is given to
the fork-join tasks [8], which violates DM. Despite the similarity of how
the proposed approach handles fork-join tasks with TDM, it outperforms
TDM in all cases, achieving, on average, bounds 13.9% lower. That minor
difference is because TDM slots must be slightly longer than the offsets
to fit an eventual recovery. Nonetheless, the proposed approach not only
can guarantee short WCRT for replicated tasks but it also provides for the
performance of independent tasks.
6.4.1.3. Evaluation of independent tasks
In a second experiment, bitcount and rijndael are fixed as fork-join tasks
and load on both cores is varied. The generated task periods are in the
range [20,500] ms, larger than the longest stage of the fork-join tasks. The
schedulability of the system as the load increases is shown in Figure 6.8.
The proposed approach outperforms TDM and SPP in all cases, scheduling
1.55x and 6.96x more tasksets, respectively. Due to its non-work conserv-
ing characteristic, TDM’s schedulability is limited to medium loads. SPP
provides very small response times with lower loads but, as the load in-
creases, the schedulability drops fast due to high interference (and thus
high WCRT) suffered by fork-join tasks. For reference purposes, the plot
also shows the schedulability of SPP when assigning the highest priori-
ties to the fork-join tasks (SPP/hp). The schedulability in higher loads
improves but losing deadline monotonicity guarantees renders the systems
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Figure 6.9.: Basicmath and rijndael as replicated tasks in DMR running
on a dual-core configuration with 20.2% load (5% load from
independent tasks).
unusable in practice. Moreover, when increasing the jitter to 20% (relative
to period), schedulability decreases 14.2% but shows the same trends for
all schedulers.
Figure 6.9 details the tasks’ WCRTs when the system load is 20.2%.
Indeed, when schedulable, SPP provides some of the smallest WCRTs for
independent tasks, and SPP/hp improves the response times of fork-join
tasks at the expense of the independent tasks’. The proposed approach
provides a balanced trade-off between the performance of independent tasks
and of fork-join tasks, and achieves high schedulability even in higher loads.
6.4.2. Evaluation with synthetic workload
The performance of the proposed approach was also evaluated when vary-
ing parameters such as stage length and cycle Φ.
6.4.2.1. Evaluation of fork-join tasks
Two fork-join tasks Γ1 and Γ2 with two segments each (i.e., replicas in
DMR) are mapped to two cores. The total WCETs3 of Γ1 and Γ2 are 15
and 25ms, respectively. Both tasks are sporadic, with a minimum distance
of 1s between activations. The number of stages of Γ1 and Γ2 is varied as
a function of the maximum stage WCET, as depicted in Figure 6.10a. The
3The sum of the WCET of all stages of a fork-join task.
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Figure 6.10.: Parameters of two fork-join tasks Γ1 and Γ2 with two seg-
ments running on a dual-core configuration.
length of the cycle Φ, depicted in Figure 6.10b, varies with the maximum
stage WCET since it is derived from them (cf. Section 6.2.4).
The system performance as the maximum stage lengths of Γ1 and Γ2
increase is reported in Figure 6.11. The WCRT of Γ1 increases with the
stage length (Figure 6.11a) as it depends on the number of stages and Φ’s
length. In fact, the WCRT of Γ1 is longest when the stages of Γ1 are the
shortest and the stages of the interfering fork-join task (Γ2) are the longest.
Conversely, WCRT of Γ1 is shortest when its stages are the longest and the
stages of the interfering fork-join task are the shortest. The same occurs to
Γ2 in Figure 6.11b. Thus, there is a trade-off between the response times
of interfering fork-join tasks. That is plotted in Figure 6.12 as the sum of
the WCRTs of Γ1 and Γ2. As can be seen in Figure 6.12, low response
times can be obtained next and above to the line segment between the
origin (0, 0, 0) and the point (15, 25, 0), the total WCETs1 of Γ1 and Γ2
respectively.
6.4.2.2. Evaluation of independent tasks
To evaluate the impact of the parameters on independent tasks, the pre-
vious scenario was extended introducing 25% load on each core with ten
independent tasks generated with UUniFast [17]. The task periods are
within the interval [15,500] ms for the first experiment, and the interval
[25,500] ms for the second. The priority assignment is deadline monotonic
and considers that the deadline is equal to the period.
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The schedulability as a function of the stage lengths is shown in Fig-
ure 6.13. Sufficiently long stages cause the schedulability to decrease as
independent tasks with short periods start missing their deadlines. That is
seen in Figure 6.13a when the stage length of either fork-join task reaches
15ms, the minimum period for the generated tasksets. Thus, when in-
creasing the minimum period of generated tasks to 25ms, the number of
schedulable tasksets also increases (Figure 6.13b).
The maximum stage length of a fork-join task has direct impact on the re-
sponse times and schedulability of the system. For the sake of performance,
shorter stage lengths are preferred. However, that is not always possible
because it would result in a large number of stages or because of the ap-
plication, which restricts the minimum stage length (cf. Section 6.4.1.1).
Nonetheless, fork-join tasks still are able to perform well with appropriate
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Figure 6.13.: Schedulable tasksets as a function of the maximum stage
WCET of fork-join tasks Γ1 and Γ2 with 25% load from in-
dependent tasks.
parameter choices. Additionally, one can formulate the problem of find-
ing the stage lengths according to an objective function, such as minimize
the overall response time or maximize the slack. The offsets can also be
included in the formulation, as long as Constraints 6.1 and 6.2 are met.
6.5. Cross-layer integration discussion
Both the resilient NoC and the AIQ mechanism, introduced in Chapters 3
to 5, can be combined and used with replicated execution and the replica-
aware co-scheduling in a cross-layer approach. However, their application
depend on the system requirements, as discussed next.
When error recovery is a requirement, the replicated execution approach
requires a reliable on-Chip communication, as described in Section 6.2.3.
That is due to the fact that the approach relies on critical components such
as the voters and the RTOS kernel – also referred to as the reliable com-
puting base – which are assumed to be reliable [45, 126]. The resilient NoC
can be employed to provide reliable on-Chip communication and protect
therewith the critical communication – e.g., voter communication.
The NoC traffic of protected and unprotected tasks can be protected
with either the resilient NoC and AIQ. Since tasks are protected by the
replicated execution approach and error recovery is therefore performed
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in software, hardware error detection suffices. Also, unprotected tasks
do not require protected communication. Thus, the choice between both
approaches can be guided by the target reliability and timing requirements
in a “good enough” strategy, as discussed in Section 5.4.4. N.B. in case
of NoC resets with the AIQ approach, a controlled NoC reset must be
employed to prevent the corruption of unaffected NoC transactions, which
would wrongly induce multiple error scenarios requiring the recovery of
potentially all replicated tasks.
Another use of replicated execution is for providing integrity only, in a
integrity mode. In that mode, replicas can be used for error detection only,
without implementing any recovery strategy. When an error is detected –
i.e., replicas differ – the error is reported to the next layer in the hierarchical
fault-tolerant architecture (cf. Section 1.5.2). Notice that, providing only
integrity facilitates error in that SDCs will eventually be detected when
they manifest themselves, but the system must not recover from them.
Consider, for instance, the problem of SDCs and checkpointing: one must
ensure the absence of SDCs in a checkpoint’s state, otherwise recovery will
fail.
Another possibility is the combination of both approaches, ARQ and
AIQ, in the same NoC. Thus, the NoC traffic of critical components, such
as the voters, can rely on error recovery in hardware the reliable NoC
communication. Replicated tasks, whose recovery is already guaranteed
by the approach in software, can rely only on hardware error detection.
The synergy in the combination of both approaches, in terms of hardware
implementation requirements, has been envisioned as promising but has
not been pursued in this thesis. The synergy can occur in that the AIQ
approach with reset capabilities can be coupled with ARQ protocols, with
retransmission buffers, for NoC traffic with different requirements. The
former is used to guarantee traffic integrity with error detection in hard-
ware, whereas the latter is used to guarantee traffic integrity and reliable
service with error detection and recovery in hardware. Although the differ-
ent types of services is already provided in the resilient NoC approach, the
envisioned solution has potential to reduce the hardware implementation
overhead without the use of reliable routers, as in the AIQ approach with
reset capabilities. Further investigation in terms of hardware implementa-
tion is left as future work.
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6.6. Summary
This chapter introduced the replica-aware co-scheduling for mixed-criti-
cality, developed in the context of the project ASTEROID. The approach
targets mixed-critical systems where applications with different require-
ments and criticalities co-exist in a cross-layer fault-tolerance approach.
Upon the occurrence of errors due to random hardware faults, the error ef-
fects are contained and the appropriate error handling strategy is applied
in software – e.g., recovery by rolling back or by restarting a task. Er-
rors caused by random hardware faults are detected via hardware assisted
error detection, such as pipeline fingerprinting and the AIQ mechanism,
introduced in Chapter 5.
The proposed co-scheduling approach provides for high worst-case per-
formance of replicated software execution on many-core architectures with-
out jeopardizing the performance of the remaining tasks in the system. A
formal WCRT analysis was presented, which supports different recovery
strategies and accounts for the NoC communication delay and overheads
due to replica management and state comparison. Experimental results
with benchmark applications showed an improvement on taskset schedu-
lability of up to 6.9x when compared to Partitioned SPP and 1.5x when
compared to a TDM-based scheduler, both widely employed in the real-
time domain.

7. Conclusion
Dependability has many facets to be addressed when designing a system.
That is specially challenging in real-time mixed-critical systems, where
safety standards play an important role and where responding in time can
be as important as responding correctly or even responding at all. Depend-
ability is threatened by random hardware faults, which have increased in
importance to the point that they must be explicitly addressed. The key
to efficiently address those challenges and achieve dependability are cross-
layer approaches. This thesis has addressed the issue of cross-layer fault-
tolerance approaches for achieving dependability of real-time mixed-critical
systems. Three important requirements of such systems directed this work:
integrity, resilience and real-time.
Chapter 2 described the impacts of random hardware faults causing soft
errors on a real-time many-core system, from the NoC-level up to the
system-level. Unhandled errors in the NoC can cause not only data cor-
ruption, packet loss and derouting, as usually considered in the literature,
but it can also present static effects that lead to continuous corruption and
blocking scenarios during runtime. Moreover, errors can propagate and
indirectly affect the background traffic, propagating between criticalities
and throughout the system. Such errors, when not appropriately handled,
hinders the system’s integrity and will likely overwhelm the system’s error
recovery capability. At the system-level, the impact of soft errors can range
from masked, to wrong output, up to a complete system crash. Timing
wise, errors can cause the output of an application to delay, independently
of the output correctness, to the point where it becomes irresponsive. Based
on those findings, a set of mechanisms to attain dependability were then
introduced.
A resilient NoC was proposed in Chapter 3, which is able to transpar-
ently provide soft error protection to software with high reliability. The
approach combines well known techniques into a strong fault containment
with a resilient router design to limit the impact of errors in time and in
space. When employed together with ARQ-based protocols, the resilient
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NoC tolerates soft errors and provides reliable service with integrity and
real-time guarantees. ARQ-based protocols and their efficient use in NoCs
under real-time guarantees was addressed in Chapter 4. The presented
transport layer analysis of protocols in NoCs was integrated with network
layer analyses in such a way that it can be reused with different models
of NoC with different arbitration policies. Moreover, it was shown that
for cache-based memory traffic, which present low burstiness, simple ARQ
protocols perform well. For bursty, throughput intensive traffic, such as in
DMA transfers, it was shown that optimized protocols, such as the pro-
posed DMA ARQ protocol, can deliver superior performance while being
independent of expensive retransmission buffers.
The thesis also explored a low-overhead alternative for NoCs to guarantee
integrity and timing under errors. Chapter 5 introduced AIQ, an end-to-
end mechanism to detect errors in NoCs. AIQ explores the idea of keeping
track of transactions of distributed systems in the context of NoCs for
predictable real-time systems. AIQ integrates into the NoC resulting in a
low-overhead fault-tolerant NoC capable of detecting errors and ensuring
that their effects are contained in time. Error handling is delegated to the
higher layers of hardware and software, which may react according to an
arbitrary strategy in a cross-layer approach.
Finally, Chapter 6 addressed the problem of efficiently handling errors in
software with a replica-aware co-scheduling approach for mixed-criticality.
The approach targets cross-layer fault-tolerant systems providing reliable
software execution on unreliable hardware by means of redundant software
execution. Errors are detected via hardware assisted error detection and
error handling is performed in software. The error handling strategies can
vary from simple fault-containment to roll-back and re-execute and state
copy depending on the system configuration. The proposed replica-aware
co-scheduling provides for the high performance of replicated software ex-
ecution in many-core platforms without jeopardizing the performance of
the remaining tasks. Unlike conventional real-time schedulers, which are
severely affected task synchronization overheads, co-scheduling has shown
to achieve high resource utilization and enables the use of replicated exe-
cution in practice.
Future real-time systems are migrating to many-core platforms looking
for more efficiency, computational power and extended lifetime. The quest
for providing performance guarantees for different functions and criticality
levels within those platforms without wasting resources is still open with
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no consensus. With respect to dependability, there are many open chal-
lenges and, with them, opportunities. One clear path is that the abundant
hardware available in many-cores can be exploited for increased reliability
in cross-layer approaches. The key element that enables one to efficiently
achieve dependability is integrity and error detection. Error detection will
definitely require hardware support for efficiency and low impact on per-
formance. Error handling will most likely be handled in software, where
error handling and recovery strategies can be flexible and easily adaptable.
Extensions with respect to hard errors, might lead to reconfigurable hard-
ware in the direction of bio-inspired, self-healing systems, requiring there-
for hardware architectures with higher degrees of configurability. Those
systems can be not only reactive but also proactive in that the system’s
operation can be guided so as to extend the system’s lifetime. The future
challenge in such highly adaptable mixed-critical systems is then to ensure
the guarantees of critical tasks at all times as the system ages and new
configurations, which cannot be defined at design time, are required.
The envisioned future work includes the synergy in the combination of
the developed approaches. As seen in the redundant software execution ap-
proach, replicated tasks are protected by the approach, but there is always
the assumption that certain critical hardware and software components
perform reliably. The synergy can occur in that the AIQ approach with
reset capabilities can be coupled with ARQ protocols, with retransmission
buffers, for NoC traffic with different requirements. The former is used
to guarantee traffic integrity with error detection in hardware, whereas the
latter is used to guarantee traffic integrity and reliable service with error de-
tection and recovery in hardware. Although the different types of services
is already provided in the resilient NoC approach, the envisioned solution
has potential to reduce the hardware implementation overhead without the
use of reliable routers. Thus, a combination between error detection and
recovery in the same NoC with ARQ and AIQ can be explored in terms of
hardware and software implementation.

A. Protocol Definitions
This appendix presents the finite state machines of the protocols addressed
in Chapter 4. It also reproduces relevant parts of the formal analysis of
Go-Back-N ARQ of Axer.
ARQ-based protocols when employed above the data-link layer are con-
nection oriented. Each connection requires a pair of protocols instances:
one at the sender and one at the receiver. Notice that multiple connections
between a same sender-receiver pair are also possible. Thus, throughout
this appendix, the term sender will be used to refer to the respective pro-
tocol instance at the sender. Similarly, the term receiver will be used to
refer to the respective protocol instance at the receiver. Notice that con-
nection and traffic stream can be used interchangeably with the concept
used throughout this Thesis.
In order to identify that a packet belongs to a specific connection a
triple {senderID, receiverID, connectionID} is employed, where the first
two are, e.g., MAC addresses of the sender and receiver, respectively, and
the last is the ID of that particular connection. The connectionID can be
dropped when only single connection per sender-receiver pair are allowed.
To identify different packets within the same connection, sequence num-
bers are employed. Those can be seen, e.g., in the example of Figure 4.4.
Sequence numbers are usually managed in a circular fashion and the length
of the sequence depends on the protocol. For instance, Stop-and-Wait can
operate with only two sequence numbers, as there will be at most two dif-
ferent packets in-flight at any given time during operation (not shown in
Figure 4.4 in favor of demonstrating the progress of the transmission). Go-
Back-N, on the other hand, requires a longer sequence, since there might
exist in-flight in the network.
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A.1. Stop-and-Wait ARQ
This section presents the finite state machine diagram of Stop-and-Wait
ARQ considered in this work and whose worst-case behavior is captured
by the analysis of Axer.
Figure A.1 presents the state machine of the sender. When the sender
is idle and there is a packet to be transmitted (has pkt), it is immediately
transmitted (transmit) and the sender starts waiting for an ACK. In the
wait 4 ACK state, a timer is started. If an ACK is received before the
time reaches a timeout, the sender either goes back to idle or transmits
the next packet (transmit) depending on whether there is a packet ready to
be transmitted (has pkt). In case of a timeout, a retransmission of the last
transmitted packet is performed (retrans.) and the sender resumes waiting
for an ACK (wait 4 ACK).
idle
sta
rt
transmit
wait
4 ACK
retrans.
has pkt
ACK∧ has pkt
ACK ∧ ¬has pkt
timeout
Figure A.1.: The Stop-and-Wait ARQ state machine: sender.
Monitoring can be introduced in the wait 4 ACK state to monitor the
current conditions of the network, including RTT and error rates. With
that, impending timing violations can be detected and reported to the
system while ensuring integrity.
Whenever the protocol instance is not idle and a new packet to be trans-
mitted arrives, it is assumed to be stored in a buffer, forming a backlog.
The buffer also enables has pkt when it is not empty. Alternatively, in
practice, specially in NoCs, where strong constraints on circuit area and
power consumption dominate, instead of storing new packets in a buffer,
the protocol instance can stall new packets until it becomes idle again. In
terms of worst-case response time, there will be no difference as long as
tasks wait for the completion of the transmission instead of yielding after
pumping packets into the buffer but before they can actually be pumped
into the network.
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The state machine of Stop-and-Wait on the receiver side is presented in
Figure A.2. When idle and a packet arrives (has pkt), the receiver checks
its sequence number (check). When the packet is the next packet in the
sequence, it is received and acknowledged. Otherwise, if the packet is an
older one, it is dropped but acknowledged nonetheless. That is required,
for instance, due to cases where the ACK is lost and a same packet is suc-
cessfully received twice. Notice that a state does not necessarily translate
into a cycle of the pipelined implementation in hardware – e.g., receiving
and acknowledging the received packet could be performed in parallel.
idlestart check receive
send
ACK
has pkt next
¬next
Figure A.2.: The Stop-and-Wait ARQ state machine: receiver.
A.2. Go-Back-N ARQ
This Section presents the finite state machine diagram of Go-Back-N ARQ
considered in this work and whose worst-case behavior is captured by the
analysis of Axer.
Figure A.3 presents the state machine of the sender. When the sender is
idle and there is a packet to be transmitted (has pkt), the sender immedi-
ately transmits it (transmit) and continues transmitting packets as long as
there are packets to be sent (has pkt) and the send window has not been
fully utilized (¬window full). Whenever a packet is transmitted, a slot in
the send window is allocated for it and the respective timer is started. If
the send window has been fully utilized (window full) or there are no more
packets to transmit (¬has pkt), the sender starts waiting for ACKs (wait
4 ACK). Notice that ACKs can be received any time when the sender is
in one the states: transmit, wait 4 ACK or retrans. window. The receipt
of an ACK releases the respective slot in the send window and stops its
timer. In the wait 4 ACK state, the sender will either start transmitting
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again if there is backlog and if the window is not full anymore, or it will
return to idle after all transmitted packets have been acknowledged. In
case a timeout expires before the respective ACK is received, the sender
starts retransmitting the entire send window (retrans. window), starting
with the oldest unacknowledged packet. When the retransmission is done,
the sender returns to the wait 4 ACK state.
Similarly to Stop-and-Wait ARQ, monitoring can be introduced in the
wait 4 ACK state to monitor the current conditions of the network, includ-
ing RTT and error rates. With that, impending timing violations can be
detected and reported to the system while ensuring integrity.
Backlog is handled as described above in Stop-and-Wait ARQ.
idlestart transmit
wait
4 ACK
retrans.
window
has pkt has pkt ∧
¬window full
¬has pkt ∨
¬window full
timeout
has pkt ∧
¬window full
¬has pkt ∧
window empty
timeout
done
¬done
has pkt  window full1
Figure A.3.: The Go-Back-N ARQ state machine: sender.
The state machine of the receiver is presented in Figure A.4. It is similar
to Stop-and-Wait, it differs in the logic in checking and acknowledging. In
Go-Back-N, the most simple implementation of check while providing in-
order delivery, as shown in Algorithm A.1, is to receive only the next packet
in the sequence. Packets that are not the next in the sequence are dropped
and not acknowledged. Packets that have already been received (older
packets in the sequence) are dropped, since they were already received,
and acknowledged.
Notice that there are possible improvements to the protocol that are able
1The binary operator  is the negated exclusive OR. Thus AB ⇔ (A∧B)∨(¬A∧¬B).
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idlestart check receive
send
ACK
has pkt
accept
drop&ack
drop
Figure A.4.: The Go-Back-N ARQ state machine: receiver.
Algorithm A.1 Go-Back-N simple check
INPUT: incoming packet p belonging to connection c
OUTPUT: x ∈ {accept, drop&ack, drop}
1: let seqNum(p) return the sequence number of packet p
2: let nSeqNum(c) return the next sequence number of connection c
3: if seqNum(p) = nSeqNum(c) then
4: return accept // Accept with acknowledgement
5: else if seqNum(p) < nSeqNum(c) then
6: return drop&ack // Drop with acknowledgement
7: else
8: return drop // Drop without acknowledgement
9: end if
to improve the average case. However, the wost-case remains the same. For
that reason such improvements were not further investigated. One possible
improvement is to not retransmit packets that were already acknowledged.
That requires the receiver to accept and acknowledge packets even when a
previous packet is missing. Packets can be either delivered potentially out-
of-order to the application or delivered in-order with the help of a reorder
buffer at the receiver.
The next sections reproduce relevant parts of the formal analysis of Go-
Back-N ARQ of Axer. The analysis is divided in two parts: the error-free
case and the error case. Proofs are skipped and can be found in [8].
A.2.1. Formal analysis: the error-free case
The analysis relies on the busy window approach [149]. It starts by deriving
the busy period for the protocol.
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The busy period wgbn,i is the largest time interval in which packets arrive
at the transport layer and need to be queued while the ARQ protocol is
waiting for ACKs of previous packets. It is given by:
wgbn,i =
⌈
η+tx,i(wgbn,i)
nsw
⌉
·RTT+i (A.1)
Equation A.1 forms an integer fixed point problem typical in busy-window-
based analyses – wgbn,i is present on both sides of the equation. The
problem can be solved iteratively, starting with a very small  > 0 (wgbn,i =
).
The Worst-Case Multiple Packet Forwarding TimeB+gbn,i(q) is the largest
time interval to forward a sequence of q packets, assuming error-free condi-
tions and considering that all but the first packet arrive before the previous
packet is acknowledged. B+gbn,i(q) of a stream i is given by:
B+gbn,i(q) = (q − 1) ·RTT+i (A.2)
The Best-Case Multiple Packet Forwarding Time B−gbn,i(q) is the smallest
time interval to forward any sequence of q packets. It is given by:
B−gbn,i(q) =
(⌈
q
nsw
⌉
− 1
)
·RTT−i (A.3)
The Worst-Case Response Time R+gbn,i is the largest time interval that
any packet is delayed by Go-Back-N ARQ before being forwarded to the
network. R+gbn,i of a stream i is bounded by:
R+gbn,i = max
1≤q≤η˜+tx,i(wgbn,i)
{B+gbn,i(q)− δ−tx,i((q − 1) · nsw + 1)} (A.4)
with
η˜+tx,i(∆t) =
⌈
η+tx,i(∆t)
nsw
⌉
(A.5)
where η˜+tx,i(∆t) is an upper bound on the number of packet that belong to
the same group.
The output event model capturing the traffic injection in the network by
Go-Back-N ARQ δ−gbn,tx under error-free conditions is obtained as follows:
δ−gbn,tx(q) = max{δ−tx(q)−R+gbn +R−gbn, B−gbn(q − 1)} (A.6)
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The overall latency L+gbn,i(q) for transferring q data packets in a stream
i is given by:
L+gbn,i(q) = δ
−
tx,i(q) + L
+
i +R
+
gbn,i (A.7)
A.2.2. Formal analysis: the error case
Similarly to the analysis in Section 4.3.3.2, the worst-case impact of an
error in Go-Back-N is when it causes the loss of an ACK just before it is
delivered back to the sender.
First, the impact of errors is integrated into the busy period. The k-error
busy period wgbn,i(k) is given by:
wgbn,i(k) = k · (tout +RTT+i ) +
⌈
η+tx,i(wgbn,i(k))
nsw
⌉
·RTT+i (A.8)
In the worst case, in addition to the error-free busy window, each error leads
to a timeout tout and a retransmission RTT
+
i (data packet and ACK).
Similarly, the multiple packet forwarding time under errors is derived
accounting for the impact of k errors on the transfer. The k-error Worst-
Case Multiple Packet Forwarding Time B+gbn,i(q, k) is given by:
B+gbn,i(q, k) = k · (tout +RTT+i ) + (q − 1) ·RTT+i (A.9)
In addition to B+gbn,i, in the worst case, each error leads to a timeout and
a retransmission whose impact is also bounded by tout + RTT
+
i , as in
Equation A.8.
The k-error Worst-Case Response Time R+gbn,i(k) is derived from Eq. A.4
to account for the k-error versions of wgbn,i(k) and B
+
gbn,i(q, k):
R+gbn,i(k) = max
1≤q≤η˜+tx,i(wgbn,i(k))
{B+gbn,i(q, k)−δ−tx,i((q−1) ·nsw+1)} (A.10)
where η˜+tx,i(∆t) is given by Equation A.5.
The k-error overall latency L+gbn,i(q, k) for transferring q data packets in
a stream i is given by:
L+gbn,i(q, k) = δ
−
tx,i(q) + L
+
i +R
+
gbn,i(k) (A.11)
Besides the latency in the error-free case (Equation 4.15), in the k-error
scenario, Equation 4.19 must account for the latency overhead. This is
included by the last term, the k-error worst-case response time R+dma,i(k).
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A.3. DMA ARQ
This Section presents the finite state machine diagram of DMA ARQ, which
was introduced and formally analyzed in Section 4.3.3.
Figure A.5 presents the state machine of the sender. When the sender
is idle and there is a new transfer, the sender immediately starts trans-
mitting (transmit) and continues transmitting packets as long as there are
packets to be sent (has pkt). When there are no more packets to trans-
mit (¬has pkt), the sender starts waiting for ACKs from the receiver (wait
4 ACK). In the wait 4 ACK state, the sender will either return to idle
after receiving and ACK or start a retransmission if a timeout occurs or
if a NACK is received. In a retransmission (retrans.), the data is fetched
from the memory for as many packets as required (access memory). The
content that is retransmitted depends on event triggering it: in case of a
timeout, the last transmitted packet is retransmitted; in case of a NACK,
the missing data requested by it. When the retransmission is done, the
sender returns to the wait 4 ACK state.
idlestart transmit
wait
4 ACK
retrans.
access
memory
transfer
has pkt
¬has pkt
ACK
timeout ∨ NACK
done
¬done
¬data rdy
data rdy
Figure A.5.: The DMA ARQ state machine: sender.
Similarly to Stop-and-Wait and Go-Back-N ARQ, monitoring can be
introduced in the wait 4 ACK state to monitor the current conditions
of the network, including RTT and error rates. With that, impending
timing violations can be detected and reported to the system while ensuring
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integrity.
The state machine of the receiver is presented in Figure A.6. When idle
and a new transfer starts, the receiver transitions to receive and remains
there until all packets of the transfer are received. When the last packet
of the transfer is received (last pkt), the receiver sends either an ACK or a
NACK depending on whether all packets were successfully received or not,
respectively. In case one or more packets were missing, the NACK requests
the retransmission of those packets and the receiver transitions to receive
retrans. and remains there until all missing packets are received. Notice
that, when the last packet of a transfer is lost, the receiver remains in the
receive state until receiving the packet retransmitted by the sender. The
same applies for the last packet of a retransmission in the receive retrans.
state.
idle
sta
rt
receive
send
NACK
send
ACK
receive
retrans.
transfer ¬last pkt
last pkt
∧ ¬error
last pkt
∧ error last pkt
∧ error
last pkt ∧ ¬error
¬last pkt
last
pkt
Figure A.6.: The DMA ARQ state machine: receiver.
Notice that the transition loop in the receive and receive trans. states
can lead to a deadlock in case of a network failure – i.e., the transfer does
not finish and prevents other transfers to take place. Although a second
transfer in presence a network failure would most likely fail, the detection
of the network conditions is relevant. Just as in any ARQ-based protocol,
the network conditions can and should be monitored in order to detect
unrecoverable errors, such as permanent faults or transient faults with
static effects, and to detect error scenarios that lead to a timing violation,
such as in the case of error rates higher than expected.
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